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For Sale of Business, 6ee Contracts ; Fraud.
, Not to Engage in Practice, see Contracts.
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In Civil Case, see Evidence.
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Hospital, see Hospitals.
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Police Surgeon, see Municipal Corporations.
Prison Physician, see Prisons.
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For Matters Relating to — {continued)
Sale or Prescription :
Of Intoxicating Liqnor, see Internal Revenue ; Intoxicating Liquors.
Of Poisonous Drug, see Poisons.
Testimony of Physician :
At Coroner's Inquest, see Witnesses.
In Action For Personal Injury, see Damages.
I. DEFINITIONS.1 . .
A. Physician. The word " physician" is defined to mean a person who lias
received the degree of doctor of medicine from an incorporated institution ; one
1. "Animal magnetism " see Parks V. State,
159 Ind. 211, 226, 64 N. E. 862, 59 L. R. A.
190.
Bone-setting see infra, II, C, 1, a, (I),
(a) , note 30.
" Cancer doctor " see Musser v. Chase, 29
Ohio St. 577, 585.
Certificate see infra, II, B, 2.
" Christian science " explained see Matter
of Brush. 35 Misc. (N. Y.) 689, 695, 72 N. Y.
Suppl. 421, per Fitzgerald, Surrogate. See
infra, II, C, 1, a, (II).
Clairvoyance see infra, II, C, 1, a, (I),
(A), note 29.
Electrical treatment see infra, II, C, 1, a,
(I), (A), note 29.
" Emergency " see infra, II, B, 6, a, note
18.
Empiric see Musser v. Chase, 29 Ohio St.
577, 582.
Eye specialist see infra, II, C, 1, a, (IV),
(b) ." Fair or reasonable knowledge or skill "
see Jones r. Angell, 95 Ind. 376, 382.
" Fair " skill sec Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind.
376, 382.
" Healers " defined see 21 Cyc. 381.
"Healing act" defined see 21 Cyc. 381.
Healing art see infra, II, C, 1, a, (I), (b)." Homeopathic " defined see N. J. Gen. St.
(1895) p. 2083. § 16.
"Homeopathic specific" defined see 21 Cvc.
447.
" Hypnotism " see Parks v. State, 159 Ind.
211, 226, 64 X. E. 862, 59 L. R. A. 190.
License see infra, II, B, 2.
" Magnetic healer " see infra, ll, C, 1, a,
(IV). (A), note 38. See also Territory v.
Newman, (N. M. 1905) 79 Pnc. 813, 814." Magnetic healing " see Territory f. New
man, (N. M. 1905) 79 Pac. 813, '815. See
also Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 226, 64
N. E. 862, 59 L. R. A. 190.
" Massage " see Territory v. Newman,
(N. M. 1905) 79 Pac. 813. 815." Medical " defined see 27 Cvc. 465. See
also Territory r. Newman, (N. M. 1905) 79
Pac. 706. 707.
" Medical attendance " defined see 27 Cyc.
465 note 7.
"Medical attendant" see 27 Cyc. 465
note 7.
" Medical college " sec 27 Cyc. 465 note 7.
"Medical college in good standing" see
Territory v. Newman, (N. M. 1905) 79 Pac.
813, 815.
Medical examiners see infra, II, B, 2, a,
(ni), (B). ' \" Medical or surgical assistance " see 27
Cvc. 465 note 7.
'"Medical treatment" see 27 Cye. 465
note 7.
" Medicine " defined see 27 Cyc. 466 ; and
infra, II, C, 1, a, (i), (a)." Medicine and surgery " see infra, II, C,
1, a, (i), (a).
" Metaphysical healing " see State t'. Taft,
20 R. I. 645, 40 Atl. 758.
Midwifery see infra, II, C, 1, a, (v). See
also Territory v. Newman, (N. M. 1905) 79
Pac. 813, 814.
" No cure no pay " contract see infra, V.
A, 7.
Obstetrics see infra, II, C, 1, a, (v).
Oculist see infra, II, C, 1, a, (IV), (B).
"Operation" defined see 29 Cyc. 1497.
" Ordinary knowledge and skill " see Jones
v. Angell, 95 Ind. 370, 382.
"Other agency" see infra, II, C, 1, a,
(II), note 33.
" Practice of medicine and surgery " sec
infra, II, C, 1, a, (i), (a) ; and 27 Cyc. 468
note 19. " The practice of medicine includes
the application and use of medicines and
drugs for the purpose of curing, mitigating,
or alleviating bodily diseases." Bouvier L.
Diet, [quoted in Territory v. Newman, (N. M.
1905) 79 Pac. 813, 814]. "The practice oi
surgery is limited to manual operations usu
ally performed by surgical instruments or
appliances." Bouvier L. Diet, [tpioted in
Territory v. Newman, (N. M. 1905) 79 Pac.
813, 814]. "'The practice of medicine'
. . . means ( 1 ) to open an office for the
practice of medicine; or (2) to announce
to the public or to any individual, in any
way, a desire or willingness or readiness to
treat the sick or afflicted, or investigate or
diagnose, or offer to investigate or diagnose,
any physical or medical ailments or disease
of any person; or (3) to suggest, recommend,
prescribe, or direct for the use of any person
any drug, medicine, appliance, or other
agency, whether material or not materia,
for the use, relief, or palliation of any ail
ment or disease of the mind or body, or tie
cure or relief of any wound, fracture, or
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lawfully engaged in the practice of medicine.2 The word in its popular sense
means one who professes or practises medicine, or the healing art ; a doctor of
medicine.3 The term includes all who practise physic or surgery and is not
eeived or with the intent to receive therefor,
either directly or indirectly, any bonus, gift,
or compensation." Territory r. Newman,
(N. M. 1!)05) 79 Pac. 700." Practising medicine " see infra, II, C, 2,
a, (I), note 64. "Any person shall be held,
on practising medicine, surgery, or obstet
rics, to be a physician ... or who shall pub
licly profess to be a physician, surgeon, or
obstetrician, or assume their duties, or who
shall make a practice of prescribing, or pre
scribing and furnishing, medicine for the
sick, or who shall publicly profess to cure or
heal." Iowa Code (1807)*, § 2579 [quoted in
State r. Edmunds, 127 Iowa 333, 335, 101
N. VV. 431].
" Profession " see Lawson v. Conawav, 37
VV. Va. 159, 163, 16 S. E. 564, 38 Am. St.
Kep. 17. 18 L. R. A. 627.
"Professor" see infra, II, C, 1, a, (rv),
(a) .
" Reasonable " skill see Kendall v. Brown,
74 111. 232, 237; Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. 376,
382.
"Reputable" see infra, II, B, 2, a, (in).,
(b) , (3), (b).
2. Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in Harrison e.
State, 102 Ala. 170, 173, 15 So. 563; Terri
tory f. Newman, (N. M. 1905) 79 Pac. 813,
814].
In England physicians are a class of per
sons who have a diploma from a college of
physicians and are entitled to the honorary
distinction of doctor of medicine. See Gra
ham r. Gautier, 21 Tex. Ill, 117; Hunter t.
Clare, [1899] 1 Q. B. 635, 641. 63 J. P. 308,
68 L. J. Q. B. 278, 80 L. T. Rep. N. S. 197,
47 Wkly. Rep. 394.
By statute a physician or surgeon has been
defined to be one who prescribes or ad
ministers medicine for, or in any manner
treats, diseases or wounds, for pav
"
(Rich
ardson f. State, 47 Ark. 502, 504", 2 S, W.
187) ; "a person skilled in both medicine and
Rurgery" (Minn. Rev. Laws (1905). 88 2295-
2300 [quoted in Goss f. Goss, 102 Minn. 346,
351, 113 N. W. 690].
3. Worcester Diet, [quoted in Harrison v.
State, 102 Ala. 170, 173, 15 So. 563; Whlt-
lock v. Com., 89 Va. 337, 338, 15 S. E.
893],
Other definitions arc : " One authorized to
prescribe remedies for and treat diseases; a
doctor of medicine." Webster Diet, [quoted
in Sutton v. Facev, 1 Mich. 243, 247 ; State V.
McMinn, 118 N* C. 1259, 1201, 24 S. E.
523].
" One who practices the art of healing dis
ease and preserving health; a prescriber of
remedies for sickness and disease." State c.
Beck, 21 R. I. 288, 291, 43 Atl. 300, 45
L. R. A. 269.
"One qualified and authorized to prescribe
remedies for diseases." Prowitt r. Denver,
11 Colo. App. 70, 52 Pac. 280. 287.
"One skilled in both medicine and sur
gery." Cashier r. Sliker, 33 N. J. L. 507,
510.
" One who is versed in medical science, a
branch of which is surgery." Goss e. Goss,
102 Minn. 340, 351, 113 N. W. 090.
Synonymous terms. — " Doctor," " person
practising medicine," and " physician " are
often used as synonymous and interchange
ably. Harrisoa'r. State, 102 Ala. 170, 172,
15 So. 503. See also Corsi t. Maretzek, 4
E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 1, 7." County physician " see People v. Shearer,
143 Cal. 66, 67, 76 Pac. 813.
"Doctor" see infra, II, C, 1, a, (iv), (a).
"Dr." see infra, II, C, 1, a, (iv), (a),
note 38.
" Employee " as including a physician see
15 Cyc. 1033 text and note 57.
" Family physician " defined see 19 Cyc.
455.
" Itinerant doctors " see Cherokee v. Per
kins, 118 Iowa 405, 407, 92 N. W. 68.
" Itinerant physicians " see Cherokee v. Per
kins, 118 Iowa 405, 406, 92 N. W. 68. See
also Iowa Code (1897), § 2579 [quoted in
State f. Edmunds, 127 Iowa 333, 335, 101
N. W. 431]. An itinerant physician has been
defined to be one who travels from place to
place, pursuing his vocation in an itinerant
method. Hairston r. State, 36 Tex. Cr. 470,
471, 37 S. W. 858. Under the Iowa code
defining an itinerant physician as a physi
cian practising medicine, or professing to
heal diseases by any medicine, appliance, or
method, who goes from place to place, a non
resident who goes from place to place, pro
fessing to cure diseases by dieting his pa
tients, prescribing exercises, and furnishing
them with glasses, is an itinerant physician.
State f. Edmunds, 127 Iowa 333, 335, 101
N. W. 431.
" Laborer " does not include a physician.
Weymouth v. Sanborn, 43 N. H. 171, 173, 80
Am. Dec. 144.
" M. D." see 26 Cyc. 1606.
" Physicians in good standing " see Lawson
e. Conawav, 37 W. Va. 159, 163, 16 S. E.
564, 38 Am. St. Rep. 17, 18 L. R. A. 627.
" Regular physician " see Bradbury v. Bar-
din, 35 Conn. 577, 581.
Specialist traveling from place to place. —
A physician residing in one town and main
taining an office in another, in which he
practises medicine as a specialist, is not a
specialist traveling from place to place,
within the meaning of Sp. Sess. Laws (1897),
p. 51, subd. 13, requiring a physician travel
ing from place to place as a specialist to pay
an occupation tax. Adams v. State, 45 Tex.
Cr. 500, 78 S. W. 935; Broilcs v. State, (Tex.
Cr. App. 1902) 08 S. W. 085; Hairston v.
State. 30 T:>x. Cr. 470, 37 S. W. 858.
" Tradesmen " as including a physician see
Woodfleld r. Cnlzey, 47 Ga. 121, 124." Traveling physician " see Adams v. State,
45 Tex. Cr. 500, 507, 78 S. W. 935.
ft A]
1546 [30 Cye.] PII YS/CIA VS AVD SURGEOMS
limited to any one school of practitioners. . It therefore includes a homeopath."
In its broad sense the term “physician * includes a dentist,” but it has been held
that a dentist is not a “physician or surgeon” within the meaning o
f
those words








A surgeon is a practitioner who treats injuries, deformities, or
A veterinary surgeon is a person lawfully
practising the art o




Dentist. A dentist is a dental surgeon;” one who performs manual or
mechanical operations to preserve teeth, to cleanse, extract, insert, o
r repair them."
E
. Surgery. Surgery is a branch of medical science.” It is limited to
manual operations usually performed b
y
surgical instruments o











his contractual relations with his patient.”
G
. Osteopathy. Osteopathy is defined as a method o
f treating diseases o
f
the human body without the use o
f drugs, by means o
f manipulations *.to various nerve centers— chiefl





















. People r. De France, 104 Mich. 563, 62




139 (holding that a
dentist is not a surgeon within a statute pro
viding that communications to persons au.
thorized to practise medicine o
r surgery shall
b









that a dentist is not a physician o
r surgeon
within a statute exempting a practitioner o
f
medicine o
r surgery from jury duty); State
v
. McMinn, 118 N. C





(holding that a dentist is not a physician
within a statute protecting one who sells
intoxicating liquor on Sunday on the pre
scription of a physician). See also Cherokee
v
. Perkins, 118 Iowa 405, 92 N. W. 68.
7. Standard Dict.
A surgeon is a physician who treats bodily
injuries and ills by manual operations and
the use o
f surgical instruments and appli
ances. Goss v
. Goss, 102 Minn. 346, 351, 113
N. W. 600.
In England a surgeon is a practitioner who
holds a diploma from the Royal College o
f
Surgeons, but who has not the degree o
f
M. D. See Standard Dict.
“Itinerant surgeons " see Cherokee v. Per
kins, 118 Iowa 405, 406, 92 N. W. 68.
The word “physician” includes not only
doctors who administer medicine and physic,
but surgeons, who, by a knowledge o
f
the na
ture and structure o
f
the human system, are
able to amputate an injured and diseased
limb, o
r
to extract a ball with skill and as
much safety to life and as little pain as the






. Lyford r. Martin, 79 Minn. 243, 244, 82
N. W. 470.










State r. Beck, 21 R
.
I. 288, 293, 43 Atl.
366, 45 L. R
.
A. 269.
10. People r. De France, 104 Mich. 563.
570, 6













See also infra, II, C
, l, b.
“Physician" as including a dentist see
In re Hunter, 60 N
.
C
. 372,373. As not in
cluding a dentist see People r. De France,
104 Mich. 563, 570, 62 N
.




139; State v. McMinn, 118 N. C
.
1259, 1261,





r. Massachusetts General Hospi







Surgery is therapy o
f
a distinctly opera
tive kind. Stewart v. Raab, 55 Minn. 20, 21,
56 N. W. 256.
12. Nelson v. State Bd. o




W. 501, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 438,
50 L. R. A. 383.
13. Tucker r. Gillette, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct.
664, 670, 1
2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 401; Town r.
Archer, 4 Ont. L. Rep. 383,387. -
Malpractice defined elsewhere see 26 Cyc.
121.
“Maltreatment" defined see 26 Cyc. 121.
14. Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 229, 64




190. See also infra,
II, C, l, a, (III).
The practice o
f osteopathy consists prin
cipally in rubbing, pulling, and kneading with
the hands and fingers certain portions o
f
the
body, and flexing and manipulating the limbs
o
f
those afflicted with disease, the object of




trouble. Little v. State, 60 Nebr.
749, 751, 8





See also Nelson v. State Bd. o
f Health, 108




. 383; State r. Liffring, 61 Ohio
St. 30, 55 N
.
E
. 168, 76 Am. St. Rep. 358, 46
L. R
.
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H. Ophthalmology. Ophthalmology is the science which treats of the
physiology, anatomy, and diseases of the eye.”
II
. Right to PRACTISE MEDICINE AND SURGERY."
A
.
Power to Regulate Practice. It is well settled that under the police
power inherent in the state, the legislature may enact reasonable regulations for
the examination and registration o
f physicians, and the practice o
f
medicine and
surgery," and such statutes violate neither the federal nor the state constitutions.”





“Physician" in the statutes in reference
to the practice o
f
medicine does not include
an osteopath, a
s osteopathy teaches neither
therapeutics, materia medica, surgery, nor
bacteriology, but rests entirely upon manipu
lation o
f
the body for the cure of disease.
Nelson v. State Ba. o




W. 501, 504, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 438, 441,
50 L. R. A. 383.
15. State v. Yegge, 19 S. D
.
234, 235, 103
N. W. 17, 18, 69 L. R
.
A. 504. -
“Ophthalmoscope" defined see 29 Cyc.
1499.
16. Injunction against board o
f
health in
relation to physicians see INJUNCTIONs, 22
Cyc. 881 note 73.
17. Arkansas.- State v. McCrary, (1906)
92 S
. W. 775; Thompson v. Van Lear, 77










District of Columbia.- Czarra r. Board of
Medical Sup’rs, 25 App. Cas. 443.
Indiana.- State r. Webster, 150 Ind. 607,
50 N. E. 750, 4
l L. R. A. 212.
Michigan.— People r. Reetz, 127 Mich. 87,




amining Board, 32 Minn. 324, 20 N
.
W. 238,
50 Am. Rep. 575. .
Montana.- State v. First Judicial Dist.
Ct. Dept. No. 2
,
26 Mont. 121, 66 Pac. 754.
Nebraska.- Lincoln Medical College r.
Poynter, 60 Nebr. 228, 82 N. W. S55, hold
ing that the law governing the practice o
f
medicine and authorizing the state board o
f
health to issue certificates to physicians and
surgeons is a police measure, and was not
intended to protect medical schools o
r
medi
cal practitioners from competition in busi
ness.
New Mexico.— In re Roe Chung, 9 N. M.
130, 49 Pac. 952. -





Ohio.— State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73
N. E. 1063.
Pennsylvania.- Com. v. Wilson, 6 Pa. Dist.
628, 1
9 Pa. Co. Ct. 521; Com. r. Densten, 30
Pa. Super. Ct. 631.
United States.— Dent r. West Virginia,
129 U. S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 231, 32 L. ed. 623.
See 3









which the state may
impose such conditions as it deems advisable.
State v. Edmunds, 127 Iowa 333, 101 N. W.
431; Allopathic State Bd. o
f
Medical Ex
aminers v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So.
800.
An act forbidding physicians and surgeons
to solicit patients through paid agents is a
valid police regulation. State c. McCreary,
(Ark. 1906) 92 S. W. 775; Thompson v. Van






a state to enact such laws
proceeds from its inhereºt power to prescribe
such rules as will protect the health and
safety o
f
the people. Driscoll r. Com., 93
Ky. 393, 20 S. W. 431, 703, 14 Ky. L. Rep.
376; State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43




119 ; State r. State
Medical Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20
N
.
W. 238, 50 Am. Rep. 575; Com. v. Irving,
1 Leg. Chron. (Pa.) 60; Antle r. State, 6
Tex. App. 202.
-
Statutes liberally construed.— A statute
imposing a fine o
r imprisonment on one prac
tising medicine without a license is to be
liberally construed, so as to reasonably ef
fectuate its purpose to prevent fraud, and to
conserve the public health. State v. Oredson,
96 Minn. 509, 105 N. W. 188.
18. Alabama.- Bragg v. State, 134 Ala.
165, 3
2







McNulty, 77 Cal. 164,
1
9 Pac. 237, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257.
Indiana.--Spurgeon r. Rhodes, 167 Ind. 1
,
'78 N. E. 228.
Iowa.- State r. Kendig, 133 Iowa 164,
110 N. W. 463; State r. Wilhite, 132 Iowa
226, 100 N. W. 730.
Kansas.- State v. Creditor, 44 Kan. 565,
24 Pac. 346, 21 Am. St. Rep. 306.




. W. 427, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 685.
Maine.— State r. Bohemier, 96 Me. 257, 52
Atl. 643.
Minnesota.- State r. State Medical Ex
amining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238, 50
Am. Rep. 575.
-
Montana.— State r. First Judicial Dist.
Ct., 26 Mont. 121, 66 Pac. 754.
Ohio.— State r. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73




835; State r. Morrill, 7 Ohio S. & C. Pl.
Dec. 52, 5 Ohio N. P
.





Pl. Dec. 265, 4 Ohio N. P.
195.
Pennsylvania.— Com. r. Tensten, 217 Pa.
St. 423, 66 Atl. 653; Com. v. Taylor, 2 Kulp
364.
- -
Tennesser — O'Neil r. State, 115 Tenn. 427,
90 S
.
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tisti y.19 The authority of the legislature does not cud with declaring what quali
fications he who enters upon the practice of that profession shall possess. As it
has plenary power over the whole subject, it alone must be the judge of what is
expedient, both as to the qualifications required and as to the method of ascer
taining those qualifications.80 The only limit to the legislative power in pre
scribing conditions to the right to practise is that they shall be reasonable;21 and
whether they are reasonable the courts must j ulge.88 If the regulations and con
ditions are adopted in good faith, and they operate equally upon all who desire to
practise and who possess the required qualifications,83 and if they are appropriate
to the end in view, to wit, the protection of the public, and attainable by reason
able study or application,84 then the fact that the conditions mav be rigorous
will not render the legislation invalid. In the enactment of legislation of this
character the legislature may take account of the advance of learning, and impose
new conditions and qualifications as increased knowledge may suggest ;x and to
make such legislation effective, one having an established practice and one con
templating practising may be required to conform to the same standard of
qualification.86
B. Requirements — 1. In General. The qualifications prescribed by the sev
eral states to entitle one to enter upon the practice of medicine and snrgery may
be generally classified as follows : (1) The candidate must have a diploma from a
medical college in good standing, and, in addition, must pass a satisfactory exami
nation before a board of examiners. (2) The candidate must pass a satisfactory
examination as in the first class, but is not required to have a diploma. (3) The
Wisconsin.— State v. Currens, 111 Wis.
431, 87 N. W. 561, 56 L. B. A. 252.
United Stales.— Dent r. West Virginia,
129 U. S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 2.31, 32 L. ed. 623.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," f 2. See also Constitutional
Law, 8 Cyc. 900 note 837, 1046 note 91,
1055 note 73.
Such a statute is not prohibitive in it)
effect, and therefore void, but merely regu
lates the practice. Little i\ State, GO Xebr.
749. 84 X. W. 248, 51 L. R. A. 717.
19. Gosnell e. State, 52 Ark. 228, 12 S. W.
392; Ex p. Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 77 Pac.
879; Kettles r. People, 221 111. 221. 77 N. E:
472; State r. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43
X. W. 789, 6 L. R. A. 119; State v. Chap
man, 69 X. J. L. 464, 55 Atl. 94 [affirmed
in 70 X. ,T. L. 339, 57 Atl. 1133] ; Com. v.
Gibson, 7 Pa. Dist. 386; State v. Sexton, 37
Wash. 110, 79 Pac. 634; In re. Thompson, 36
Wash. 377. 78 Pac. 899; State r. Dental Ex
aminers Bd.. 31 Wash. 402. 72 Pac. 110.
20. Gosnell v. State, 52 Ark. 228, 12 S. W.
392; Wilkins r. State, 113 Ind. 514, 16 X. E.
192; State r. Creditor, 44 Kan. 565, 24 Pac.
346, 21 Am. St. Rep. 300; Dent r. West Vir
ginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 S. Ct. 231, 32 L. ed.
023.
21. State (i. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43
X. W. 789, 6 L. R. A. 119.
If a condition is clearly arbitrary and ca
pricious; if no reason with reference to the
end in view can be assigned for it ; and espe
cially if it appears that it must have been
adopted for some other purpose — such as to
favor or benefit some person or class of per
sons — it will be held unreasonable and be
yond the power of the legislature to impose.
State r. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43 X. W.
789, 6 L. R. A. 119; State v. Gravett, 65
Ohio St. 289, 62 N. E. 325, 87 Am. St. Rep.
605, 55 L. R. A. 791.
" Managing " dental business as distin
guished from " practising." — A statute in so
far as it requires examination by and a
license from a dental board before one may
" own, run, or manage " a dental office, as
distinguished from the actual practice of den
tistry, is not a proper exercise of the police
power, but is unconstitutional. State r.
Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 Pac. 635. 107 Am.
St. Rep. 798. 08 L. R. A. 839. See also
Saunders t. Taylor, 5 Lack. Leg. X. (Pa.)
153.
22. State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 4S
N. W. 789, 6 L. R. A. 119.
23. State v. Chapman, 69 X. J. L,. 464, 55
Atl. 94; State v. Creditor, 44 Kan. 565, 24
Pac. 346, 21 Am. St. Rep. 306.
If the statutes do not discriminate between
the different schools of medicine, but merely
exact that the practitioner of whatever school
shall have a certificate from the board of
medical examiners, and shall exercise the
skill usually possessed by practitioners in
good standing of that school, they are valid.
State v. Heath. 125 Iowa 585, 101 X. W.
429; Stone r. State, 48 Tex. Cr. 114, 86 S, W.
1029.
24. State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 4J
X. W. 789, 6 L. R. A. 119; State r. Currens,
111 Wis. 431, S7 N. W. 561, 56 L. K. A. 252;
Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 S. Ct
231, 32 L. ed. 623.
25. State r. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289. 62
X. E. 325, 87 Am. St. Rep. 005, 55 L K. A.
791} Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114,
9 S. Ct. 231, 32 L. ed. 623.
26. State v. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289, 62
X. E. 325, 87 Am. St. Rep. COS, 55 L. R. A
791.
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candidate may either present an acceptable diploma, or, if he has no diploma, he may
be examined a9 to his qualifications. (4) The applicant must hold a diploma issued
by a reputable medical college, whichmust be satisfactorily shown to belong to him.27
2. License or Certificate — a. In General — (i) Necessity— {a) In General.
Formerly no license or certificate was required of a person who undertook the
practice of medicine. A diploma of an incorporated medical college was looked
upon as furnishing the necessary qualification for a person to engage in the prac
tice of such profession. The result was that many persons engaged in the practice
of medicine who had acquired no scientific knowledge with reference to the char
acter of diseases or of the ingredients of drugs that they administered, some of
whom imposed npon the public by purchasing diplomas from fraudulent concerns
and advertising tiiem as real. This resulted in the adoption of statutes upon the
subject, and now in most of the states the medical laws provide that, before any
person can practise medicine in any of its departments in the state, he must apply
tor and receive a certificate of qualification or license from the state board of
medical examiners.'8 A license and a certificate have been held not to bo the
same thing.*9 A statute providing that no person, unless previously registered or
licensed to practise medicine or dentistry, "shall begin" the practice of medicine
or dentistry without obtaining a license is applicable to one who continued after
the act took effect, an illegal practice previously begun.80 '•
■
(b) In County of Residence or Practice. Under some statutes a physician
or dentist, changing his residence from one county to another, must obtain a new
license in the county where he proposes to reside, and it is unlawful for him to
practise in snch county without such license.31 Under other statutes a license
from any board of the state will entitle the bolder to practise throughout the state.35
27. Taylor Physicians 10, 11. See also the
statutes of the several states; these will be
found epitomized in " Laws Regulating the
Practice of Medicine in United States and
Elsewhere," published by the American Med
ical Association.
, 28. See the statutes of the several states.
And see Harding v. People, 10 Colo. 387, 15
Pac. 727; Dowdell r. McBride, 18 Tex. Civ.
App. 645, 45 S. \V. 397 (holding that under
Rev. St. (1805) tit. 82, providing for the
appointment of boards of examiners, whose
certificates shall entitle the holder to prac
tise medicine, a compliance with the law is
necessary to enable one to practise medicine,
although an express provision to that effect
contained in a former enactment on the sub
ject is not contained in the later statute) ;





In Alabama Code (1880), §§ 1296-1298
provide that a graduate of a medical college
in the United States, whose diploma is ret
corded, may practise medicine without a
license in any county having only a medical
board established by the county commis
sioners; but where there is a board of medi
cal examiners, organized according to the
constitution of the state medical association,
and in affiliation with it, a license or" cer
tificate of qualification from such board is
necessary. Section 4071 provides for the
punishment of any person practicing medi
cine without a lii cnse, diploma, or certificate,
or who is not " a regular graduate of a
medical college of this State, having had his
diploma legally recorded." It was held that
a graduate of a medical college of another
state whose diploma is' recorded is not in
dictable for practising without license or cay*
tificate from a board of medical examiners in
the county, organized under or in affiliation
with the state association. Stough f. State,
88 Ala. 234, 7 So. 150; Brooks p. State, 88
Ala. 122, 6 So. 902. :<••'.
In Kentucky the law of May 10, 1886, re
quiring eveTV person desiring to practise den
tistry to obtain a certificate of qualification
from the board of examiners elf the Kentucky
Dental Association, was not repealed bv the
law of May 1
,
1893 (St. § 459), requir
ing such a certificate to be obtained by those
who desire to begin the practice after tfhat
date, and requiring all persons theretofore
holding such certificates to have them regis
tered ; and therefore one who now practises
dentistry without having obtained such a cer
tificate may be punished therefor, although
he began the practice prior to Mav 1
,
1893.
Com. r. Rash.im, 101 Kv. 170, 40 S. W. 253,
19 Kv. L. Rep. 336;
29.
"
Nelson v. State, 97 Ala. 79, 12 So. 421.
"Certificate" defined see 6 Cyc. 728.
'VLicense " defined see Licenses, 25 Cvc.
597.
30. Kettles v. People, 221 111. 221, 77 N. E.
472: Hooper v. Hatdorff, 141 Mich. 358j 104
N. W. 607.
31. Mavfield v. Nale, 26 Ind. App. 240, 59
V. E. 415.
In other words a person engaged in the
practice of medicine must procure a license
in each cotintv 'where he practises. Orr r.
Meek, 111 Ind'. 40, 11 "N. E. 7«7.
32. Derrick p. State, 34 Tex. Cr. 21, 28
S. W. 818.
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(n) Sufficiency. Under a statute requiring a license from eouic chartered
8cIiool, state board of medical examiners, or medical society, neither a certificate
showing that the holder has passed a limited course of study, nor a limited com
mission for the practice of medicine within a,, limited sphere, is sufficient.0
Where a statute requiring an applicant to obtain a license or certificate further
requires that such license or certificate sliall be indorsed or countersigned by a
particular officer before it shall become valid, a license or certificate not so
indorsed or countersigned is insufficient to authorize the holder to practise
medicine.31
(hi) Authority to Issue — (a) In General. The power of the legislature
to require an applicant to pass an examination and obtain a license as a condition
to his right to practise medicine in the state includes the right to select the par
ticular agency to whom the duty of conducting the examination and granting the
license shall be delegated.35
(b) Medical Hoards — (1) In General.' This agency is usually called the
state medical board or board of medical examiners. Where the statute does not
require that the different schools. of medicine shall be represented on the board,
its composition cannot affect its jurisdiction or the legality of its acts.36 A statute
creating such a board to be composed of members of a particular school of medi
cine is not unconstitutional on the ground .of discrimination.87 Nor is an act
unconstitutional in not providing that each school of medicine should be repre
sented by equal numbers on the board.33 . The fact that the board was not regu
larly organized is immaterial j39 if it is the de facto board its certificate protects
the holder from prosecution.'10; • '
•
(2) Nature of Power. The authority of a state medical or dental board in
granting or refusing licenses to applicants, or in passing on the reputability of
colleges, is neither legislative nor judicial, but quasi-judicial, involving the exerci^
of judgment and discretion.41 The ascertainment and determination of qualifica-
33. People v. Fulda, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 65, 4
N. Y. Snppl. 945, holding that neither a cer
tificate from a medical school in Prussia that
defendant had there passed a limited course
of study, nor a commission, after examina
tion therefor, as a medical officer in a regi
ment in the volunteer army, is such a license
to practice medicine as is required by Pen.
Code, § 350.
34. Brooks t;. State, 146 Ala. 153, 41 So.
156 (requirement that all medical certificates
issued by county boards of examiners be
countersigned by tlie Benior censor of the
state medical association) ; Nicholson v.
State, 100 Ala. 132, 14 So. 746 (requirement
that certificate be indorsed and sealed by
probate judge and recorded).
35. Allopathic State Bd. of Medical Ex
aminers v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So.
809; Weeden r. Arnold, 5 Okla. 578, 40 Pac.
915. holding that the superintendent of pub
lic health of the territory of Oklahoma is
the proper officer to issue a license to an
applicant as a practising physician, and it is
not the duty of the board of public health to
issue such license.
36. Iowa Eclectic Medical College Assoc. P.
Schrader, 87 Iowa 659, 55 X. W. 24, 20
L. R. A. 355.
37. Allopathic State Bd. of Medical Ex
aminers v. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So.
809; Dowdell v. McBride, 92 Tex. 239. 47
fi. W. 524; Kenedv «. Schultz, 6 Tex. Civ.
App. 461, 25 S. W.-667.
38. Brown r. People, 11 Colo. 109, 17 Pac.
104.
39. Bragg r. State, 134 Ala. 165, 32 So.
767, 58 L. R. A. 925.
Failure to appoint members within time
limited. — Failure of the governor to appoint
the members of a- board of medical examiners
within one month after the passage of the
act creating such board, as required thereby,
does not invalidate the appointments subse
quently made, since the requirement as to
time is merely directorv. People v. Has-
brouck. 11 Utah 291, 39 Pac. 918.
Failure to notify member of tune and place
of organization.— Under an act to regulate
the practice of medicine, which does not im
pose on any member of the board of medical
examiners the duty of notifying the others of
the time and place of organization of the
board, a failure to give such notice to a
member will not afford sufficient ground to
restrain the board, when organized, from dis
charging its proper functions under the law
as a board of examiners. Howard r. Parker.
49 Tex. 236.
40. Bragg r. State, 134 Ala, 165, 32 So.
767, 58 L. R. A. 925; Brown V. People. 11
Colo. 109, 17 Pac. 104.
41. California.— Van Vleck V. State Bd.
of Dental Examiners, (1897) 48 Pac. 223.
Idaho.— Raaf t.\ Stete Bd. of Medical Ex
aminers, 11 Ida. 707, 84 Pac. 33.
Illinois. — People p. Illinois State Bd. of
Dental Examiners, 110 111. 180.
[II, B, 2, a, (ii)]
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS [SO Cyc] 1551
tions to practise medicine by a board of experts appointed for that purpose is not
the exercise of "judicial power," as that phrase is used in conferring judicial
power upon specified courts,42 although the statute provides for an appeal there
from;43 and therefore a statute authorizing a state medical board to ascertain and
determine the qualifications of applicants to practise medicine is not unconstitu
tional as conferring judicial power on the board.41
(3) Authority and Powers — (a) In General. A state medical board has
full authority to prescribe rules and regulations governing the issuance of certifi
cates of medical practitioners.45 An existing board, however, has no power to
review the action of a former board.4*
(b) To Determine Reputability of Institution Granting Diploma.47 The require
ment that a medical or dental board shall issue to the holder of a diploma a cer
tificate entitling him to practise medicine or dentistry is almost universally upon
the express condition that the diploma shall be from a
" reputable " institution, or
an institution "in good standing." Whether a college be reputable or in good
standing is not a legal question but a question of fact,48 and is usually left to the
judgment and discretion of the state medical or dental board,49 unless the status
Kansas.— Meffert Cv State Bd. of Medical
Registration, etc., 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247,
1 L. R. A. N. S. 811.
Tfew Hampshire.— Brown r. Grenier. 73
N. H. 426, 02 Atl. 590.
Tennessee. — Williams r. State Bd. of Den
tal Examiners, 93 Tenn. 619, 27 S. W.
1019.
Wisconsin.— State r. Chittenden, 127 Wis.
468, 107 N. W. 500.
42. State «. Webster, 150 Ind. 607. 50
N. E. 750, 41 L. R. A. 212; People v. Has-
brouck. 11 Utah 291, 39 Pac. 918.
43. State v. Webster. 150 Ind. 607, 50
N. E. 750, 41 L. R. A. 212.
44. Ex p. Whitley, 144 Cal. 167, 77 Pao.
879; People v. Hasbrouck, 11 Utah 2»1, 39
Pac. 918.
45. Brooks v. State, 146 Ala. 153, 41 So.
156.
It has power, by proper investigation, to
determine the identity of applicants, the
genuineness of diplomas, and whether they
were issued bv a school legally organized and
in good standing. Iowa Eclectic Medical Col
lege Assoc. r. Schrader, 87 Iowa. 659. 55
N. W. 24, 20 L. R. A. 355. The power re
lates to reasonable administration of matters
appertaining to the public welfare, not to
interferences with the internal management
of medical or dental colleges. State r. Chit
tenden. 127 Wis. 468, 107 X. W. 500. Com
pare Iowa Eclectic Medical College Assoc. r.
Schrader, 87 Iowa 659, 55 N. W. 24, 20
L. R. A. 355, holding that the board has
power to adopt a schedule of requirements as
to the qualifications of students on entering
a school, branches to be taught, how to be>
taught, length of course, and attendance, and
facilities for teaching. But it has been held
that the law does not authorize the board to
invade the private affairs of a medical or
dental college in respect to its Tates of tui
tion, or whether it shall grant concessions
from advertised rates, or by taking charge,
in invitum, of its examinations as to en
trance qualifications. State v. Chittenden.
127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500.
46. Miller v. Medical Bd., 33 Oreg. 5, 52
Pac. 763, holding that when a state board of
medical examiners, having power to grant a
license upon a diploma alone, have passed
upon the diploma of an applicant for a
license, refusing the same, and are succeeded
by a new and distinct board, not having the
power to license without an examination,
they cannot review, upon a second applica
tion, the decision of the former board, or
grant a license upon the diploma alone, With
out an examination.
47. Authority of medical college to confer
degrees or diplomas see Colleges and Uni
versities, 7 Cvc. 289.
48. People i. Illinois State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 110 111. 180.
. The word " reputable," as thus used, means
" reputable " in the general sense in which
the term is ordinarily used ; worthy of repute
or distinction, held in esteem, honorable,
praiseworthv. State v. Chittenden, 127 Wis.
468, 107 N.'W. 500; State t. Chittenden, 112
Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587. The board must
determine whether a diploma comes from a
reputable source as an independent fact, con
sidering the term " reputable " in its ordi
nary sense and measuring the character of
the college from the standpoint of men com
petent to judge thereof by reason of their
scientific attainments in the line of work for
which such a college stands. State r. Chit
tenden, 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587.
Reputability of a dental college relates to
that which will enable the college to do good
work, and the actual accomplishment; it is
distinct from other requisites as to a diploma
being r\ passport to the favor of the official
board as regards the issuance of a license.
It may or may not exist, and all the other
requisites be present. State r. Chittenden,
127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500. Marshall. J.,
delivering the opinion of the court.
49. Illinois.— Illinois State Bd. of Dental
Examiners v. People, 123 111. 227, 13 N. E.
201 ; People r. Illinois State Bd. of Dental
Examiners, 110 111. 180; Illinois State Bd. of
Health r. People. 102 111.App. 614.
[II, B, 2, a, (m), (b), (8), (b)]
1552 [socyc] PHYSICIANS AND SUBGEONS
of such schools and colleges is fixed by statute, in which case the board of examiners
has no discretion in regard to determining their reputability.50 Where the law
does not define the method by which the board shall proceed to determine the
reputability of a college, such board may perform its duty in that regard in any
reasonable way it may deem proper and the decision of the board in this regard
cannot be coerced or reversed by the courts, in the absence of arbitrary and oppres
sive conduct on the part of the board.52 The, board may adjudicate the status of
a medical college as to reputability either of its own motion, or ou petition of the
Missouri. — State v. Lutz, 136 Ho. 033, 38
S. W. 323.
Vew Jersey.— State c. Hudson County Bd.
of Health, 53 N. J. L. 594, 22 Atl. 226.
Ohio. — State v. Hygeia Medical College, CO
Ohio St. 122, 54 N.'E. SO.
Oregon. —Barmore v. State Bd. Medical Ex
aminers, 21 Oreg. 301, 28 Pae. 8, holding
that the board had a right to define the
words " medical institutions in good stand
ing" so as to include only those schools
that require for graduation at least three
regular sessions of six months each, extend
ing over a period of three years, and to make
a further rule that those examined must at
tain seventy-five per cent.
Tennessee. — Williams v. State Bd. of Den
tal Examiners, 93 Tenn. 619, 27 S. W.
1019.
Wisconsin.— State v. Chittenden, 112 Wis.
569, 88 N. W. 587.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 4.
The character of a school having been once
fairly determined by the board, when and
under what circumstances a reexamination of
the subject should be made must necessarily
rest solely in its discretion so long aa it
acts reasonablv. State r. Chittenden, 112
Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587.
Such power not unconstitutional — A stat
ute providing that no person shall be eligible
for examination by the state board of ex
aminers who shall not furnish satisfactory
evidence of having graduated from a reput
able college indorsed by the board of examin
ers is not open to the objection of uncon
stitutionally conferring arbitrary power on
the board of examiners to decide what col
leges are reputable (Ex p. Whitley, 144 Cal.
167, 77 Pac. 879), or to establish unreason
able rules and regulations ( Kettles v. Peo
ple, 221 111. 221, 77 N. E. 472).
Power non-delegable.— The discretionary
power of determining on the fitness of issu
ing a license for the practice of dentistry
to the graduates of reputable dental colleges,
vested in the state board of dental examiners
by the Illinois act regulating the practice of
dentistry, cannot be delegated by the state
board to the national association of dental
examiners, an association comi>osed mostly
of men residing outside of the state, and
holding a convention at the time in New
York. Illinois State Bd. of Dental Examin
ers f. People, 123 111. 227, 13 N. E. 201.
Burden of proof to show reputability.—
When a graduate of a dental college applies
to the state board nf dental examiners for
a license to practise his profession, the
burden of proof is on him to establish the
reputability of such college. State r. Chit
tenden. 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587.
What is not "medical college." —A college
which teaches osteopathy, a method of treat
ing diseases by kneading or manipulation of
the body, and does not teach surgery, bac
teriology, materia medica. or therapeutics,
is not a " medical college," within the mean
ing of Ky. St. § 2013, which requires the
state board of health to issue a certificate
to practise medicine to any reputable
physician who has a diploma from a repu
table medical college chartered under the
laws of this state, or from a reputable and
legally chartered medical college of some
other state or country, indorsed as such by
the state board of health. Nelson r. State
Bd. of Health, 108 Kv. 769. 57 S. W. 501,
22 Kv. L. Rep. 438, 50 L. R. A. 383.
50. Wise v. State Veterinary Bd., 138
Mich. 428, 101 N. W. 562.
An act prescribing the standard of scholar
ship to be maintained by medical schools,
whose diplomas the state board of medical
examiners should be authorized to accept, as
that prescribed from time to time by an
association composed of colleges devoted to
the work of preparing persons for the pro
fession, makes the standard sufficiently fixed,
definite, and certain. Em p. Gerino, 143 Cal.
412, 77 Pac. 100, 66 L. R. A. 249. Shaw, J.,
delivering tue opinion of the court.
51. State v. Chittenden, 112 Wis. 569, 88
N. W. 687.
The board cannot establish a rule of its
own by which reputability or good standing
shall be shown. State r. Lutz, 136 Mo. 633.
38 S. W. 323, holding that the question of
good standing cannot be made to depend
merely on whether the college has complied
with a resolution of the board requiring
every medical college, by a certain date, to
furnish the board with a list of its matricu
lates and the basis of their matriculation.
52. Williams v. State Bd. of Dental Ex
aminers, 93 Tenm 619, 27 S. W. 1019. See
also Illinois State Bd. of Dental Examiners
V. People, 20 111. App. 457, holding that the
discretion vested in the board of examiners
cannot be exercised arbitrarily for the gratifi
cation of feelings of malevolence, and for
the attainment of merely personal and sel
fish ends.
All questions in regard thereto may be
considered at rest till, by lapse of time or
otherwise, some reasonable ground exists for
believing that its character may probably
have changed. State v. Chittenden, 112 Wis.
509, 88 N. W. 587.
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college,53 and when it has once determined that question in favor of an applicant,
it cannot refuse him a license for arbitrary reasons of its own.54
(c) To Refuse License ok Certificate For Cause. Boards of medical exami
ners are generally authorized by statute to refuse certificates to individuals guilty
of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.55 But an applicant for a license who
possesses the requisite medical qualifications cannot be denied a license without
a hearing on the question of his character and conduct.56
(4)
Right to Review Decision of Board.57 State medical laws sometimes con
tain a provision authorizing resort to the courts for relief, either by way of appeal
or writ of review, against the action of a board of examiners in refusing a license to
an applicant.58 The law usually provides the manner of taking this appeal, but
failure to do so does not affect the right.59 Notice of the appeal should be served
upon a member of the board,60 and where the notice so served is sufficient, it is
immaterial whether the board was represented at the trial or not.61 The board,
when aggrieved by the decision of the district court, may appeal or move for a
new trial.62 Pending an appeal from a refusal to grant a license, the court has
no power to allow the applicant to practise.63 When no appeal is provided for by
statute, the medical or dental board, in passing on a question within its jurisdic
tion calling for the exercise of judgment, is supreme so long as it proceeds to a
53. State v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 107
N. W. 500.
54. Illinois State Bd. of Health v. People,
102 111. App. 614; Iowa Eclectic Medical
College Assoc. r. Schrader, 87 Iowa 059, 55
N. W. 24, 20 L. R. A. 355; Smith v. State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 115 Ky. 212, 67
S. W. 999, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 25; Boucher v.
State Bd. of Health, 19 R. I. 366, 33 Atl.
878.
55. See the statutes of the several states.
The term " unprofessional " does not con
template matters of mere professional ethics,
but is used convertibly with dishonorable.
State v. State Medical Examining Bd., 32
Minn. 324, 20 X. W. 238, 50 Am. Rep. 575.
56. State v. State Medical Examining Bd.,
32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238, 50 Am. Rep.
575 ; Gage t. New Hampshire Eclectic Medi
cal Soc, 63 N. H. 92, 56 Am. Re->. 492.
57. Injunction against medical examiners
see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 880 note 52.
58. See the statutes of the several states;
and cases cited infra, this section.
In Idaho the state medical law contains no
provision granting the right of appeal from
the action of the board of examiners in re
fusing a license to an applicant, but by the
terms of section 9 of the act [Laws (1899),
p. 348] it is provided that the action of the
board in refusing to grant a license under
the provisions thereof may be reviewed by
the district court on certiorari, provided pro
ceedings therefor be instituted within ten
davs after notice of such refusal. Raaf r.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 11 Ida. 707,
84 Pac. 33. By conferring this right, the
legislature has indicated an intention to limit
and confine the authority and jurisdiction of
the courts in considering the action of the
board to the procedure and scope of investi
gation and inquiry usually and ordinarily
pursued and exercised by the courts in the
issuance and consideration of writs of re
view. Raaf v. State Bd. of Medical Exam-
iners, supra. The language of the medical
act and the purposes and objects thereof pre
clude any inference that the legislature ever
intended that a disappointed applicant might
apply to the court and there have his answers
reexamined, marked, graded, and passed upon
as to their correctness by tbe court. Raaf v.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, supra.
Effect of succession of new board before
appeal. — The refusal to grant a license by a
state board of medical examiners, which has
been succeeded by a new and distinct board,
and which refusal was not appealed from as
permitted by law, cannot be reviewed on a
subsequent appeal from a decision of the
new board refusing a license to the same
partv. Miller v. Medical Bd., 33 Oreg. 5, 52
Pac. "763.
Refusal for incompetency. — When the right
to appeal is granted in
" all cases of the re
fusal or revocation of a certificate" by the
medical board, the right exists as well where
a certificate to practise medicine has been
refused by the board for incompetency as
where it has been refused for unprofessional,
dishonorable, or immoral conduct. State v.
First Judicial Dist. Ct., 19 Mont. 501, 48
Pac. 1104.
59. State r. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 19
Mont. 501, 48 Pac. 1104.
Judgment by consent. — A judgment on ap
peal to the circuit court, reversing a de
cision of the board of medical examiners,
cannot be sustained where entered
"
by agree
ment " of an attorney acting for the prose
cuting attorney without authority. In re
Coffin. 152 Ind. 439, 53 N. E. 458.*
60. State v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 27
Mont. 103. 69 Pac. 710.
61. State r. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 27
Mont. 103. 69 Pnc. 710.
62. State r. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 27
Mont. 103, 69 Pac. 710.
63. State r. First Judicial Dist. Ct.. Dept.
No. 2, 26 Mont. 121. 66 Pac. 754.
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reasonable conclusion on evidence bearing on such question.64 Mandamus will
issue, however, to compel action by the board when they fail or refuse to act, and
also in case of abuse of discretion.68
(iv) Registration — (a) Necessity. It is a common provision of medical
laws that physicians must register their licenses or certificates with some designated
county officer in order to be entitled to practise.66 Such a requirement is manda
tory upon all practitioners except such as may be expressly or impliedly exempted.67
If a civil and a penal statute respecting registration are irreconcilable, as where
they require registration with different officers, the penal provision is held
inoperative.68
(b) Time. A statute requiring registration to take place within a certain
time after the passage of the act must be strictly complied with, and registration
after the prescribed period has elapsed is ineffectual to bring one within the
protection of the statute.69 The period of limitation has been held to begin to
run from the time the law goes into effect, and not from the time of its approval™
An attempt to register under an act before it goes into effect is ineffectual.71
(c) Place. Under a statute requiring a practitioner to record his certificate in
the county where he resides or sojourns, he must, upon changing his domicile to
another county, furnish his certificate to the proper officer of the latter county for
record.72 But a statute requiring a physician to register in the county where he
is practising or intends to commence the practice has been held not to require a
physician who is duly registered and practising in one county to register in
another county, so as to authorize him to visit patients in such other county.73
64. Van Vleek r. State Bd. of Dental Ex
aminers, (CaL 1897) 48 Pac. 223; Kowen-
strot v. State, 0 Ohio S. & C. PI. Dee. 467, 4
Ohio N. P. 257; State v. Chittenden, 127
Wis. 4(i8, 107 N. \V. 500.
65. See Mandamus, 20 Cyc. 242.
66. See the statutes of the several states.
Municipal regulation.— While in the exer
cise of its police power a regulation requir
ing all persons practising medicine or sur
gery in a city to register as such would
prohably be valid, a regulation making the
right to register depend on the sanction or
approval of an officer of the board of health,
and of his view as to the qualifications of
such persons to practise, and providing for
the punishment of those violating such regu
lation, is unauthorized and void, the stat
utes of the state providing as to who shall
and shall not practise. State r. Prendergast,
8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 401, 6 Ohio Cir. Dec. 807.
67. Physicians registered under a former
law are generally exempted from registering
again. State v. Morgan, 00 Mo. App. 343, 70
S. W- 267.
A statute incorporating a medical society,
with such powers as pertain to other like
corporations, does not exempt the members
or licensees of that society from the operation
of a statute requiring registration by physi
cians before practising for hire. State r.
Bohemier, 96 Me. 257. 52 Atl. 643.
In Massachusetts, St. (1817) e. 131, § 3,
requiring every person licensed to practise
physic and surgery to deposit a copy of the
license with the clerk of the town in which
he may reside, does not apply to a person
who has received the degree of doctor of
medicine. Wright C. Lanckton. 19 Pick. 288.
In Nebraska a person practising medicine
or surgery must file with the county clerk
the sworn statement required by the act of
March 3, 1881, section 2, notwithstanding
he is a graduate of a medical college and has
received a degree. Dogge t. State, 17 Xebr.
140, 22 X. W. 348.
68. French v. State, 14 Tex. App. 76.
69. Com. v. Densten, 217 Pa. St. 423, 66
Atl. 653; In re Wadel, 25 Pa. Co. Ct. 60.
See also Battles v. Board of Registrv, etc,
16 R. I. 372, 17 Atl. 131. Compare Ritter r.
Rodgers, 8 Pa. Co. Ct. 451, holding that Pa,
Act, April 11, 1889, § 2 (Pamphl. Laws 28),
providing that veterinary surgeons of five
years' standing, who are not entitled to use
the degree of veterinary surgeon, shall regis
ter within six months after passage of the
act, or be guilty of a misdemeanor in using
the title thereafter, is unconstitutional.
70. Patrick r. Perrvman, 52 111. App. 514.
71. State r. Mcintosh, 205 Mo. 016, 103
S. W. 1071.
72. Hilliard v. State, 7 Tex. App. 69.
73. Martino v. Kirk, 55 Hun (X. Y.) 474,
8 X. Y. Suppl. 758.
In Kentucky a late statute declares that
all persons hereafter receiving a certificate
of qualification to practise dentistry shall
have it recorded in the county or counties in
which they shall practise. Such statute ap
plies only to persons receiving certificates
after its enactment. Com. r. Xevill, 92 S. W.
550, 29 Ky. L. Rep. 108, holding that a den
tist who had previously received his certifi
cate and had it registered under a former
statute in the county of his residence -was
not bound to have it registered again in the
county or counties in which he should prac
tise.
In Pennsylvania under the former statute
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(d) Caring Invalid Registration. One whose registration is not legal because
of error, misunderstanding, or unintentional omission may, by a subsequent valid
registration, validate the original registration from the date of its filing, and thus
be relieved of the consequences attendant upon a failure to register or an imper
fect registration.71 A medical register is a public record, over which the court in
charge of whose office it is put has summary power of correction or cancellation
on its own motion or the suggestion of any one.75
(v) Revocation — (a) Authority to Revoke. The state, in the exercise of
its police power, may prescribe the qualifications of persons desiring to practise
medicine, and may create a board whose duty it shall be to hear and determine
any complaint made against any person holding a physician's license or certificate
and revoke such license or certificate for any cause provided for in the statute.76
The power to revoke such licenses or certificates is not a judicial power, which
cannot, under the state constitution, be vested in the board of examiners.77
Whether such a statute authorizes the revocation of a certificate issued prior to
its passage depends entirely upon the wording of the statute.78 The fact that a
license is issued to one not entitled to it will not prevent the board from
revoking it.79
(b) Acts Authorizing Revocation. The grounds commonly designated by
the statute upon which the medical board is authorized to revoke a physician's
license or certificate are unprofessional, dishonorable, or immoral conduct.80
Unprofessional or dishonorable conduct is not defined by the common law, and what
conduct may be of either kind is a matter of opinion only.81 For this reason it
a physician duly registered in one county,
but who went at regular intervals into an
other, and had a place of business there to
meet all patients who might call on him,
was a sojourner and liable to a penalty for
neglect to register in the latter county. Ege
v. Com., 6 Pa. Cas. 583, 9 Atl. 471. By a
later statute, however, one registry is made
sufficient warrant to practise in any county
of the state. Fishblate v. McCullough, 9 Pa.
.Super. Ct. 147; Com. v. Townley, 7 Pa. Dist.
413.
74. Parish r. Foss, 75 Ga. 439 (failure to
register through neglect of clerk to have
proper book) ; Ottawav v. Lowden, 172 N. Y.
129, 64 N. E. 812 [reversing 55 N. Y. App.
Div. 410, 66 N. Y. Suppl. 952] ; New York v.
Bigelow, 13 Misc. (N. Y.) 42, 34 N. Y.
Suppl. 92 (registration with wrong officer) ;
Pettit v. State, 28 Tex. App. 240, 14 S. W.
127.
75. In re Campbell, 197 Pa. St. 581, 47
Atl. 860.
76. California.— Hewitt v. State Bd. of
Medical Examiners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39,
113 Am. St. Rep. 315, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 896.
District of Columbia.— Czarra V. District
of Columbia Bd. of Medical Sup'rs, 25 App.
Cas. 443.
Illinois.— Williams v. People, 17 111. App.
274, power to revoke certificates of those
only who are not graduates in medicine.
Kansas. — MefTert v. State Bd. of Medical
Registration, etc., 60 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247,
1 L. R. A. N. S. 811 [affirmed in 195 U. S.
025, 25 S. Ct. 790, 49 L. ed. 350].
Xew York.— In re Smith, 10 Wend. 449.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 15.
77. State r. State Bd. of Medical Exam
iners, 34 Minn. 387, 26 N. W. 123; State
Bd. of Health e. Roy, 22 R. I. 538, 48 Atl.
802.
78. See cases cited infra, this note.
" License heretofore issued."— Wis. Laws
(1905), p. 726, e. 422, giving the circuit
court power to revoke a license to practise
medicine " which has been heretofore or
which may be hereafter issued " to any per
son guilty of immoral conduct after the pas-
saga of this act, or who has procured such
license by fraud or perjury, is retroactive so
as to permit a revocation of the license of a
physician practising after the passage of the
act under a license obtained bv fraud prior
thereto. State v. Schaeffer, 129 Wis. 459, 109
N. W. 522.
License issued "under this act."—A stat
ute giving a state medical board power to
revoke licenses issued "under" or "in com
pliance with " such act has no application
to licenses granted under a former act. State
Bd. of Health v. Ross, 191 111. 87, 60 N. E.
811 [affirming 91 III. App. 281]; State V.
Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 N. E. 750, 41
L Tt A 212
79. State v. Goodier, 195 Mo. 551, 93 S. W.
928.
80. See the statutes of the several states.
The statutes of Ontario provide that the
name of any practitioner who has bepn guilty
of disgraceful conduct in a professional re
spect shall be liable to have his name erased
from the medical register. See In re Wash
ington, 23 Ont. 299.
81. Czarra v. Board of Medical Sup'rs, 25
App. Cas. (D. C.) 443.
The word " unprofessional " has been judi
cially defined as synonymous with " dishonor
able!" State v. State Medical Examining
[II, B, 2, a, (v), (b)]
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has been held ir. several cases that such a statute is void for uncertainty.82 Simi
lar statutes have been construed in other jurisdictions without the question of
validity being raised, the courts merely considering what can be deemed unpro
fessional, dishonorable, or immoral conduct. Thus it has been held gronnd for
revoking a license to obtain from the medical board, by misrepresentation, a cer
tificate to practise medicine;83 or to misrepresent to a patient the character of
his disease, and obtain money from him upon the strength of such misrepresenta
tion ;8
S
or to perform a pretended operation upon a woman to enable her to con
ceal her real condition from her parents.85 It is held not to be immoral, dis
honorable, or unprofessional for a physician to conceal the fact that one of his
patients had innocently suffered the accident of a miscarriage.8' Mere advertising
b
y a physician is not such unprofessional conduct as to warrant the revocation of
his license;87 if
,
however, the advertisement is false and known to be false, and
is a studied effort to impose upon the credulity of the public for gain, the law is
otherwise.83 A statute providing that a license to practise medicine may be
Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. \V. 238, 50 Am. Rep.
575. If it is shown that a medical man in
the pursuit of his profession has done some
thing in regard to it which would be rea
sonably regarded as disgraceful and dishonor
able by his professional brethren of good
repute and competency, it is open to the
board to find that he has bean " guilty of
infamous conduct in a professional respect."
Allinson v. General Council of Medical Edu
cation, etc., [1894] 1 Q. B. 750, 58 J. P. 542,
63 L. J. Q. B. 534, 70 L. T. Rep. N. S. 471,
9 Reports 217, 42 Wkly. Rep. 289.
82. Hewitt v. State Bd. of Medical Exam
iners, 148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39, 113 Am. St.
Rep. 315, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 896 (holding that
the provision of a statute which authorizes
the revocation of the certificate of a physi
cian by the board of medical examiners for
unprofessional conduct, consisting of medi
cal advertising in which grossly improbable
statements are made, but which fails to de
fine " grossly improbable statements " in any
way, but leaves their definition in each par
ticular case to the opinion of the then board
of medical examiners, is too indefinite and
uncertain to be capable of enforcement) ;
Czarra v. Board of Medical Sup'rs, 25 A pp.
Cas. (D. C.) 443; Matthews v. Murphy, 63
S. W. 785, 23 Kv. L. Rep. 750, 54 L. R. A.
415.
These decisions proceed upon the principle
that legislation providing for the revocation
of the certificate of a physician for profes
sional or moral unfitness must be reasonable
in its provisions, and must apply to matters
or conduct on the part of the physician which
affect the health, morals, or safety of the
community, and the acts or conduct which
are made ground of forfeiture must be de
clared with certainty and definiteness.
Hewitt v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
148 Cal. 590, 84 Pac. 39, 113 Am. St. Rep.
315, 3 L. R. A. N. S. 896.
Test of uncertainty.— The courts cannot
uphold and enforce a statute whose broad
and indefinite language may apply not only
to a particular act about which there would
be little or no difference of opinion, but
equally to others about which there might be
radical differences, thereby devolving upon
the tribunals charged with the enforcement
of the law the exercise of an arbitrary power
of discriminating between the several classes
of acts. Czarra v. Board of Medical Sup"r»,
25 App. Cas. (D. C.) 443.
In the District of Columbia the act of con
gress of June 3
,
1896, chapter 313, section 10,
provides that sufficient cause exists for the
revocation of a physician's license in the
employment of fraud or deception in passing
the examinations required, in chronic inebri
ety, the practice of criminal abortion, or in
case of conviction of crime involving moral
turpitude. Czarra r. Board of Medical
Sup'rs, 25 App. Cas. (D. C.) 443, holding
that the conviction of a physician of dis
tributing obscene and indecent printed mat
ter in his district is a sufficient ground for
the revocation of his license.
83. State Bd. of Health v. Rov, 22 R. I.
538, 48 Atl. 802.
84. Re Washington, 23 Ont. 299.
85. In re Telford, 11 Brit. Col. 355.
86. State v. Kellogg, 14 Mont. 426, 36 Pac
957.
87. Re Washington, 23 Ont. 299.
Publishing broadcast the symptoms of ca
tarrh is not conduct disgraceful in a pro
fessional respect. In re Washington, 23 Ont.
299.
88. People v. McCoy, 125 111. 289, 17 N. E.
786; People v. McCoy, 30 111.App. 272 (both
of which cases hold, however, that a charge
that the holder of a certificate made state
ments and promises as to the cure of ths
sick calculated to deceive and defraud the
public, although sufficient to authorize a
revocation, is not sustained by evidence of
an advertisement headed "A Surgical
Triumph," and reciting that the holder had
opened an office for a limited time, nor by
other advertisements reciting his wonderful
attainments and success) ; State r. State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 34 Minn. 391. 26
N. W. 125; In re Washington, 23 Ont. 299.
Similarly it has been held that one pub
lishing advertisements reflecting upon the
medical profession generally in order to in
duce people to come to him for advice is
" guilty of infamous conduct in a professional
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revoked only for unprofessional or dishonorable conduct has no application to a
temporary license issued by the board of medical examiners without authority."9
(c) Proceedings to Revoke— (1) In General. The action of a medical
board in revoking a physician's license or certificate for unprofessional or dis
honorable conduct being in its nature judicial, the board has no power to institute
such a proceeding without a reasonable notice of the charge against him, and the
time and place of the trial thereof.90 But a board, in conducting such an inves
tigation, is not a judicial tribunal, and is not governed by the technical rules
applicable to law courts.91
(2) Parties. Where a proceeding to cancel a certificate issued to a physician
without authority can be brought only by the attorney -general, it bus been held
that the board of examiners is a necessary party defendant to the proceedings
because it is the official action of the board which is attacked.92 In a proceeding
by a board of medical examiners, on relation of other parties, to revoke the
license of a physician for unprofessional conduct, the state is properly made a
party thereto.93
(3) Complaint. Certainty to a common intent is all that is required in the
complaint for revocation.91
(4) Evidence. The practice in revocation proceedings before a medical board
being more flexible than that allowable in the courts, evidence which tends to
prove or disprove the point in issue may be introduced, although not the best
evidence which might be had.95
(5)
Appeal. Where no appeal is provided for, in the absence of fraud,
corruption, or oppression, the findings of a medical board in a proceeding to
license. Allinson v. General Council of Medi
cal Education, etc., [1894] 1 Q. B. 750, 58
J. P. 542, 63 L. J. Q. B. 534, 70 L. T. Rep.
X. S. 471, 9 Reports 217, 42 Wkly. Rep. 289.
89. Volp v. Say lor, 42 Oreg. 546, 71 Pac.
980.
90. People f. McCoy, 125 111. 289, 17 N. E.
780 (holding that where defendant testified
that notice of the proceedings to revoke was
never served on him, plaintiff's affidavit of
service of notice is insufficient to overcome
such testimony, and the proceedings must be
taken to be invalid) ; State v. State Medical
Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W. 238,
50 Am. Rep. 575; State r. Schultz, 11 Mont.
429, 28 Pac. 643 ; Reg. v. Ontario College of
Phvsieians, etc., 44 TJ. C. Q. B. 146.
the mere fact that the statute is silent
respecting the procedure will not warrant the
construction that the investigation should be
made ex parte, or without reasonable op
portunity to be heard. State r. State Medi
cal Examining Bd., 32 Minn. 324, 20 N. W.
238, 50 Am. Rep. 575; State r. Schultz, 11
Mont. 429. 23 Pac. 643.
An exception to the rule requiring notice
rind an opportunity to be heard exists in the
case of a license, void because issued with
out authority to one not entitled thereto.
Volp r. Savior, 42 Orep. 546. 71 Pac. 9S(1.
91. Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Regis
tration, etc., 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1
L. R. A. N. 8. 811 \afprmed in 195 V. S.
625, 25 S. Ct. 790. 49 ed. 350].
92. Brown v. Grenier, 73 X. H. 426, 62 Atl.
590. But see State r. Schaeffer, 129 Wis.
459, 109 N. W. 522, holding that the state
board of medical examiners is not a neces
sary party to a proceeding by the state to
revoke a license to practise medicine, pro
cured from such board by fraud of the ap
plicant.
93. State v. Estes, 34 Oreg. 196, 51 Pac. 77,
52 Pac. 571, 55 Pac. 25.
94. Walker r. McMahn, 75 Nebr. 179, 106
N. W. 427; Munk v. Frink, 75 Nebr. 172, 106
N. W. 425, holding that a complaint filed
before a state medical board for the purpose
of procuring an order revoking the license
of a physician is sufficient, if it informs the
accused, not only of the nature of the wrong
laid to his charge, but also of the particular
incidents of its alleged perpetration.
95. Traer v. State Bd. of Medical Exam
iners, 106 Iowa 559, 76 X. W. 833.
Proof by affidavits is not error, where the
accused, after notice, fails to appear and
object. Traer r. State Bd. of Medical Ex
aminers, 106 Iowa 559, 76 N. W. 8.33, hold
ing further that under a statute making a
certified transcript of equal credit with an
original, a certified transcript of a coroner's
return containing the written evidence and
the names of witnesses before an inquisition,
although such evidence was adduced by
means of affidavits, is proper evidence before
the state board of medical examiners in a
proceeding to revoke a certificate to prac
tise medicine, where it was not objected to.
A statutory provision that the president
or any member of the state board of medical
examiners may administer oaths and take
testimony on matters relative to their duties
does not provide an exclusive mode of proof
so as to prevent the consideration by the
board of evidence not so taken. Traer v.
State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 100 Iowa
559, 76 N. W. 833.
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revoke a physician's license are conclusive on the courts.96 But an appeal or writ
of review in such case is sometimes provided for to the district or circuit court in
and for the county in which the hearing was had ;9
7
and the right is not nugatory,
because the legislature has prescribed no rules of practice to guide the district
court in adjudicating such cases.98
(6) Effect of Fobmke Adjudication. A medical board is not precluded
from preferring charges against a physician to revoke his license by the fact that
the same charges had been once before passed upon by them, and had not been
sustained.90 Nor are the trial and acquittal of a physician in a court of criminal
jurisdiction on the same charges exhibited against him by a medical society a bar
to an inquiry under the statute for the purpose of depriving him of the right to
practise.1
(vi) Wuo May Be Licexsed. "While a corporation is a person in a certain
sense, it is not such a person as can be licensed to practise medicine.1 But
licensed physicians may form a corporation, and make contracts for the services
of its members and other licensed physicians without thereby violating a statute
forbidding the practice of medicine without a license.8
b. Temporary License. A statutory provision authorizing a single member
of the state medical board to grant a temporary license to an applicant to practise
medicine until the next meeting of the board has been construed to authorize the
granting of a temporary license to an applicant from year to year, provided the
96. Meffert c. State Bd. of Medical Regis
tration, etc., 66 Kan. 710, 72 Pac. 247, 1
L. R. A. N. S. 811 [affirmed in 193 U. S.
625, 25 S. Ct. 790, 49 L. ed. 350].
Certiorari will not lie to review rulings on
the competency and sufficiency of evidence
not objected to. Traer t>.State Bd. of Medi
cal Examiners, 106 Iowa 559, 76 N. W. 833.
97. See the statutes of the several states.
And see Walker v. McMahn, 75 Nebr. 179,
106 N. W. 427 ; Munk v. Frink, 75 Nebr. 172,
106 N. W. 425 ; State v. Estes, 34 Oreg. 196,
51 Pac. 77, 52 Pac. 571. 55 Pac. 25, holding
that an appeal will not be dismissed because
the record is silent as to where the hearing
was had, where the motion to dismiss recites
that the hearing was had in the county in
which the circuit court to which the appeal
was taken was located, and the decision of
the board purports to have been signed in
that county.
Under a statute further providing that
either party may appeal from the judgment
of the circuit court to the supreme court
in the same manner as in civil actions, the
medical board has authority to appeal from
the judgment of the circuit court overruling
its findings. State p. Estes, 34 Oreg. 196,
51 Pac. 77, 52 Pac. 571. 55 Pac. 25.
98. State v. First Judicial Dist. Ct., 13
Mont. 370, 34 Pac. 298.
Papers filed in such an appeal as an an
swer of the board and signed by their at
torney are nugatory where no provision for
the filing of such papers is made by the
statute. State Bd. of Health v. Rov, 22*R. I.
538, 48 Atl. 802.
A notice of appeal from the circuit court,
signed by the attorneys, in behalf of the
board of medical examiners, which signature
was authorized by the president of the board,
and afterward ratified by said board, is suf
ficient, so far as the attorneys' authority is
concerned, to give the supreme court juris
diction. State v. Estes, 34 Oreg. 196, 51 Pac.
77, 52 Pac. 571, 55 Pac. 25.
Costs. — Where a statute providing for ap
peals from a medical examining board makes
no provision for recovery of costs in case the
action of the board is reversed, defendant
is not entitled to recover costs from the
relators as in an ordinary action, the general
statute providing for the recovery of costs
not being applicable to appeals in this class
of cases. State r. Estes, 34 Oreg. 196, SI
Pac. 77, 52 Pac. 571, 55 Pac. 25.
99. Czarra v. District of Columbia Medi
cal Sup'rs, 25 App. Cas. ( D. C.) 443; In re
Smith, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 449.
1. In re Smith, 10 Wend. (X. Y.) 44.9,
where it is said that the two proceedings
are entirely distinct and independent, having
different objects in view; the one having re
gard to the general welfare and criminal
justice of the state; the other simply and
exclusively to the respectability and character
of the medical profession, and the conse
quences connected with or necessarily flowiag
from it.
2. State Electro-Medical Inst. r. State, 74
Nebr. 40, 103 N. W. 1078, Sedgwick, J., de
livering the opinion of the court, and Barnes.
J., dissenting.
The qualifications of a medical practitioner
are personal to himself, and the intent of a
statute in compelling a license to practise
medicine is that one who undertakes to judse
the nature of disease and to determine the
remedy therefor must have the personal quali
fications prescribed by statute. State Electro-
Medical Inst. v. State. 74 Nebr. 40, 103 N. W.
1078.
3. State Electro-Medical Inst. c. State. 74
Nebr. 40, 103 N. W. 1078; State Electro-
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full board in the meantime has not refused to license the applicant;4 bnt after
tlie board, as such, has refused a license to an applicant, no one member can
grant him one.5 The fact that the board of medical examiners, in issuing a tem
porary license, used the form of a regular license, which erroneously recited that
plaintiff had passed a satisfactory examination in medicine and surgery before the
board, and was thereby authorized to practise, and merely limited the duration
of the license, does not constitute such liconse a regular unlimited license to
practise.6
e. Renewal License. All phj-sicians or dentists licensed by the board or any
previous board are entitled to a renewal license each year on application.'
d. License From Another State. Under the Colorado statute a license from
the board of dental examiners of that state is not necessary to entitle a person to
practise dentistry, if such person has a valid and sufficient license from the
board of any other state.8
8. Proof of Diploma. An applicant for a license or certificate to practise
medicine who possesses a diploma must furnish to the medical board satisfactory
proof of having received it from a legally chartered medical institution in good
standing.9 A diploma is not per ee evidence of that fact ;10 the existence of the
college at the date of the diploma must be proved by producing its act of
incorporation."
4. Good Moral Character. The legislature has the same power to require, as
a condition of the right to practise the profession, that the applicant shall bo pos
sessed of the qualifications of honor and a good moral character, as it has to
require that ho shall be learned in the profession.12
5. Privilege or Occupation Taxes.13 Unless specially restrained by the consti
tution, the legislature may confer upon municipal corporations the right to tax
physicians practising medicine therein.14 So itinerant physicians are frequently
required to pay an occupation tax.15
4. Wragg r. Strickland, 36 Ga. 559.
5. Wragg f. Strickland, 36 Ga. 559; Peter
son r. Seagraves, 94 Tex. 390, CO S. W.
751.
6. Volp v. Saylor, 42 Oreg. 546, 71 Pac.
980, holding further that the fact that the,
hoard of medical examiners is without power
to grant a temporary license to an unsuc
cessful candidate does not justify one to
■whom such a license has been granted in
altering the same so as to make it appear
to lie a regular unlimited license.
'
7. State v. Mcintosh, 205 Mo. 616, 103
S. W. 1071.
Where, however, the board is given author
ity to inquire whether the former license
was rightfully obtained, and to refuse or re
voke a license for criminal conduct or im
moral character, the old license is merely
prima facie evidence of a right to the new
one. State r. Webster, 150 Ind. 607, 50 X. E.
730, 41 L. R. A. 212.
8. Robinson v. People, 23 Colo. 123, 46 Pac.
676.
9. State v. Gregory, 83 Mo. 123. 53 Am.
Rep. 505.
In Pennsylvania, under the act of June 8,
1881, requiring a medicul practitioner hav
ing a diploma from an institution in an
other state to obtain the indorsement thereon
of the dean of some medical faculty within
the state, the filing of a certificate made by
the secretary of a medical faculty is not
sufficient, even if the institution applied to
refuses to indorse anv diploma. In re Bauer,
2 Pa. Cas. 69, 4 Atl. 913.
10. Hill v. Boddie, 2 Stew. & P. (Ala.) 56.
11. Hunter o. Blount, 27 Ga. 76.
12. State v. State Medical Examining Bd.,
32 Minn. 324, 20 X. W. 238, 50 Am. Rep.
575 ; Wert v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347 ; Com.
V. Irving, 1 Susq. Leg. Chron. (Pa.) 69.
13. License or occupation tax generally see
Licenses, 25 Cyc. 593 et seq. See also Con
stitutional Law, 8 Cyc. 900 note 83; 1046
note 91.
14. Savannah v. Charlton, 36 Ga. 460
(holding, however, that a physician lawfully
licensed to practise medicine anywhere in
the state cannot be compelled to take out a
license before practising in any particular
city) ; Girard v. Bissell, 45 Kan. 0<S,25 Pac.
232.
15. See the statutes of the several states.
"Itinerant physician" defined see supra,
p
. 1545 note 3.
Dental surgeon. — T'nder Iowa Code, § 700,
giving cities and towns power to license and
tax itinerant doctors, itinerant physicians
and surgeons," a city had no power to require
a " dental surgeon " to obtain a. license.
Cherokee v. Perkins, 118 Iowa 405. 92 X. W.
68.
In Pennsylvania, the act of March 24, 1877,
which requires all itinerant medical practi
tioners to obtain an annual license, is not
repealed by the act of June 8, 1 SSI, which
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6. Exemptions From Operation of Statutes — a. In General. The statutes in
many states except from their operation certain classes of persons, and services
rendered in particular cases. Thus it is commonly provided that the statute shall
not apply to any commissioned medical officer of the United States army, navy, or
marine service ; medical examiners of relief departments of railroad companies;
members of the staff of hospitals aud asylums; physicians called into consulta
tion from another state, or to treat a particular case, and who do not otherwise
practise in the state ;1
6
medical students assisting at operations under the supervi
sion of a licensed physician ; 17 or to services rendered gratuitously, or in case of
emergency,18 or to the administration of domestic medicines.19 These exemptions
have been attacked as unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination, but have
been upheld by the courts.30
b. Prior Practitioners. One who lias an established practice as a physician or
dentist is not ij)so facto exempt from complying with subsequent legislation
requiring him to conform to a reasonable standard respecting qualification.21
Medical laws quite frequently, however, exempt from their operation those who
have practised in the state for a prescribed time previous to the passage thereof,3
and such a provision is not unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination.3
This exemption applies only to those whose previous practice was lawful.24
register their diplomas. Moore r. Bradford
County, 148 Pa. St. 342, 23 Atl. 890. But
sec Peebles v. Wayne County, 10 Pa. Co. Ct.
69.
16. State V. Bohemier, 96 Me. 257, 52 Atl.
643; Com. v. Wilson, 6 Pa. Dist. 028, 19
Pa. Co. Ct. 521.
17. State Bd. of Registration, etc. v. Terry,
73 X. J. L. 150, 62 Atl. 193, holding that
to exempt defendant from the penalties of
the act for practising dentistry without a
license, it was not sufficient that he was a
student, but his practice must have consisted
in assisting his preceptor under his direct
and personal supervision.
18. People v. Lee Wah, 71 Cal. 80, 11 Pac.
851, holding that where one without a certifi
cate renders gratuitous medical services to
a person, because his case has been given up
by regular practitioners, this is not an
"
emergency."
An emergency means a case in which or
dinary medical practitioners are not avail
able, as where the exigency is of so pressing
a character that some kind of action must
be taken before such parties can be found or
procured. People v. Lee Wah, 71 Cal. 80,
11 Pac. 851.
19. State v. Huff, 75 Kan. 585, 90 Pac.
279, 12 L. R. A. X. S. 1094, holding, how
ever, that where defendant is charged with
recommending a medicine for a fee, the fact
that it was a domestic medicine does not
constitute, a defense.
20. State r. Bohemier, 96 Me. 257, 52 Atl.
643; Com. v. Wilson, 6 Pa. Dist. 628, 19
Pa. Co. Ct. 521.
21. Allopathic State Bd. of Medical Ex
aminers V. Fowler, 50 La. Ann. 1358, 24 So.
809; People v. Fulda, 52 Hun (X. Y.) 65,
4 X. Y. Suppl. 945, 7 X. Y. Cr. 1; State v.
Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 2S9. 02 X. E. 325, 87
Am. St. Rep. 605, 55 L. R. A. 791.
22. Alabama.— Harrison r. State, 102 Ala.
170, 15 So. 563'.
'
Idaho.— State v. Cooper, 11 Ida. 219, 81
Tac. 374.
Ohio — State t'. Ohio State Medical Bd.,
60 Ohio St. 21, 53 N. E. 298.
Pennsylvania. — Com. v. Gibson, 7 Pa. Dist.
386.
Texas — Ranald v. State, (Cr. App. 1898)
47 S. W. 976 (evidence insufficient to show
previous practice) ; Hilliard' v. State, 7 Tex.
App. 69.
In Rhode Island the physician must have
been " reputably and honorably " engaged in
the practice of medicine prior to the passage
of the act. Paquin v. State Bd. of Health,
19 R. I. 365, 33 Atl. 870.
Under a statute providing that previous
practice constitutes a prima fade qualifica
tion, the medical board may refuse a certifi
cate on the ground of incompetency despite
the fact of prior practice for the statutory
time. State v. Mosher, 78 Iowa 321, 43 X. W.
202.
Proof of previous practice.— Where the ex
cepted class of applicants are required to
furnish the board satisfactory evidence of
their previous practice and procure a certi
ficate, one cannot avail himself of the ex
emption unless such requirement has been
complied with. State r. Mosher, 78 Iowa 321.
43 X. W. 202. See also State f. Hicks, 143
N. C. 689, 57 S. E. 441.
23. State v. Creditor, 44 Kan. 565, 24 Pae.
346, 21 Am. St. Rep. 306: Ex p. Spinney.
10 Xev. 323; State V. Call, 121 X. C. 643,
28 S. E. 517.
24. State v. Board of Dental Examiners,
etc., 26 Ohio Cir. Ct. 309; State r. Board
of Dental Examiners, 31 Wash. 492, 72 Pae.
110.
For that reason the fact that one practised
medicine for more than the prescribed period
after the passage of the act is no defense to
a prosecution for practising without author
ity, since the continued violation of the stat
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Furthermore it has been held that the applicant must have been in the practice
at the time of the passage of the act.”
C. Practising witä. Authority — 1. What Constitutes—a. Practising
Medicine or Surgery—(1) /y GENERAL –§ In Absence of Definition of Term.In the absence of a statutory definition of what acts shall constitute the practice
of medicine and surgery, the words “medicine and surgery” and “practice of
medicine and surgery” are usually taken to have a meaning in their ordinary
sense.” Medicine, in the popular sense, is a remedial substance;” something
which is administered, either internally or externally, in the treatment of disease
or the relief of sickness.” The practice of medicine, as ordinarily or popularly
understood, has relation to the art of preventing, curing, or alleviating disease or
pain.” Nor is it necessary for one to profess to practise generally either as a
physician or surgeon to bring him within the operation of the statute, but it




When Term Defined b
y
Statute. The state has the right to determine
what acts shall constitute the practice o
f
the healin art; and ſis right has been





(II) CHRISTIAN SCIENCE TREATMENT.
What then constitutes the practice o
f
medicine depends upon the
Under a statute making it unlawful
to practise medicine without a license, but not attempting to define what consti
tutes “practising medicine,” it is held that the term must be construed to relate
to the practice o
f
medicine as ordinarily and lº. understood, and thereforedoes not include one who gives treatment y the system known as “christian
science.”* Where, however, the meaning o
f
the term “practising medicine”
compliance with its requirements. State v.
Wilson, 61 Kan. 791, 60 Pac. 1054; Hargan v.
Purdy, 93 Ky. 424, 20 S. W. 432, 14 Ky.
L. Rep. 383; Driscoll v. Com., 93 Ky. 393,
20 S
.
W. 431, 703. 14 Ky. L. Rep. 376.
Contra, Wert v. Clutter, 37 Ohio St. 347,
holding that ten years o
f
continuous prac
tice might embrace time since as well as
before the taking effect o
f
the act.
25. Sherburne v. Board of Dental Exam
iners, 13 Ida. 105, 88 Pac. 762; Hart v. Fol
som, 7
0 N. H. 213, 47 Atl. 603, holding that
evidence that plaintiff had practised medicine
prior to the passage o
f
the act was not
sufficient to entitle him to a certificate, since








to come within the provision o
f
the statute.
The words “at the time of the passage of
the act " refer to the date when the act takes
effect and not when it is approved. Mills
v
. State Bd. o
f Osteopathic Registration, etc.,
135 Mich. 525, 98 N
.
W. 19.
26. Kansas City r. Baird, 92 Mo. App.
204; State v. Heffernan, 28 R
.
I. 20, 65 Atl.
284. -
27. State v. Mylod, 20 R
. I. 632, 40 Atl.
753, 41 L. R. A. 428.
28. Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo. App.
204.
“Medicine” defined see 27 Cye. 466.
29. State v. Mylod, 20 R
. I. 632, 40 Atl.
753, 41 L. R. A. 428.
“Practice o
f
medicine" see 27 Cyc. 466
note 19.
Clairvoyance.— The services o
f
a medical
clairvoyant have been held to be medical
services. Bibber v. Simpson, 59 Me. 181.
Electrical treatment.— It is not necessary
that internal remedies be administered; they
may be applied externally, and they need not
necessarily be substances which may be seen
and handled. Thus one giving electrical treat
ment is “practising medicine.” Davidson
v
. Bohlman, 37 Mo. App. 576.
30. Hewitt v. Charier, 16 Pick. (Mass.)
353, holding that one who professes and
practises bone-setting in dislocations and
fractures, reducing sprains, swellings, and
contractions o
f
the sinews by friction and
fomentation, is practising surgery.
31. State v. Edmunds, 127 Iowa 333, 101
N. W. 431; State v. Yegge, 19 S. D. 234,
103 N. W. 17, 69 L. R
.
A. 504.
32. See the statutes of the several states.
33. Kansas City v. Baird, 92 Mo. App.





222, 6 Ohio N. P
. 129; State v. Mylod, 20
R. I. 632, 40 Atl. 753, 41 L. R. A. 428. See
also Reg. v. Stewart, 17 Ont., 4.
“Other agency” does not include christian
science.— Under a statute prohibiting any
person not having a certificate from the board
o
f
medical registration from prescribing, di
recting, o
r recommending any drug, medicine,
o
r
other agency for the treatment, cure, o
r
relief o
f any bodily infirmity, the term
“other agency" does not include the system





Pl. Dec. 222, 6 Ohio N. P
.
129.
In Maine a “christian scientist’” may
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has been extended by statute to cover all treatment of whatever nature for the
cure of physical or mental ailments, then giving christian science treatment
without a license is in violation of the law.34
(in) Osteopathy. Whether or not a person giving osteopathic treatment is
to be regarded as "practising medicine" depends either upon the construction
placed upon that term by the courts, or upon the comprehensiveness of the
definition given by the statute itself.35 But it has been several times held that an
osteopath is not within a statute forbidding the prescribing or applying of any
drug, medicine, appliance, or other agency by an unlicensed person.* iSor does
osteopathy come within an exception in a statute applying to persons treating the
sick by mental or spiritual means.37
(iv) Professing to Cure or Heal — (a) In General. In many states it is
provided that any person shall be held as practising medicine within the meaning
of a statute prohibiting the practice of medicine without a license, who shall pub
licly profess to cure or heal, or hold himself out as a physician, and assume the
duties,38 or who shall prefix the title " doctor " or " professor " or append the let
ters " M. D." to his name.39 A mere public profession of an ability to heal will
practise the healing art according to that
method, on obtaining a certificate of good
moral character pursuant to Rev. St. c. 13,
§ 9. Wheeler v. Sawyer, (1888) 15 Atl. 67.
34. State v. Buswell, 40 Nebr. 158, 58
N. W. 728, 24 L. R. A. 68; State r. Marble,
72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N. E. 1062, 106 Am. St.
Rep. 570, 70 L. R. A. 835.
The Illinois statute expressly exempts from
its operation those who treat the sick by
mental or spiritual means without the use
of drugs or material remedy. Hurd Rev. St.
p. 1144 [Laws (1889), p. 275, § 7].
35. Thus where the statute merely regu
lates the " practice of medicine " some courts
confining the definition of the words " prac
tise medicine " to the mere administration of
drugs, or use of surgical instruments, hold
that an osteopathist is not within the stat
ute. State v. Lawson, (Del. 1907) 65 Atl.
593; Nelson !'. State Bd. of Health, 108 Ky.
769, 57 S. W. 501, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 438, 50
L. R. A. 383; Smith v. Lane, 24 Hun (X. Y.)
632; State v. Biggs, 133 N. C. 729, 46 S. E.
401, 98 Am. St. Rep. 731, 64 L. R. A. 139;
State v. McKnight, 131 N. C. 717, 42 S. E.
580, 59 L. R. A. 187; Com. v. Pierce, 10 Pa.
Dist. 335; Com. r. Thompson, 24 Pa. Co. Ct.
667, 7 Lack. Leg. N. 111. Other courts hold
that the legislative intent was to include
all who practise the healing art, whatever
the treatment employed, and therefore the
practice of osteopathv is within the statute.
Ligon v. State, 145
*
Ala. 659, 39 So. 662;
Bragg v. State. 134 Ala. 165, 32 So. 767,
58 L. R. A. 925; People v. Allcutt, 117 X. Y.
App. Div. 546, 102 X. Y. Suppl. 078 [affirmed
in 189 N. Y. 517, 81 N. E. 1171]. Under
a statute providing that any one shall be re
garded as practising medicine who shall treat,
operate on, or prescribe for any physical ail
ment of another, one engaged in the practice
of osteopathv is practising medicine. People
v. Gordon. 194 111. 560, 62 N. E. 858, 88
Am. St. Rep. 165 [reversing 96 111. App.
450]; People ('. Jones, 92 111. App. 445;
Jones v. People, 84 111. App. 453; Eastman
v. People, 71 HI. App. 236; Little v. State,
00 Xebr. 749, 84 X. W. 248, 51 L. R. A. 717;
State i-. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289. 62 X. E.
325, 87 Am. St. Rep. 605, 55 L. R. A. 791.
36. Hayden v. State, 81 Miss. 291, 33 So.
653, 95 Am. St. Rep. 471, 63 L. R. A. 616;
State r. Herring. 70 N. J. L. 34, 56 Atl. 670
[affirmed in (1905) 60 Atl. 1134]." Osteopathy " is not an " agency " within
the act of Feb. 27, 1896, " to regulate the
practice of medicine" (92 Ohio Laws 44),
which forbids the prescribing of any " drug
or medicine or other agency " for the treat
ment of disease by a person who has not
obtained from the board of medical registra
tion and examination a certificate of quali
fication. State v. Liffring, 61 Ohio St. 39,
55 N. E. 168, 76 Am. St. Rep. 358, 46 L. R.
A. 334; Eastman v. State, 6 Ohio S. & C.
PI. Dec. 296, 4 Ohio X. P. 163.
37. People t. Gordon, 194 111. 560, 62 X. E.
858, 88 Am. St. Rep. 165 [reversing 96 111.
App. 450] ; People v. Jones, 92 111. App. 447.
38. Benham v. State, 116 Ind. 112, 18
X. E. 454; People v. Somme, 120 X. Y. App
Div. 20, 104 X. Y. Suppl. 940 [affirmed in
190 X. Y. 541, 83 X. E. 1128].
A sign " Dr. . . . Magnetic Healer," is
evidence that one held himself out as a
medical practitioner. People r. Phippin, 70
Mich. 6, 37 X. W. 888.
Publishing a card as " doctor of neurology
and ophthalmology " is a public profession
that one is a physician, and thi<, with the
assumption of duties as such, comes within
the meaning of the section. State r. Wil-
hite, 132 Iowa 226, 109 X. W. 730.
39. Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 X. E.
862, 59 L. R. A. 190; People v. Somme, 120
X. Y. App. Div. 20, 104 X. Y. Suppl. 946
[affirmed in 190 X. Y. 541, 83 X. E. 1128]:
State v. Yegge, 19 S. D. 234, 103 X. \Y. 17,
69 L. R. A. 504; Reg. v. Baker, 17 Cox C. C.
575, 50 J. P. 406, 66 L. T. Rep. X. S. 416.
A diploma from a regularly organized
homeopathic society is sufficient to authorize
a member of such society to use the title of
"doctor" in the practice of medicine and
surgery, and to protect him against the
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not subject one to the penalties of the law.40 Such profession must be made
under such circumstances as to indicate that it is made with a view of undertaking
to cure the afflicted.'" But proof of actual treatment is not exacted in all cases."
In the absence of a statute on this subject, a statute merely prohibiting the prac
tice of medicine by any person not qualified and licensed will not prohibit the
assumption of the title "Doctor" by any person whatever his profession.43
(b) Oculists and Eye Specialists. It has been held that one holding himself
out as an eye specialist holds himself out as a physician and surgeon.44 But the
application by an oculist of liquid to the eye is said to be the practice of
surgery rather than of medicine.
(v) Obstetrics and Midwifery. A person practising obstetrics 44 or mid
wifery 47 is within a statute requiring a license for practising medicine or surgery.
(vi) Selling and Administering Patent Medicines. Although the mere
selling of patent medicines by one who does not pretend to diagnose disease, and
determine what remedy is proper, is not a violation of a statute forbidding the
practice of medicine by unlicensed persons,48 still the fact that one gives his own
proprietary medicine will not protect him where he attends and prescribes for
sick persons and holds himself out as competent to prescribe.4*
penalties imposed by the statute for using
such title and practising without a diploma
from some incorporated medical society or
college. Ravnor r. State, 62 Wis. 289, 22
N. W. 430.
Assumption of title signifying registration
— Canada. — Under a statute punishing any
one who falsely professes to be a registered
physician, the mere use of the letters M. D."
without supplemental words implying regis
tration is not sufficient to convict. Foster r.
Rose, 37 Can. L. J. N. S. 824; Reg. v. Tefft,
45 V. C. Q. B. 144.
40. State v. Heath, 125 Iowa 585, 101
N. W. 429.
41. State v. Heath, 125 Iowa 585, 101
N. W. 429.
An eye expert who invites people to call
upon him, but who states that he does not
give medical or surgical treatment, does not
profess to cure or treat disease by any drug
or application." People t>.Smith, 208 III. 31,
69 X. E. 810.
42. State v. Heath, 125 Iowa 585, 101
X. W. 429.
43. State r. McKnight, 131 N. C. 717,
42 S. E. 580, 59 L. R. A. 187 ; State v. Mvlod,
20 R. I. 632, 40 Atl. 753, 41 I* R. A. 428.
44. Com. p. St. Pierre, 175 Mass. 48, 55
X. E. 482.
Statutory provisions.— Under a statute
providing that a person shall be regarded as
practising medicine who shall treat or profess
to treat, operate on or prescribe for, any
physical ailment or injury, a person who
causes a customer to look at objects on a
wall, and therefrom determines what kind of
lens he needs to aid his defective vision, and
then has glasses ground accordingly and
fitted into frames, and delivers such spec
tacles to his customer, is not required to first
take out a license to practise medicine. Peo
ple p. Smith, 208 III. 31, 69 X. E. 810 [affirm
ing 108 111. App. 499], Xor can such a per
son be required to take out a license because
he advertises for those who have headache,
dizziness, etc., to call on him, where the ad
vertisement expressly declares that he does
not give medical or surgical treatment, and
it is apparent from the entire advertisement
that all he professes to do is to fit spec
tacles to the eye. People r. Smith, supra.
But under a similar statute one who
diagnoses his patient's diseases by a micro
scopic examination of a drop of blood, and
treats them by placing them under the rays
of electric arc lights, and also incidentally
prescribes certain medicines, for which pre
scription he makes no charge, has been held
to be practising medicine. O'Xeil v. State,
115 Tenn. 427, 90 S. W. 627, 3 h- R- A, X. S.
762, holding further that one who diagnosed
his patient's diseases bv microscopic examina
tion of a drop of blood, and treated them by
placing them under the rays of electric arc
lights, is not an optician, within Acts ( 1901 ),
p. 115, c. 78, excepting opticians from its
provisions as to licensing persons practising
medicine. Under a statute providing that
every person prefixing the title "Dr." to his
name, or professing to lie a physician, or
prescribing any drug, medicine, apparatus,
or other agency for the cure of any ailment,
shall be regarded as practising medicine, a
person engaged in fitting glasses to the eye,
who prefixes the title
" Dr." to his name, and
claims to be an ophthalmologist, is practis
ing medicine. State c. Yegge, 19 S. D. 234,
103 X. YV. 17, 69 h. R. A. 504.
45. U. S. r. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. Xo.
16,713, 5 Cranch C. C. 62.
46. State r. Welch, 129 X. C. 579, 40
S. E. 120.
47. People v. Arendt, 60 111. App. 89.
48. State r. Kcndig, 133 Iowa 164, 110
X. W. 403; State r. Van Doran, 109 X. C.
864, 14 S. E. 32; College des Medecins f.
Tucker, 17 Quebec Super. Ct. 70.
49. District of Columbia.— Springer r.
District of Columbia, 23 App. Cas. 59.
Kansas.— I'nderwood v. Scott, 43 Kan.
7l4, 23 Pac. 942.
New York.— Thompson v. Staats, 1.5 Wend.
395.
[II, C, 1, a, (vi)]
1564 [30 Cyc] PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
(vn) Selling Mechanical Instruments oh Appliances. A statute regu-
latins; the practice of medicine does not include those who merely advertise, puff,
or sell mechanical instruments or devices, although they profess their use will cure
human ills.50 But selling and directing the application of plasters for the cure of
cancer is "practising" within the meaning of the statute.51
(vin) Practising Under Licensed Physiciax. Liability under a statute
prohibiting the practice of medicine without a license is not affected by the fact
that the operations were performed and the medicines were administered under
the direction and charge of a licensed physician and surgeon.52
(ix) Pita ctising After Refusal of License. "Where one admits practising
without a license, it is no defense to a prosecution therefor that the medical board
had wrongfully refused to issue him a license.53 But the contrary has also been
held.54
(x) Practising After Revocation of License. Under a statute pre
scribing a penalty for practising
" without first having procured a certificate,'' a
conviction cannot be had for engaging in practice after the certificate has been
revoked for unprofessional conduct.
(xi)
Practising Without Fee or Reward. The penalty for practising
medicine without a license is usually limited to the practice for reward or com
pensation.56 It is not necessary to show that a separate fee was charged for any
specified service or operation, but it is sufficient if a fee was collected for a series
of services or operations in violation of the act.57 Neither is it necessary to show
that a charge was made immediately after the service or operation, it being suf-
Xorth Carolina.— State i\ Van Doran, 109
X. C. 864, 14 S. E. 32.
Ohio. — Jordan v. Dayton Overseers of
Poor, 4 Ohio 294.
Canada. — Reg. t". Coulson, 27 Ont. 59 ;
Reg. v. Howarth, 24 Ont. 561; Reg. v. Hall,
8 Ont. 407.
50. People v. Lehr, 196 111. 361, 63 N. E.
725 [affirming 93 111.App. 505], holding that
where a party was agent for the sale of an
article or instrument to be attached to parts
of the body, which he advertised would cure
many diseases, and he urged people to buy
it and try it, but he did not claim to be a
physician or to practise medicine, did not
examine his patrons or attempt to ascertain
ot tell them what their diseases were, and
did not prescribe or administer drugs or
remedies, nor apply the instrument to the
bodies of purchasers, this was not the prac
tice of medicine within the meaning of the
title of the act of 1899, fixing a penalty for
the practice of medicine without a certificate.
51. Provincial Medical Bd. v. Bond, 22
Nova Scotia 153.
52. State e. Reed, 68 Ark. 331, 58 S. W.
40; State v. Paul, 50 Nebr. 369, 76 N. W.
8G1.
53. State v. Doerring, 194 Mo. 398, 92
S. W. 489 (holding that if one substantially
complies with all the provisions of the stat
ute, and the board wrongfully withholds from
him a license, then he must resort to some
appropriate remedy to compel the issuance
of such license) ; Krowenstrot r. State, 15
Ohio Cir. Ct. 73, 8 Ohio Cir. Dec. 119.
54. State v. Cooper, 11 Ida. 219, 81 Pac.
374, 377, where it is said: " If the Board of
Medical Examiners could withhold a license
from an applicant . . . until he could
appeal to the courts for redress, making a
criminal of him every time he prescribed for
or visited a patient, they could not only de
prive him of valuable property rights, but
ruin him in his profession, and brand him as
a criminal."
55. Em p. McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, 19 Pac.
237, 11 Am. St. Rep. 257.
Pending an appeal from the action of the
state board of medical examiners in revoking
defendant's license, defendant cannot be con
victed of practising without a license, when
the judgment of the board is finally reversed.
State v. Kellogg, 14 Mont. 451, 36 Pac. 1077.
56. See the statutes of the several states.
See also State v. Pirlot, 20 R. I. 273. 38 AtL
656, holding that, although Gen. Laws,
c. 165, | 2, makes it unlawful to practise
medicine without exhibiting and having reg
istered a certificate, yet, as section 8, pro
viding a penalty, limits the fine to the prac
tice of medicine for reward or compensation,
section 2 cannot be violated where a medical
practitioner receives no compensation for his
services.
Thus it is not a violation of the statute
for a person who does not hold himself out
as a physician to advise, or give medicine to,
a sick person, merely as a neighbor or friend,
where no charge is made, and no compensa
tion is expected, for such services. Nelson
V. State, 97 Ala. 79, 12 So. 421.
Nor can a druggist's cleric who prescribe?
for a customer be convicted under such an
act where no profit inures to him from the1
sale. Prust r. Rose, 37 Can. L. J. N. S.
824.
57. State v. Littooy, 37 Wash. 693, 79
Pac. 1135; State f, Brown, 37 Wash. 106,
79 Pac. 638.
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ficient that some time within one year before filing the information a fee was paid
for the services alleged to have been rendered.58
b. Practising Dentistry. The practice of dentistry has been denned as the
treatment of diseases or lesions of the human teeth or jaws, or the correction of
malpositions thereof.59 A statute thus defining dentistry does not prevent a
licensed surgeon from treating diseases of the jaws, which may come within the
scope both of general surgery and dentistry.60
2. Prosecutions For Practising Without Authority61 — a. Indictment, Infor
mation,62 or Complaint63— (i) In General. The offense of practising medicine
without a license being purely a statutory offense, if the statute so far individuates
the crime that the offender has proper notice of the nature of the charge against
him, it is sufficient to charge it in the language of the statute or in terms sub
stantially equivalent thereto.64 It is necessary to state specifically the essential
facts constituting the offense.65 It is not sufficient to sustain a criminal prose
cution of this kind merely to charge a person with having " unlawfully " prac
58. State v. Littooy, 37 Wash. 693, 79
Pac. 1135; State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 100, 79
Pac. 638.
59. See State r. Vandersluis, 42 Minn.
129, 43 N. W. 789, 6 UR.A. 119.
The taking of an impression, the making
of false teeth therefrom, and the fitting of
such teeth in the mouth constitute a " cor
rection of malposition of the jaws," within
the meaning of the statute regulating the
practice of dentistry. State p. Xewton, 39
Wash. 491, 81 Pac. 1002.
60. State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129,
43 X. W. 789, 6 L. R. A. 119.
61. See, generally, Criminal Law, 12 Cyc.
"0. . . ,
62. Indictment or information generally
see Indictments and Infobmations, 22 Cyc.
155.
63. Criminal complaint generally see
Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 291 et seq.
64. Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 64 N. E.
862, 59 L. R. A. 190; State p. Edmunds, 127
Iowa 333, 101 N. W. 431 ; Com. p. Campbell,
22 Pa. Super. Ct. 98 (holding that an indict
ment charging that defendant did " engage in
the practice of medicine and surgery without
having complied with the provisions " of the
act of May 18, 1893 (Pub. Laws 94), suffi
ciently sets forth the violation of the act,
which forbids any one to " enter upon . the
practice of medicine or surgery within the
state, unless he or she has complied with the
provisions of this act") ; State p. Flanagan,
25 R. I. 369, 55 Atl. 8/6.
*' Practising as a physician " see i»/ro, this
note.
" Practising medicine " equivalent to " pracr
tising as a physician."— An indictment which
alleged that defendant did " practise medi
cine " sufficiently charges that he " prac
tised as a physician," within the meaning of
a statute which makes it unlawful for any
person to so practise without having a
license. Whitlock p. Com., 89 Va. 337, 15
S. E. 893.
Practise or attempt to practise.— An in:
dictment for practising medicine without a
license, which charges that defendant unlaw
fully " did practise or attempt to practise
medicine or surgery," is not open to the
objection that the offenses of practising and
attempting to practise are so distinct that
the offense is not sufficiently set out. State
v. Welch, 129 N. C. 579, 40"S. E. 120; State
v. Van Doran, 109 N. C. 864, 14 S. E. 32.
65. O'Connor B. State, 46 Xebr. 157, 64
X. W. 719; Denton v. Stale, 21 Xebr. 445. 32
N. W. 222.
Use of drug, medicine, or other agency. —
Under Ohio Rev. St. § 4403c, prohibiting per
sons from practising medicine, or prescribing,
directing, or recommending for the use of
any person any drug, medicine, or other
agency for the permanent cure or relief of
any bodily infirmity, unless a certificate from
the board of registers shall be filed, etc., an
information charging defendant with having
for a fee prescribed, directed, and recom^
mended a system known as
" christian
science," or other agency of the kind de
scribed was recommended or administered, is
insufficient. Evans v. State, 9 Ohio S. & C.
PI. Dec. 222, 6 Ohio X. P. 129.
Particular branch of medicine. —An infor
mation under a statute " to regulate the
practice of medicine," and which requires
that, before any person engages in the
'•practice of medicine in any of its branches
or departments," he shall comply with cer
tain provisions thereof, need not allege the
''particular branch or department " of medi
cine in which defendant engaged. Antle v.
State, 6 Tex. App. 202.
In Texas an indictment for unlawfully en
gaging in the practice of medicine must al
lege that it was done without a diploma, or
else without having a certificate of qualifica
tion from some authorized board of medical
examiners, as provided by statute, or with
out having practised five consecutive years in
the profession ; and it must be alleged that
the accused resided or sojourned in the
county where such indictment was presented.
State v. Goldman, 44 Tex. 104; Carribene v.
State, 3 Tex. App. 262.
There must be a statement of facts show
ing the doing by the accused person of one
or more of the acts included within the
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tised medicine in violation of the statute, for this amounts to no more than the
statement of a mere legal conclusion."
(n) Failure to Qualify. Under a statute making it an offense to practise
medicine without complying with the provisions thereof respecting qualification,
an indictment must expressly negative the fact of defendant having any of the
qualifications requisite to the lawful practice of medicine.67 Thus an indictment
which does not allege in some form a failure to register,68 or a failure to register
and obtain a certificate,69 or a failure to have the certificate recorded,70 as the case
may be, charges no offense. The negation of defendant's qualification must be
broad enough to meet the requirements of the statute.71
. (m) Person Practised Upox. Since no individual right is infringed by
the practice of medicine in violation of the statute, the indictment need not
specify on whom defendant practised.78 Furthermore it has been held that it is
not necessary to charge defendant with prescribing medicine for human beings as
distinguished from furnishing medicine for domestic animals.78
(iv) Heward or Compensation Where the statute does not contain the
words " fee or reward," an indictment for practising medicine without a license
need not charge that defendant practised for "fee or reward."74
(v) Negatiwxo Exceptioxs. The general rule as to exceptions, provisos,
and the like is that where the exception or proviso forms a portion of the
description of the offense so that the ingredien ts thereof cannot be accurately and
definitely stated if the exception is omitted, then it is necessary to negative the
exception or proviso.75 But where the exception is separable from the description
and is not an ingredient thereof, it need not be noticed in the accusation, for it is
Nebr. 157, 04 N. W. 710; State r. Carer, 4
Wash. 424, 30 Pac. 729.
66. Steuben County v. Wood, 24 N. Y.
App. Div. 442, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 471 ; Schaef-
fer v. State, 113 Wis. 595, 80 N. W. 481, Bar-
deen, J., delivering the opinion of the court.
The pleader must go further and charge
that defendant did practise medicine by do
ing what the statute says it shall consist in,
following the statute as far as applicable so
as to bring the charge clearly within it. Dee
v. State, 68 Miss. 601, 9 So. 356; Schaeffer
r. State, 113 Wis. 505, 89 N. W. 481. But
see People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W.
888 [followed in White r. Lapeer Cir. Judge,
133 Mich. 03, 94 N. W. 601], holding that
the complaint in a prosecution for practising
medicine without a license need not specify
the particular acts or means by which de
fendant practised medicine.
67. Blalock r. State, 112 Ga. 338, 37 S. E.
361.
68. State t. Fusscll, 45 Ark. 65; Driscoll
f. Com., 93 Kv. 303, 20 S. W. 431, 703, 14
Kv. L. Rep. 370.
"69. State v. Welch, 129 ST. C. 570, 40 S. E.
120 (holding that an indictment for prac
tising medicine without a license, which al
leges that defendant did not exhibit to the
clerk a license, nor make the oath necessary
to procure registration, and did practise,
" not then and there having obtained from
said Clerk of the Court a certificate of regis
tration," sufficiently charges that defendant
"did not register and obtain" a license);
State v. Call. 121 N. C. 043. 28 S. E. 517.
70. State r. Hathaway. 100 Mo. 236, 17
S. W. 299.
71. State r. Goldman, 44 Tex. 104.
72. People r. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 K. W.
888; State v. Doerring, 194 Mo. 398, 92 S.W.
489; State v. Little, 76 Mo. 52: State r.
Smith, 00 Mo. App. 283 ; State r. Van Doran,
109 N. C. 804, 14 S. E. 32; State v. Martin,
23 R. I. 143, 49 Atl. 497.
73. State v. Kendig, 133 Iowa 164, 110
N. W. 463.
74. State r. Welch, 129 N. C. 579, 40 S. E.
120; State r. Call, 121 K. C. 643, 28 S. E.
517. See also Whitlock v. Com., 89 Va. 337,
15 S. E. 893.
Even where, by statutory definition, the
words " practise medicine " embrace the idea
of exacting compensation, an indictment
charging that the accused did unlawfully
" practise medicine," and expressly negativ
ing his having any Of the qualifications es
sential to the lawful practice of medicine has
been held to be good in substance, and suffi
cient to support a conviction, although there
be no allegation that the accused received or
intended to receive compensation. Blalock r.
State, 112 Ga. 338, 37 S. E. 361.
75. Salter v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 591, 73
S. W. 395; McCann r. State, 40 Tex. Cr.Ill, 48 S. W. 512. See also IXDiCTMExrs
ant) Informations, 22 Cyc. 344.
Where the statute includes two or more
classes which will be affected thereby — such
as physicians who remove into the state to
practise after the passage of an act to regu
late the same, and persons who were resid
ing in the state and practising under a
former act — the information must show on
its face that the accused does not lielong to
either class. Herring r. State, 114 Ga. 96,
39 S. E. 806; Gee Wo r. State, 36 Xebr. 241,
54 N. W. 513.
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a matter of defense.” The rule as sometimes stated is titat, if the exception is
found in the enacting clause, it must be negatived; but if found in a subsequent
clause, it need not be.” The negative averment is taken as true, unless disproved
by defendant, since the subject-matter of such averment lies peculiarly within his
knowledge.” -
-
(v1), JoixDER OF OFFENSES. Where the offense of practising medicine with
out authority may be committed in one or more of several ways, the indictment
unay, in a single count, charge it
s
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such board de jure.” Furthermore the state must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did practise medicine without a
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the prosecution,
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the accused to show that h
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had a license” or other qualification
to practise as required b
y law,” as such evidence is not accessible to the state, but
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730; Hale v. State, 58 Ohio St. 676,76. Colorado.— Harding v. People, 10 Colo.
387, 15 Pac. 727.
Illinois.- Williams v. People, 20 Ill. App.
92.
Iowa.- State v. Kendig, 133 Iowa 164, 110
N. W. 463. -
Maryland.—Watson v. State, 105 Md. 650,
66 Atl. 635.




W. 991; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6
,
37 N. W. 888.
Missouri.- State v. Smith, 60 Mo. App.
283.
Nebraska.-O'Connor r. State, 46 Nebr.
157, 64 N. W. 7 19: Gee Wo v. State, 36
Nebr. 241, 54 N. W. 513.
New Jersey.— Mayer r. State, 64 N
. J. L.
323, 45 Atl. 624. -











Ohio.— Hale r. State, 58 Ohio St. 676, 51
N. E. 154; Krowenstrot v. State, 15 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 73, 8 Ohio Cir. Dec. 119.
Rhode Island.— State v. Flanagan, 25 R
. I.
369, 55 Atl. S76.
-
See 3
9 Cent. Dig. tit. “Physicians and
Surgeons,” $ 9. See also INDICTMENTS AND
INFORMATIONs, 22 Cyc. 344.
77. Ferner r. State, 151 Ind. 247, 51 N. E
.




Div. 442, 48 N
.
Y
. Suppl. 471; Antle v.
State, 6 Tex. App. 202; Logan v. State, 5º App. 306; Blasdell r. State, 5 Tex. App.3.
78. State v. Hathaway, 115 Mo. 36, 21
S. W. 1081.
79. State v. Wilhite, 132 Iowa 226, 109
51 N. E. 154. -
80. Bragg v. State, 134 Ala. 165, 32 So.
767, 58 L. R
.
A. 925, since, if true, the
remedy is in the civil courts, on rejection of
an application for a license, and not by a
violation of the criminal law.
81. Evidence generally see CRIMINAL LAw,
1






. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. No.





116 Ind. 112, 18Benham v. State,
N. E. 454. - -
84. People v. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 606,





. 472; Williams r. People, 20 Ill.
App. 92; Benham r. State, 116 Ind. 112, 18
N. E
. 454; People r. Fulda, 52 Hun (N. Y.)
65, 4 N. Y







. Nyce, 34 Hun (N. Y.) 298.





368; State v. Wilson, 62 Kan. 621, 64 Pac.
23, 52 L. R. A. 679; Com. v. St. Pierre, 175
Mass. 48, 55 N. E
. 482; Raynor v. State, 62
Wis. 28'9, 22 N. W. 430. -
86. People v. Boo Doo Hong, 122 Cal. 606,
55 Pac. 402; State v. Wilson, 62 Ran. 621,
64 Pac. 23, 52 L. R. A. 679. -







88. Springer v. District o
f Columbia, 23
Apn. Cas. (D. C.) 59. º
Where respondent exhibited a sign as “Dr.
. . . Magnetic Healer,” and was called in to
visit sick persons, and treated them, and
made a certificate of death, and a medical
practitioner's sworn statement, there is evi
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rendered inadmissible by the rule that the state is not allowed to put in issue the
general character of defendant.89 On behalf of defendant any legal evidence
tending to show that he had rightful authority to practise, or that he was not
guilty of the offense charged, is admissible.90 The court will not compel a witness
to produce the medicine which he received from defendant.91
(m) Weight and Sufficiency.91 In a prosecution against one for practising
as a physician without a diploma, the existence of the diploma is prima facie
evidence of a right to it.93 In some states it is provided by statute that the use
by a person of the title " Dr.," " Doctor," etc., or the exposure of a sign, circular,
or advertisement indicating the occupation of the person shall be prima facie
evidence that he is practising medicine.91 Proof that defendant attended a single
case and held himself out to the community as a physician is sufficient to warrant
a conviction.95 Although defendant, to constitute gnilt, must have practised for
compensation and reward, the state need not prove the actual receipt of snch
compensation.98 Uncorroborated testimony of employees of a dental society may
be sufficient to support a conviction.97
d. Variance. Proof that defendant acted either as a physician or surgeon is
sufficient to support an information charging that he held himself out as a phvsi-
dence that he held himself out as a medical
practitioner. People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6,
37 N. W. 888.
A medical practitioner's sworn statement,
a certificate of death, and a report of in
fections diseases, executed by respondent, are
admissible to show that he held himself out
as a medical practitioner. People v. Phippin,
70 Mich. 6, 37 X. W. 888.
A business card of defendant, containing
his name, with the title " Dr." prefixed, and
advertising himself as pharmacist and chem
ist, and with having a free dispensary at
his place of business, where registered physi
cians were in attendance daily to give medi
cal and surgical advice free of charge, is
admissible as a declaration of defendant tend
ing to prove that he had been engaged in
carrying on the prohibited business, which
was corroborative of the proof offered in
support of the offense charged. Mayer v.
State, 64 N. J. L. 323. 45 Atl. 624.
89. Antle v. State, 6 Tex. App. 202.
90. See cases cited infra, this note.
Services rendered without compensation. —
Com. t\ St. Pierre, 175 Mass. 48, 55 N. E.
482.
Possession of diploma.— In a prosecution
under Wis. Laws (1881), c. 256, § 1, pro
hibiting a person from prefixing the title of
" doctor " to his name without having a
diploma from a duly incorporated medical
society or college, it is error to reject a
diploma offered in evidence by defendant, on
the ground that its articles of incorporation
did not declare that such power existed, it
not being necessary that the articles of in
corporation of a medical college should desig
nate with particularity all the powers which
it may exercise when dulv incorporated.
Wendel r. State, 62 Wis. 300. 22 N. W. 435.
But in a prosecution of a physician for prac
tising without a certificate countersigned by
the senior censor of the state medical asso
ciation, in violation of Ala. Code (1896),
§ 5333, defendant's diploma and proof of
the length of time he practised medicine are
inadmissible. Brooks r. State, 146 Ala. 153,
41 So. 156.
Evidence that other physicians had no cer
tificates is inadmissible. Brooks v. State, 146
Ala. 153, 41 So. 156.
Refusal to issue certificate.— A person
charged with having practised medicine with
out a proper certificate cannot show that the
state board acted unjustly in refusing him
one. Krowenstrot e. State, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct.
73, 8 Ohio Cir. Dec. 119; State r. Littooy.
37 Wash. 693, 79 Pac. 1135; State c. Brown.
37 Wash. 106, 79 Pac. 638.
91. U. S. v. Williams, 28 Fed. Cas. No.
16,713. 5 Cranch C. C. 62.
92. Evidence held sufficient to justify con
viction see Ferner t'. State, 151 Ind. 247. 51
N. E. 360: Benham r. State. 116 Ind. 112,
18 N. E. 454; State v. Kendig, 133 Iowa 164,
110 N. W. 463; State v. Hoff, 75 Kan. 585.
90 Pac. 279, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 1094; State
v. Oredson, 96 Minn. 509, 105 N. W. 188:
People v. Somme, 120 N. Y. App. Div. 20, 104
N. Y. Suppl. 946 [affirmed in 190 N. Y.
541, 83 N. E. 1128]; Pavne r. State, 112
Tenn. 587, 79 S. W. 1025; State r. Lawson,
40 Wash. 455, 82 Pac. 750; State v. Sexton,
37 Wash. 110, 79 Pac. 634.
93. Wendel v. State, 62 Wis. 300, 22 N. W.
435; Raynor r. State, 62 Wis. 289, 22 X. W.
430.
94. Mayer v. State, 64 N. J. L. 323, 45
Atl. 624.
But evidence that there appeared in a cer
tain newspaper an advertisement of a doctor
having the same name as accused is insuffi
cient to warrant a conviction, since it can
not be presumed that the advertisement was
authorized by defendant, nor that he was the
person named in the advertisement. State r.
Dunham, 31 Wash. 636, 72 Pac. 459.
95. Antle ;;. State, 6 Tex. App. 202.
96. State f. Hale, 15 Mo. 606.
97. People r. Stein, 112 N. Y. App. Dir.
896, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 923.
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cian and surgeon.98 So proof that defendant engaged in any branch or department
of medicine sustains the allegation that he engaged in the practice of medicine."
Since the time of the commission of the offense is not of the essence thereof, it is
not necessary to prove that the offense charged was committed on the precise date
alleged ; proof that it occurred on any day within the period of limitation and
before the filing of the information is sufficient.1
e. Questions Fop Jury.8 Where a statute regulating the practice of medicine
does not declare what specific acts shall constitute "practising medicine," or what
it is to " publicly profess to do so," both of which are prohibited unless the person
so doing has obtained a license, it is for the courts to determine whether the facts
and proof in a particular case bring it within the terms of the statute, taking these
in the sense in which they are commonly understood.3 But where the acts which
shall constitute the practice of medicine are defined by statute, whether or not
defendant has, by his conduct, brought himself within such definition, is a question
for the jury.*
f. Instructions. The instructions must conform to the pleadings and the evi
dence.5 Where, under the statute, the possession of either a license or a diploma
would preserve a physician from prosecution, it is error to instruct that if defend
ant had practised medicine without having a license and a diploma the jury
should convict." It is not necessary for the court to instruct the jury as to the
law of costs in case of acquittal.7
g. Verdict. Upon an indictment tinder a statute which makes it a mis
demeanor for any person to practise medicine for fee or reward without a license,
a special verdict which does not find that defendant practised "for fee or
reward " will not justify a conviction.8
h. Review'— (i) In General. The admission of incompetent evidence
which could not have harmed defendant is not reversible error.10 Where the
charge of the court is not in the record, it will be presumed that the jury were
properly instructed as to the offense for which defendant was on trial.11
(ii) Record. The record of a summary conviction under the Ontario Medi
cal Act18 for illegally practising medicine must set out the particular act or acts
which constitute the practising ; 13 and should, if possible, state the facts necessary
to bring it within the statute."
L Effect of Conviction. Where the offense denounced by the statute is of
such a continuous nature as to subject the violator to but one conviction for
98. Com. v. St. Pierre, 175 Mass. 48, 55
N. E. 482.
99. Antle v. State, 6 Tex. App. 202.
1. Kettles v. People, 221 111. 221, 77 N. E.
472; State v. Littoov, 37 Wash. 693, 7!) Pa«.
1135; State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 100, 79 Pac.
638.
2. Right to trial by jury in prosecutions
for practising without authority see Juriks,
24 Cyc. 142 et seq.
3. Springer t>. District of Columbia, 23
App. Cas. (D. C.) 50.
4. State v. Heath, 125 Iowa 585, 101 N. W.
429.
5. State v. Heffernan, 28 R. I. 20, 65 Atl.
284, holding that an instruction that a per
son who uses neither drugs nor medicine can
not be said to engage in the practice of medi
cine was inapplicable where the evidence
showed that defendant used nerve food which
he claimed supplied the capillary nerves of
the entire body, and was very good for all
ailments.
6. Aldenhoven v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. 6, 56
S. W. 914.
7. Com. v. Clymer, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 61.
8. State f. Call, 121 K. C. 643, 28 S. E.
517.
9. Review generally see Criminal Law, 12
Cyc. 331 et seq., 702 et seq.
10. Raynor v. State, 62 Wis. 289, 22 N. W.
430.
11. Richardson v. State, 47 Ark. 562, 2
S. W. 187.
12. Ont. Rev. St. (1807) c. 176, § 49;
Ont. Rev. St. (1887) c. 148, § 45.
13. Reg. v. Whelan, 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 277;
Reg. v. Coulson. 24 Ont. 240.
14. Reg. r. Hessel, 44 U. C. Q. B. 51. See
also Criminal Law, 12 Cyc. 328 et seq.
Insufficient statement.— A conviction stat
ing the offense as having been committed be
tween dates specified, by prescribing, etc., for
a certain person will be set aside if the
evidence discloses no offense as regards the
attendance upon such person ; and it cannot
be sustained by proof of altogether separate
offenses shown to have been committed
within the stated time as regards other per
sons. Reg. v. Whelan, 4 Can. Cr. Cas. 277.
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the whole period of time next before the institution of the prosecution, a con
viction under one indictment is a bar to proceedings under other similar indict
ments for previous acts, although each in itself constituted the practise of
medicine.”
III. RELATION TO PATIENT.
A. Nature of Relation. The relation of a physician to his patient is one of
trust and confidence, and while such relation does not per se forbid the acceptance
of a gift or conveyance by him from his patient,” the burden is on the physician
to prove that such gift or conveyance was fairly and honestly obtained, and that
the transaction was above suspicion." Any settlement made by a patient through
his physician, in "s.". of advice given mala fide, will be set aside.”É. Degree of Skill and Care Required — 1. GENERAL Rule — a. As to
Ordinary Practitioners. A physician or surgeon undertaking the treatment of a
patient is not required to exercise the highest degree of skill possible. ... He is only
required to possess and exercise that degree o
f
skill and learning ordinarily pos




his profession in good standing, practising
in similar localities, and it is his duty to use reasonable care and diligence in the
exercise o
f
his skill and the application o
f
his learning, and to act according to his
best judgment.”
15. Wilson v. Com., 119 Ky. 769, 82 S. W.
427, 26 Ky. L. Rep. 685. -
16. Audenreid's Appeal, 89 Pa. St. 114, 33
Am. Rep. 731; Audenreid v. Walker, 11 Phila.
(Pa.) 183.
17. Unruh v. Lukens, 166 Pa. St. 324, 31
Atl. 110, holding that the fairness of such a
transaction is not established by evidence
that the physician rendered professional serv
ices for a number o
f years without compensa
tion, where he does not attempt to fix their
value. ,











500. See also CoNTRACTs, 9 Cyc. 458.
19. Alabama.- McDonald v. Harris, 131
Ala. 359, 31 So. 548.
Connecticut.— Landon r.
Conn. 209, 23 Am. Dec. 333.
Illinois.-Quinn v. Donovan, 85 Ill. 194;
Hallam v. Means, 82 Ill. 379, 25 Am. Rep.
328; McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209; Ritchey
v
. West, 23 Ill. 385; Holtzman v. Hoy, 19
Ill. App. 459.
Iowa.-- Peck v. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa 320,
55 N. W. 511; Bowman v. Woods, 1 Greene
441.
Kansas.— Branner v. Stormont, 9 Kan. 51;
Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46.
Maine.— Ramsdell v. Grady, 97 Me. 319,
54 Atl. 763; Cayford v. Wilbur, 86 Me. 414,
2
9 Atl. 1117; Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594,
8
1 Am. Dec. 593; Simonds v. Henry, 39 Me.
155, 63 Am. Dec. 611; Howard v. Grover, 28
Me. 97, 48 Am. Dec. 478.
Maryland.— State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md.
162, 1
6 Atl. 382, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340, 2
L. R. A. 587.






Minnesota.- Getchell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 464.
Missouri.- McMurdock v. Kimberlin, 23
Mo. App. 523.
Nebraska.- Van Skike v. Potter, 53 Nebr.
28, 7
3 N. W. 295; Hewitt v. Eisenhart, 36
Nebr. 794, 55 N. W. 252.
New Hampshire.— Leighton v. Sargent, 27
N. H. 460, 59. Am. Dec. 388.




201, 49 N. E
. 760, 63 Am. St. Rep. 655;




Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. 488 [reversed




r. Craigue, 31 Barb. 534; Graves r. Santway,
2 Silv. Sup. 67, 6 N
.
Y








. Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. N
.
Cas.
45; Wells r. World's Dispensary Medical
Assoc., 9 N. Y. St. 452.
Ohio.— Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106,
6
5 N. E
. 865, 93 Am. St. Rep. 639; Tish v.




Pl. Dec. 725, 7 Ohio
N. P. 472.
Oregon.— Langford v. Jones, 18 Oreg. 307,
22 Pac. 1064; Heath v. Glisan, 3 Oreg. 64.
Pennsylvania.-McCandless v. McWha, 22
Pa. St. 261; Wohlert v. Seibert, 23 Pa.
Super. Ct. 213; Braunberger v. Cleis, 13 Am.
L. Reg. 587; Haire v. Reese, 7 Phila. 138.
Tennessee.— Wood v. Clapp, 4 Sneed 65.
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“The physician . . . is not a guarantor,





his treatment, but he only undertakes to
do what can ordinarily be done under similar
circumstances.” Ordronaux Jur. Med. 42
[quoted in Ely v. Wilbur, 49 N. J. L. 685, 10
Atl. 358, 441, 60 Am. Rep. 668].
An oculist who treats a patient must exer
cise the care and skill usually exercised b
y
oculists in good standing, and is liable for
gross mistakes. Stern v. Lanng, 106 La. 738,
31 So. 303.
A veterinary surgeon, in the absence of a
special contract, engages to use such reason
able skill, diligence, and attention as may be
ordinarily expected o
f persons in that pro
fession. He does not undertake to use the
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b. As to Specialists. A physician holding himself out as having special
knowledge and skill in the treatment of particular diseases is bound to bring to
the discharge of his duty to a patient employing him as such specialist, not merely
the average degree of skill possessed by general practitioners, but. that special
degree of skill and knowledge possessed by physicians who are specialists in the
treatment of such disease, in the light of the present state of scientific knowledge.*
2. Necessity of Following Professed or Recognized School, Systei:. or Treat
ment. Physicians are bound by what is universally settled in the profession;21
but the mere fact that writers on the treatment of a certain ailment or prac
tical surgeons prescribe a certain mode of treatment does not mak<> it incumbent
on a surgeon called to treat the ailment to conform to such system.*8 If the case
is a new one, the patient must trust the skill and experience of the physician
called, and likewise, if his injury or disease is attended with injury to other parts,
or other diseases develop for which there is no established mode of treatment ;*
*
but where the settled practice allows but one course of medical treatment in the
case, any departure of a physician therefrom may be regarded as the result of
want of knowledge or attention.*4 "Where there are different schools of practice,
all that any physician undertakes is that he understands and will faithfully treat
the case according to the recognized rules of his particular school.*5 To constitute
a school of medicine under this rule, it must have rules and principles of practice
for the guidance of all its members, as respects principles, diagnosis, and remedies,
which each member is supposed to observe in any given case.*8
highest degree of skill, nor an extraordinary
amount of diligence. Barney v. Pinkham, 29
Xebr. 350, 45 N. W. 694, 26 Am. St. Rep.
389.
" Ordinary skill," within the meaning of
the rule that a physician or surgeon is only
required to exercise ordinary care and skill,
means such degree of skill as is commonly
possessed by men engaged in the same pro
fession. Boon v. Murphy, 108 N. C. 187, 12
S. E. 1032; Heath v. Giisan, 3 Oreg. 64.
In use of X-rays. — In an action against a
physician for negligence in applying to plain
tiff's body X-rays to locate a foreign sub
stance thought to be in his lungs, the rule of
liability is the same as in other actions for
-malpractice, requiring ordinary care and pru
dence. Henslin v. Wheaton, 91 Minn. 219,
97 X. VV. 882, 103 Am. St. Rep. 504, 64
L. R. A. 126.
Effect of refusal of assistance from other
physicians.— The measure of skill which a
physician is bound to exercise is not affected
by his refusal of the proffer of assistance
from other physicians. Potter v. Warner, 91
Pa. St. 362, 36 Am. Rep. 668.
The term " duties of physician," as used
in a contract with a physician and surgeon
for their performance, includes in its general
and ordinary acceptation surgery, as well as
the administration of medicine. Wetherell
v. Marion County, 28 Iowa 22. See Clinton
County v. Ramsey, 20 111. App. 577, for simi
lar interpretation of words " medical treat
ment."
20. Baker v. Hancock, 29 Ind. App. 456,
63 X. E. 323, 64 X. E. 38, holding further
that the question when a physician becomes
a specialist is not one of law, but one of
fact primarily for his own determination;
but, when he holds himself out as a special
ist, it becomes his duty to use that degree of
skill which such a practitioner of necessity
should possess.
21. Burnham v. Jackson, 1 Colo. App. 237,
28 Pac. 250; Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46;
Hesse v. Knippel, 1 Mich. X. P. 109, where
it is said that a physician cannot try ex
periments with his patients to their injury.
22. Burnham v. Jackson, 1 Colo. App. 237,
28 Pac. 250.
23. Carpenter «. Blake, 60 Barb. (N. Y.)
488 [reversed on other grounds in 50 X. Y.
696].
24. Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am.
Dec. 593; Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb.
(X. Y. ) 488 [reversed on other grounds in 50
N. Y. 696], holding that if writers on the
treatment of dislocations, or if, in the ab
sence of such authority, practical surgeons,
prescribe a mode of reducing them, and of
treating the joint after the bones are re
placed, it is incumbent on surgeons called to
treat such an injury to conform to the sys
tem of treatment thus established; and, if
they depart from it, they do it at their
peril.
25. Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 27
Atl. 1116, 38 Am. St. Rep. 371, 22 L. R. A.
343; Bowman r. Woods, 1 Greene (Iowa)
441 ; Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am.
Dec. 593; Martin v. Courtney, 75 Minn. 255,
77 X. W. 813.
Known and recognized system. — It is suffi
cient if the practitioner follow a known and
recognized system. Williams r. Poppleton. 3
Oreg. 139.
26. Grainger v. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85
S. W. 1114, 70 L. R. A. 49; Xelson v. Har
rington, 72 Wis. 591, *0 X. W. 228, 7 Am.
St. Rep. 900, 1 L. R. A. 71fl. See also
Longan v. Weltmer, 180 Mo. 322, 79 S. W.
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3. DEPENDING ON NATURE OR CHARACTER of INJURY or Disease. Whatever ma
be the character of the injury or disease a physician is called on to treat, he is
only held to employ reasonable care and skill, to exercise only that degree of
skill which is ordinarily possessed by members of the profession in like localities.
He is not required to exercise care and skill proportionate to the character of
the injury or disease he treats, and he is not liable if he does not treat a severe
injury with such skill as it







Profession. In determining the degree of learning
and skill required o
f





the time.” It has been held erroneous, however, to charge that the
skill required is such as thoroughly educated physicians ordinarily exercise, as this






PRACTICE. Although there are some authorities
which tend to support the rule that a physician is bound to exercise only such a
degree o
f
care as is ordinarily exercised in his profession in the particular locality
in which he practises,” the better and more correct rule is that a physician and
surgeon is required to exercise that degree o
f knowledge, skill, and care which
physicians and surgeons practising in similar localities ordinarily possess.”





Christian science and clairvoyancy not be
ing recognized schools o
f medicine, one who
professes to cure disease by those systems o
f
treatment must be held to the standard of
care o
f
the ordinary physician in good stand
ing. Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40
N. W. 228, 7 Am. St. Rep. 900, l L. R. A.
719. Contra, Spead v. Tomlinson, 73 N. H.
46, 59 Atl. 376, 68 L. R
.
A. 432.
27. Utley v. Burns, 70 Ill. 162. -
28. Indiana, Baker r. Hancock, 29 Ind.
App. 456, 63 N
.
E





Iowa.-Ferrell v. Ellis, 129 Iowa 614, 105
N. W. 993; Peck v. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa
320, 55 N. W. 511; Almond v. Nugent, 34
Iowa 300, 11 Am. Rep. 147; Smothers v.
Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 11 Am. Rep. 141.
Michigan.- Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich.
501.
Minnesota.-Staloch v. Holm, 100 Minn.





North Carolina, McCracken v. Smathers,
122 N. C
. 799, 29 S
.
E. 354.




. 865, 93 Am. St. Rep. 639.
-
Pennsylvania.-- English v. Free, 205 Pa.
St. 624, 55 Atl. 777; McCandless v. McWha,
22 Pa. St. 261; Haire r. Reese, 7 Phila. 138.
Rhode Island.— Bigney v. Fisher, 26 R
.
I.
402, 59 Atl. 72.
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29. Peck r. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa 320, 55
N. W. 511; Hitchcock v. Burgett. 38 Mich.
501. But see McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa.
St. 261. .
The true measure is that degree o
f skill
ordinarily exercised in the profession by the
members thereof as a body, the average o
f
the skill and diligence ordinarily exercised by
the profession as a whole: not that exercised
b
y
the thoroughly educated, nor yet that ex
ercised by the moderately educated, nor
merely o
f
the well educated, but the average.
Almond v. Nugent, 34 Iowa 300, 11 Am. Rep.
147; Smothers v. Hanks, 34 Iowa 286, 11
Am. Rep. 141.





. Suppl. 360; Hathorn v. Rich
mond, 48 Vt. 557.
31. Indiana.- Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind.
497, 501 (where it
,
was said: “It will not
do, a
s
we think, to say, that if a surgeon or
physician has exercised such a degree o
f skill
as is ordinarily exercised in the particular
locality in which he practises, it will be suffi
cient. There might be but few practising in
the given locality, all of whom might be
quacks, ignorant pretenders to knowledge not
possessed by them, and it would not do to
say, that, because one possessed and exercised
as much skill as the others, he could not be
chargeable with the want o
f
reasonable
skill ”); Thomas v. Dabblemont, 31 Ind. App.
146, 6
7 N. E
. 463; Baker r. Hancock, 29 Ind.
App. 456, 63 N
.
E





Iowa.— Ferrell v. Ellis, 128 Iowa 614, 105




W. 324; Whitesell v. Hill, 101
Iowa 629, 70 N. W. 750, 37 L. R. A. 830.
But see Whitesell v. Hill, (1896) 66 N. W.
894.
Kentucky.— Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20,
69 S.W. 1096, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 791, 59 L. R. A.
277; Dorris v. Warford, 100 S
.
W. 312, 30









Massachusetts.- Small v. Howard, 128
Mass. 131, 35 Am. Rep. 363.
North Carolina.-McCracken v. Smathers,
122 N. C





Rhode Island.— Bigney v. Fisher, 26 R
.
I.
402, 59 Atl. 72.
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6. Depending on Compensation. The fact that a physician or surgeon renders
his services gratuitously does uot ahsolve lain from the duty to use reasonable and
ordinary care, skill, and diligence.8* But if one does not profess to be a physician,
or to practise as such, and is merely asked his advice as a friend or neighbor, he
incurs no professional responsibility.88
7. Insurance of Cure or Benefit. In the absence of a special contract to that
effect,84 a physician does not warrantor insure that his treatment will be success
ful or even beneficial,85 and he is not responsible in damages for want of success,
unless it be shown to result from a want of ordinary skill or diligence.36
8. In Determining Nat re of Injury or Malady and Mode of Treatment. A
physician or surgeon is bound to use reasonable knowledge and care in learning
the condition of his patient, in ascertaining if an operation is necessary, in deter
mining whether the time and place are proper, and in making a diagnosis of the
case.87
9. In Discontinuing Attendance. A physician, responding to the call of a
patient, thereby becomes engaged, in the absence of a special agreement, to attend
to the case, so long as it requires attention, unless he gives notice to the contrary
32. McNevins v. Lowe, 40 111.209 ; Du Bois
v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325, 29 N, K. 313, 27
Am. St. Rep. 52!), 14 L. R. A. 429; Becker v.
■Janinski, 15 X. Y. Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. N.
Cas. 45; Gladwell v. Steggall, 5 Biilg. N. Cas.
733, 3 Jur. 535, 8 L. J. C. P. 361, 8 Scott 60,
35 E. C. L. 391. See also Peck .c. Hutchinson,
88 Iowa 320, 55 X. VV. 511.
33. McNevins v. Lowe, 40 111. 209 ; Ritchey
v. West, 23 111. 385 ; Higgins v. McCabe, 126
Mass. 13, 30 Am. Rep. 642.
34. Connecticut.— StyleB v. Tyler, 64 Conn.
432, 30 Atl. 165.
New York.— Brongon v. Hoffman, 7 Hun
674.
Ohio. — Craig f. Chambers, 17 Ohio St.
253.
Oklahoma.— Champion v. Kieth, 17 Okla.
204, 87 Pac. 845.
llVsf Virginia. — Dye r. Corbin, 59 W. Va.
266. 53 S. E. 147.
United Mates.— Ewing r. Goode, 78 Fed.
442.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Suregons," § 23.
Express promise necessary. — An allegation
in the declaration in an action for miscon
duct in setting a fractured bone that defend
ant promised to perfect a cure can only be
sustained by positive proof of an express
promise, as the law does not raise, by im
plication, such an undertaking. Grindle v.
Rush, 7 Ohio, Pt. II, 123.
Illustration of contract.— Where a dentist
inserted in a receipted bill, given for the
price of a set of teeth, the words "war
ranted for one year; and if on trial they
cannot he made useful, the teeth to be re
turned and the money refunded," if the pur
chaser, by a fair trial of the teeth, according
to the instructions given him at the time
they were delivered, could not make them
useful, he had a right to return them within
a year and recover the price. Davis v. Ball,
0 Cuah. (Mass.) 505. 53 Am. Dec. 53.
35. Illinois. — Quinn v. Donovan, 85 111.
104: McKee v. Allen. 94 111. App. 147;
Vunker r. Marshall, 65 111. App. 607.
Kansas — Tefft C. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 40.
Missouri.— Vanhooser r. Berghoff, 90 Mo.
487, 3 S. W. 72; Logan v. Field, 75 Mo. App.
594.
Xew York.— Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N. Y.
201, 49 N. E. 700, 63 Am. St. Rep. 655;
Becker r. Janinski, 15 X. Y. Suppl. 675, 27
Abb. X. Cas. 45; Boldt v. Murray, 2 N. Y.
St. 232.
Ohio. — Gallaher v. Thompson, Wright 466;
Bliss v. Long, Wright 351.
Oregon. — Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oreg.
139.
Pennsylvania. — McCandless v. McWha, 22
Pa. St. 261 ; Haire c. Reese, 7 Phila. 138.
Texas. — Graham r. Gautier, 21 Tex. Ill;
Wilkins v. Ferrell, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 231,
30 S. W. 450.
England.— Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P.
475, 34 E. C. L. 844.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and Sur
geons," § 23.
The implied contract of a physician treat
ing a fractured limb is not to restore it in its
natural perfectness, but to treat it with that
degree of diligence and skill which is ordi
narily possessed by the average of the mem
bers of the profession in similar localities,
regard being had to the state of the medical
profession at the time. Bigney v. Fisher, 26
R. I. 402, 59 Atl. 72. See also MacKenzie v.
Carman. 103 X. Y. App. Div. 246, 92 X. Y.
Suppl. 1003.
36. Maine.— Patten r. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594,
81 Am. Dec. 593.
Nebraska.— O'Hara r. Wells, 14 Xebr. 403,
15 X. W. 722.
Ohio.— Tish r. Welker, 5 Ohio S. * C. PI.
Dee. 725. 7 Ohio X. P. 472.
Oklahoma.— Champion V. Kieth, 17 Okla.
204, 87 Pac. 845.
Pennet/lvan-ia. — Tiedeman v. Loewengrund,
2 Wklv. Xotes Cas. 272.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and Sur
geons," § 23.
37. Quinn r. Donovan, 85 III. 194 (holding
that an instruction, in an action against a
surgeon for mistreatment of a fracture, that
mi, b, 9i
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or is discharged by the patient and he is bound to use ordinary care and skill
not only in his attendance, but in determining when it may be safely and prop
erly discontinued.3* But if the patient goes to the office of the physician, from
whom he receives proper treatment, and then fails to return for further treat
ment, in consequence of which he suffers, he has no right of action against the
physician.40
10. In Using Anesthetics. Where a patient is put under the influence of an
anesthetic, depriving him of the use of his faculties, physicians, surgeons, and
dentists are required to use the highest professional skill and diligence to avoid
every possible danger.41 But they are only bound to look to natnral and probable
effects,42 and are not answerable for results arising from the peculiar condition or
temperament of a patient, of which they had no knowledge.43
11. In Giving Instructions. It is the duty of a physician or surgeon, in taking
charge of a case, such as a broken limb, to give his patient all necessary and
proper instructions as to what care and attention the patient should give the
limb, in the absence of the physician, and the caution to be observed in the use
of the limb before it is entirely healed,44 and for failure to discharge his duty in
this respect he may be liable in damages.45
12. To Avoid Communicating Contagious Diseases. It is the duty of physicians
who are attending patients afflicted with contagious diseases, when called to attend
other patients, to take all such precautionary means as experience has proved to
be necessary to prevent its communication to them.46
IV. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OR MALPRACTICE.47
A. Practitioners Subject to Liability. A physician need not be qualified
to practise in order to render himself liable for negligence or malpractice. If, by
treating, operating on, or prescribing for physical ailments, a person holds himself
out as a physician to persons employing him, and they believe him to be a physi
cian, he will be chargeable as such.48 But one who does not profess to be a phy
sician, and volunteers to attend a sick person merely as an act of kindness, and
without expectation of reward, incurs no liability, although his treatment of the
case is improper.49
if defendant could have learned the nature
of the injury, and applied the proper remedy,
and failed to do ao, he was' liable, requires
too great a degree of skill) ; 'Patten v. Wig-
gin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am. Dec. 593; Graves
V. Santway, 2 Silv. Sup. (N. Y.) 67, 6 N. Y.
Suppl. 892 [affirmed in 127 N. Y. 677, 28
N. E. 256].
38. Williams t>.Gilman, 71 Me. 21 ; Ballou
v. Prescott, 64 Me. 306; Barbour v. Martin,
62 Me. 536; Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 383,
35 Atl. 1094; Gerken v. Plimpton, 62 N. Y.
App. Div. 35, 70 N. Y. Suppl. 793 ; Boom v.
Reed, 69 Hun (N. Y.) 426, 23 N. Y. Suppl.
421; Potter v. Virgil, 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 578;
Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106. 65 N. E.
865, 93 Am. St. Rep. 639.
When a physician engages to attend a pa
tient without limitation of time, he can cease
his visits only with the consent of the pa
tient, or on giving the patient timely notice,
or when the patient no longer requires medi
cal treatment. Becker v. Janinski, 15 N. Y.
Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45.
39. Mucci v. Houghton, 89 Iowa 608, 57
N. W. 305; Ballou r. Prescott, 64 Me. 305;
Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 36 Atl.
1094.
40. Dashiell f. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35
Atl. 1094.
41. Keily v. Colton, 1 N. Y. City Ct. 439.
42. Bogle v. Winslow, 5 Phila. (Pa.) 136.
43. Bogle r. Winslow. 5 Phila. (Pa.) 136.
44: Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. (N. Y.)
488 [reversed on other grounds in 50 N. Y.
696] ; Tish v. Welker, 5 Ohio S. 4 C. PI.
Dec. 725, 7 Ohio N. P. 472.
45. Beck v. German Klinik, 78 Iowa 696,
43 N. W. 617, 7 L. R. A. 566.
46. Piper v. Menifee, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.)
465. 54 Am. Dec. 547.
47. Carrier not liable for malpractice of
physician employed by its servant to care for
passenger see Carriers. 6 Cvc. 600 note 74.
48. Matthei t. Woolev. 69 III. App. 654;
Musser v. Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577 (holding
that an empiric is liable to a civil action for
malpractice notwithstanding it is made a
penal offense for such a person to practis?
medicine in anv of its departments) ; XeHon
v. Harrington, '72 Wis. 591, 40 N. \V. 228. 7
Am. St. Rep. 900, 1 L. R. A. 719; Jones r.
Fav, 4 F. & F. 525; Ruddock v. Lowe, 4
V. & F. 519. '
49. Higgins v. McCabe, 126 Mass. 13, 30
Am. Rep. 642.
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B. Acts or Omissions Constituting Negligence or Malpractice — 1. In
General. It being the duty of a physician or surgeon to possess a reasonable
degree of learning and skill, to exercise ordinary care and diligence, and to use
his best judgment in all cases of doubt,50 he will be liable for a failure to conform
to ihe proper standard whereby injury results to a patient ; 51 but mere lack of skill
or negligence without injury gives no right to recover even nominal damages.52 If
a physician follows the established practice, and no gross error is shown, he is not
liable for injuries caused by the treatment.53 Nor is he liable for want of success.54
2. Refusal to Take Case. A physician, not being bound to render professional
services to everyone who applies, is not liable for arbitrarily refusing to respond
to a call, although he is the only physician available.85
8. Failure to Discover Nature of Injury or Ailment. A patient is entitled to
an ordinarily careful and thorough examination, such as the circumstances, the con
dition of the patient, and the physician's opportunities for examination will per
mit.56 If there is reasonable opportunity for examination, and the nature of the
injury or ailment can be discovered by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence,
then a physician is answerable for failure to make such discovery ; 57 otherwise
not.58 So too it has been held that if a physician, by the exercise of reasonable
care and skill, ought to discover that an ailment is incurable, that it will not yield
to usual treatment, and that the patient will not be benefited, and fails to make
such discovery and advise the patient thereof, he is guilty of negligence.69 1 -
4; Wrong Diagnosis. A wrong diagnosis of a case, resulting from a want of
skill or care on the part of the physician, and followed by improper treatment, to
the injury of the patient, renders the physician liable in damages ; 60 and the fact
that the same results would have ensued even without the improper treatment is
immaterial on the question of the physician's liability.61 But unless improper
treatment follows, a wrong diagnosis gives no right of action.62 The fact that
information and not medical treatment was sought does not excuse negligence in
making the diagnosis.63 But a general practitioner will not be held liable for
making a wrong diagnosis of a very rare disease, which can only be detected by a
skilled expert.64 Nor does a mere omission by a patient's attending physician to
50. See supra, III, B.
51. Barney v. Pinkham, 29 Nebr. 350, 45
N. W. 604, 26 Am. St. Rep. 389; McCracken
v. Smathers, 122 N. C. 790, 20 S. E. 354;
Wohlert r. Seibert, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 213 ;
Seare e. Prentice, 8 East 348; Rich e. Pier-
pont, 3 F. & F. 35. See also cases cited
supra, III, B, 1, a.
52. Ewing r. Goode, 78 Fed. 442.
53. McKee v. Allen, 94 111.App. 147 ; Stern
V. Lanng, 106 La. 738, 31 So. 303; Stevenson
r. Gelsthorpe, 10 Mont. 563, 27 Pac. 404.
54. Champion v. Kieth, 17 Okla. 204, 87
Pac. 845. See also cases cited supra, III,
B, 7.
55. Hurlev e. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59
K. E. 1058, "83 Am. St. Rep. 108, 53 L. R. A.
135.
56. Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 69 S. W.
1096, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 791, 59 L. R. A- 277.
57. Manser v. Collins, 69 Kan. 290, 70 Pac.
851: Burk V. Foster, 114 Ky. 20, 09 8. W.
1096, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 791, 59 L. R. A. 277;
Lewis v. Dwinell, 84 Me. 497, 24 Atl. 945.
58. Gedney v. Kingslev, 16 N. Y. Suppl.
702 ; Langford v. Jones, 19 Oreg. 307, 22 Pac.
1064.
The failure of a physician to discover that
his patient's arm is dislocated is not negli
gence, where he made more than one careful
examination of the injured arm, and called
in another physician for consultation. James
v. Crockett, 34 N. Brunsw. 540.
59. Logan v. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594,
60. Grainger c. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85
S. W. 1114, 70 L. R. A. 49.
61. Grainger C. Still, 187 Mo. 197, 85
S. W. 1114, 70 L. R. A. 49.
62. Tomer v. Aiken, 126 Iowa 114, 101
N. W. 769.
A physician or surgeon is not chargeable
for ignorance of a case, if he prescribes for
it rightly. Fowler v. Sergeant, 1 Grant
(Pa.) 355. , .
63. Harriott t>.Plimpton, 166 Mass. 585, 44
N. E. 992.
64. Wohlert f. Seibert, 23 Pa. Super. Ct,
213, holding that a physician who is merely
a general practitioner cannot be held liable
in damages to n patient for diagnosing and
treating a disease of the eye as conjunctivitis,
when it was in fact glaucoma, where the evi
dence shows that glaucoma is a very rare
disease; that it is incurable in character;
that its certain diagnosis could be made only
by the skilled expert, of special training,
skill, and experience ; that it should be treated
with remedies and appliances which are never
expected to be within the reach of the gen
eral practitioner of medicine; that its promi
[IV. B, 4]
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use ordinary skill in diagnosing Ills disease l)efore rejmrting it to the board of
health as a case of smallpox give a right of action.65
5. Failure to Follow Established Practice.66 It has been broadly stated that
any deviation from the established mode of practice is sufficient to charge a phy
sician with liability in case of any injury arising to the patient.67 When a par
ticular mode of treatment is upheld by a consensus of opinion of the members of
the profession, it should be followed by the ordinary practitioner; and if a phy
sician 6ees fit to experiment with some other mode he does so at his own peril.88
If, however, the character of the injury or disease is such that the patient cannot
endure the most approved method of treatment in such cases, then a failure to
resort to such treatment does not show a want of skill or negligence.69 When the
treatment adopted is not in accordance with established practice, but is positively
injurious, the case is not one of negligence, but of want of skill.™
6. Abandonment or Neglect of Case — a. Unwarranted Abandonment. The
unwarranted abandonment of a case at a critical period, resulting in increased
pain and suffering on the part of the patient, will render the physician liable in
damages.71
b. Failure to Attend With Sufficient Frequency. A physician is not charge
able with neglect on account of the intervals elapsing between his visits, where
the injury requires no attention during the intervals; but is negligent where
attention is required.72
e. Temporarily Leaving Practice. A physician has a right to leave tempo
rarily his practice if he makes provision for the attendance of a competent physi
cian upon his patients.73 If he notifies a patient that he is going away, and iudi
cates who will attend him in his stead, no neglect can be imputed to him.74 But
a physician who leaves a patient in a critical stage of the disease, without reason,
or sufficient notice to enable the party to procure another medical attendant, is
guilty of a culpable dereliction of duty, and is liable therefor.75
7. Performing Operation Without Consent — a. Of Patient. Where a patient
nent symptoms were so nearly identical with
those of conjunctivitis that the diagnosis
made by defendant was one reasonably to be
expected from a general practitioner; and
that the treatment given was not found
faulty by any general practitioner or expert
who testified in the case.
65. Brown r. Purdy, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct.
109.
66. See also supra, III, B, 2.
67. Patten r. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am.
Dec. 593; Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N. Y. 201,
49 N. E. 7G0, 63 Am. St. Rep. 655.
Advice in immaterial matter.— In an action
against a surgeon for damages caused by his
unskilfulness or negligence in reducing a frac
ture of plaintiff's arm. the fact that defend
ant advised bathing the parts with a decoc
tion of wormwood and vinegar, which the
expert testimony condemned, was not such a
departure from approved medical treatment
as to entitle plaintiff to recover. Winner
r. I.athrop, 67 Hun (N. Y.) 511, 22 N. Y.
Suppl. 516.
Evidence held insufficient to show devia
tion from christian science treatment see
Spead v. Tomlinson. 73 N. H. 46, 59 Atl.
376. 08 L. R. A. 432.
68. Jackson r. Burnliam, 20 Colo. 532, 39
Pac. 577; Hesse l\ Knippcl. 1 Mich. N. P.
109; Slater r. Baker, 2 Wils. C. P. 359.
69. TTallnm v. Means, 82 111. 379. 25 Am.
Rep. 328.
70. Carpenter r. Blake, 60 Barb. (X. Y.)
488 [reversed on other grounds in 50 X. Y.
696].
71. Lathrope r. Flood, (Cal. 1901) 63 Pac.
1007.
72. Tomer f. Aiken, 126 Iowa 114, 101
N. W. 709.
Whether a physician is negligent in per
mitting certain intervals to elapse between
his calls on his patient depends on the cus
tom, in similar localities, in the treatment
of similar cases, and not upon the custom
of any particular physician in his own prac
tice. Tomer tr. Aik'en, 126 Iowa 114, 101
N. W. 709.
The fact that one of two physicians em
ployed to attend an injured person was neg
ligent in not attending his patient with suffi
cient frequency is immaterial on the liability
of the other, who was discharged from attend
ing after his first call. Tomer t. Aiken, 126
Iowa 114, 101 N. W. 769.
73. Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442.
74. Becker r. Janinski, 15 N. Y. Snppl.
675. 27 Abb. X. Cas. 45.
Where a physician remains away longet
than he had notified the patient, and injury
results from the lack of treatment during
that time, the physician is liable for mal
practice. Gerken r. Plimpton, 62 JC. Y. App.
Div. 35, 70 N. Y. Suppl. 793.
75. Barbour r. Martin, 62 Me. 53fi. T>ao-
forth, J., delivering the opinion of the court.
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is in possession of his faculties and in such physical health as to be able to consult
about his condition, and where no emergency exists making it impracticable to
confer with him, his consent is a prerequisite to a surgical operation by his physi
cian.76 If, however, a patient voluntarily submits to an operation, his consent will
l>e presumed, unless he was the victim of false and fraudulent misrepresenta
tions.77 Where an emergency arises calling for immediate action for the preser
vation of the life or health of the patient, and it is impracticable to obtain his
consent or the consent of any one authorized to speak for him, it is the duty of
the physician to perform such operation as good surgery demands, without bucIi
consent.78 And again if
,
in the course of an operation to which the patient con
sented, the physician discovers conditions not anticipated before the operation was
commenced, and which, if not removed, would endanger the life of the patient,
he will, although no express consent be obtained or given, be justified in extending
the operation to remove and overcome them.79
b. Of Husband or Father. Whether or not the consent of the husband or
father to the performance of an operation upon a married woman or child is neces
sary is not well settled. One case holds that surgeons are justified in performing
an operation upon a married woman with her consent, when they deem it neces
sary, whether her husband consents or not,80 Other cases, apparently assuming
that the husband's consent is necessary, hold that, by placing his wife under the
care of a surgeon for treatment, a husband impliedly consents to such operations
as may be found necessary or expedient.81 A father's consent to the performance
of an operation upon a child seventeen years of age has been held unnecessary.82
8. Failure to Give Instructions. Although a physician may have exercised a
proper degree of skill and care in his treatment of a case, still if he fails to give
the patient or his attendants proper instructions as to the care and attention best
calculated to effect a care, ho is guilty of negligence for which he may be held
liable.83
9. Communicating Contagious Disease. A physician who, knowing that he
has an infectious disease, continues to visit a patient without apprising him of
the fact and without proper precautions on his own part, and communicates to
him this disease, is responsible for the consequent damage, including as well the
suffering, danger, and loss of time, as the expense necessarily occasioned b
y the
76. Pratt c. Davis, 224 111. 300, 79 X. E.
562, 7 L R. A. N. S. (509 [affirming 118 111.
App. 101]; Mohr r. Williams, 95 Minn. 201,
104 X. W. 12, 111 Am. St. Rep. 402, 1
L. R. A. X. S. 439.
77. State c. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 102, 10
Atl. 382, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340, 2 L. R. A.
587; McClallen f. Adams, 19 Pick. (Mass.)
333, 31 Am. Dee. 140.
Consent presumed. — In an English case it
has even been held that consent will be pre
sumed notwithstanding the fact of a direct
prohibition to perform the operation under
certain circumstances. Beatty r. Culling-
worth, 44 Cent. L. J. 153.
78. Pratt r. Davis, 224 III. 300, 79 N. E.
662, 7 L. R. A. N. S. 009 [affirming 118 111.
App. 101]; Short's Succession, 45 La. Ann.
1485, 14 So. 184; Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
201, 104 K. W. 12, 111 Am. St. Rep. 402, 1
L. R. A. X. S. 439. See 4 Mich. L. Rev.
49-51.
79. Mohr r. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104
N. W. 12, 111 Am. St. Rep. 402, 1 L. R. A.
N. S. 439.
A surgeon who undertakes to perform a
minor operation on a patient is justified in
performing a major operation, without the
consent of the person operated upon, should
such major operation be necessary to save
the life of the patient. Parnell t. Springle,
5 Rev. de Jur. 74.
80. State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 102, 16
Atl. 382, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340, 2 L. R. A.
587, holding that a husband has no power
to withhold from his wife the medical assist
ance which her case may require.
81. McClallen r. Adams, 19 Pick. (Mass.)
333, 31 Am. Dec. 140.
Authority given by a husband to perform
one operation upon his wife will not confer
any authority to perform a second. Pratt v.
Davis, 224 111. 300, 79 X. E. 502, 7 L. R. A.
X. S. 609 [affirming 118 111.App. 101]. Scott
C. J., delivering the opinion of the court.
82. Bakker t. Welsh, 144 Mich. 032, 103
N. W. 94, 7 L. R. A. N. S. 012. See 5 Mich.
L. Rev. 40, 41.
83. Beck v. German Klinik, 78 Iowa 696,
43 X. W. 617. 7 L. R. A. 508: Carpenter v.
Blake, 75 X. Y. 12; Cari*nter r. Blake, GO
Barb. (X. Y.) 488 [reversed on other
grounds in 50 N. V. 690]. See abo cases





1578 [SOCyc] PHYSICIANS AND SUBGEONS
second disease, thus produced by his own wrongful act.84 So also where a sur
geon, while in attendance on a patient, directs the latter's wife to assist in dressing
a wound, knowing that there was danger of infection, but negligently assuring
her that there was no such danger, and she relies on his advice, and becomes
infected with poison, the surgeon is liable.85 ./
10. Intrusion of Unprofessional Assistant. Where a physician takes an
unprofessional, unmarried man with him to attend a confinement case, when there
was no emergency, both are liable in damages to the woman.86
11. Mistake in Prescription. Where a physician, by a lapms calami, makes
a mistake in a prescription, as the result of which the patient dies, the fact that
the druggist who fills the prescription is also negligent is no defense in an action
against trie physician for malpractice.87 But a physician is not liable for tiie
druggist's negligence in putting up a prescription properly written by the
physician.88
12. Malpractice Resulting in Death. A physician is liable for malpractice
resulting in death, if it was the proximate cause thereof.89 But if death was
caused by a disease not resulting from a surgical operation in question the
surgeon is not liable.90
13. Errors of Judgment. A physician entitled to practise his profession, pos
sessing the requisite qualifications, and applying his skill and judgment with due
care, is not ordinarily liable for damages consequent upon an honest mistake or
an error of judgment in making a diagnosis, in prescribing treatment, or in deter
mining upon an operation, where there is reasonable doubt as to the nature of the
physical conditions involved, or as to what should have been done in accordance
with recognized authority and good current practice.91 Whether errors of judg
ment will or will not make a physician liable in a given case depends not merely
upon the fact that he maybe ordinarily skilful as such, but whether he has
treated the case skilfully or has exercised in its treatment such reasonable skill
and diligence as is ordinarily exercised in his profession.92 There is a fundamental
difference in malpractice cases between mere errors of judgment and negligence
84. Piper v. Menifee, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.)
465. 54 Am. Dec. 547, by way of argument.
85. Edwards t. Lamb, 69 N. H. 599, 45
Atl. 480, 50 L. R. A. 160, holding that where
plaintiff, under the direction of defendant, a
surgeon, assisted in dressing a wound of her
husband, and became infected with poison by
reason of slight scratches on her fingers, de
fendant, knowing the danger, was guilty of
negligence in assuring her there wag none,
since he was not justified in assuming that
her hands were free from such wounds.
86. De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9
X. W. 140, 41 Am. Rep. 154, holding further
that it makes no difference that the patient
or her husband supposed at the time that
the intruder was a medical man, and there
fore submitted without objection to his pres
ence.
87. Murdock v. Walker, 43 111. App. 590.
88. Stretton v. Holmes, 19 Ont. 286.
89. Braunberger v. Cleis, 13 Am. L. Reg.
(Pa.) 587.
90. State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16
Atl. 382, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340, 2 L. R. A.
587.
91. Illinois.— McKee v. Allen, 94 111. App.
147.
Kansas.— Tefft r. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46.
Minnesota.— Staloch r. Holm, 100 Minn.
270, 111 X. W. 264, 9 L. R. A. X. S. 712.
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Missouri. — Vanhooser r. Berghoff, 90 Mo.
487, 3 S. W. 72.
New York.— Becker c. Janinski, 15 X. V.
Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. X. Cas. 45; Wells r.
World's Dispensary Medical Assoc., 9 X. Y.
St. 452.
Oregon. — Heath v. Glisan, 3 Oreg. 64.
Texas. — Graham v. Gautier, 21 Tex. Ill:
Wilkins v. Ferrell, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 231, 30
S. W. 450.
West Virginia. — Dve r. Corbin, 59 W. Va_
266, 53 S. E. 147.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 32.
The reasons for excepting malpractice cases
from the rule that the exercise of defendants
best judgment is no defense to an action for
negligence are to be found in the character
of emergencies physicians meet which often
preclude deliberation: in the nature of their
undertaking which contracts for individual
judgment and skill; in the peculiarity of the
human constitution, which presents difficul
ties not arising from insensate matter; ia
the nature of medical science, which is based
on progressive knowledge ; and in the in
herent uncertainty of the expert testimony
involved. Staloch v. Holm. 100 "Minn 'TS,
111 X. W. 264, 9 L. R. A. X. S. 712.
92. West v. Martin, 31 Mo. 375, 80 Am.
Dec. 107.
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in previously collecting data essential to a proper conclusion, or in subsequent con-
dnct in the selection and use of instrumentalities with which the physician may
execute his judgment. If he omits to inform himself as to the facts and
circumstances, and injury results therefrom, then he is liable.93
14. Fraud and Deceit.94 It is the duty of a physician to act with the utmost
good faith toward his patient, and if he knows that he cannot accomplish a cure,
or that the treatment adopted will probably be of no benefit, it is his duty to advise
his patient of these facts, and if he fails to do so he is guilty of a breach of duty.95
But to recover on account of deceit based on his statement that he could and
would cure plaintiff, the latter must not only prove that the representation was
false, but also that it was made with a fraudulent intent.98
16. Wrongful Certificate of Insanity.97 Without statutory provisions to that
effect, a civil action for damages against a physician for certifying to a person's
insanity cannot be based on the insufficiency of the methods which he pursued in
reaching and certifying a correct conclusion.98 In an action against a physician
for falsely certifying, through malice or negligence, to the insanity of plaintiff,
the falsehood, and not the insufficiency of the certificate, is the ground of action
against defendant.90 Therefore a physician who signs a certificate of insanity
which is false, without exercising ordinary care and prudence in making his
examination, and without making due inquiry into the question of sanity, is liable
to an action for damages.1 Nor is he the less liable for the want of such due care
and inquiry because he has acted bona fide? But a physician who signs a certifi
cate of insanity when the patient is sane is not liable therefor where the certificate
was signed after making an examination, and the mistake was due merely to an
error of judgment, provided the physician brings to the case the learning, care,
and diligence required by law.8 In such an action the burden is on plaintiff to
show negligence,4 and also to show that at the time the certificate of insanity was
given he was in fact sane.5 Defendant may show under what circumstances and
on what information he acted in making such certificate.6 If such evidence does
not go to the extent of a justification in case the certificate is found to be false? it
is proper evidence to be considered in awarding damages.7
"
,. ,
16. Effect of Contributory Negligence. It is the duty of a patient to coop
erate with his physician and conform to the necessary prescriptions and treatment,
and follow all reasonable instructions given.8 Therefore it is a good defense to
For there may be responsibility where there
is no neglect if the error of judgment is so
gross as to be inconsistent with the use of
tlmt degree of skill that it is the duty of
every physician to bring to the treatment of
a case. McKee r. Allen, 94 111. App. 147 ;
West v. Martin, 31 Mo. 375, 80 Am. Dec.
107 ; Becker v. Janinski, 15 M. Y. Suppl. 675,
27 Abb. N. Cas. 45 ; Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va.
266, 53 S. E. 147. •■ •
1
93. Stoloeh v. Holm, 100 Minn. 276, 111
N. W. 264, 9 L. E. A. N. S. 712; Johnson v.
Winston, 68 Nebr. 425, 94 N. W. 607.
94. Action of deceit generally see 20 Cyc. 1.
95. Logan v. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594.
For example, where a physician in charge
of a sanitarium represents to an invalid,
without knowing the truth or falsity of the
representation, that if the latter will take
treatment at the sanitarium he can be cured,
and the invalid relies thereon, and enters the
sanitarium, but is not cured, the physician
is liable in an action for deceit. Hedin v.
Minneapolis Medical, etc., Inst., 62 Minn.
146, 64 N. W. 158, 54 Am. St. Rep. 628, 35
L. R. A. 417.
96. Hedin v. Minneapolis Medical, etc.,
Inst., 62 Minn. 146, 64 N. W. 158, 54 Am.
St. Rep. 628, 35 L. R. A. 417; Spead v.
Tomlinson, 73 N. H. 46, 59 Atl. 376, 68
L. R. A. 432.
97. Examination of insane persons in gen
eral see Insane Persons, 22 Cyc. 1123 et
seq.
" < 11 : * - >.
98. Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163.
99. Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163.
1. Avers t. Russell, 50 Hun (N. Y.) 282,
3 N. Y. Suppl. 338; Hall t\ Semple, 3 F. & F.
337.
2. Hall r. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337.
3. Williams v. Le Bar, 141 Pa. St. 149, 21
Atl. 525; Hall v. Semple, 3 F. & F. 337.
4. Williams v. Le Bar, 141 Pa. St. 149, 21
Atl. 525.
5. Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163.
8. Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163.
7. Pennell v. Cummings, 75 Me. 163.
8. HaeTing «. Spicer, 92 111. App. 449;
Tish v. Welker, 5 Ohio S. & C. PI. Dec. 725,
7 Ohio N. P. 472; McCandless V. McWha, 22
Pa. St. 261; Haire if. Reese, 7 Phila. (Pa.)
138; Lawson f. Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, le
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an action for malpractice, where the physician or surgeon is charged with negli
gence or the non-observance of proper care or the want of skill in performing tlie
services undertaken, that the patient was guilty of negligence at the time which
conduced or contributed to produce the injury complained of;' but it will not
suffice to defeat the action that the patient was subsequently negligent, and
thereby conduced to the aggravation of the injury primarily sustained at the
hands of the physician or surgeon, and such conduct on the part of the patient is
pertinent only in mitigation of damages.10
S. E. 504, 38 Am. St. Ren. 17, IS L. R. A.
(i27.
9. Illinois.— Haering v. Spicer, 92 111.App.
449.
Indiana,— Lower v. Franks, 115 Ind. 3:!4,
17 N. E. 630; Gramm v. Bocner, 50 lnd.
497; Young v. Mason, 8 Ind. App. 204, 35
N. E. 521.
Massachusetts.— Ilibbard v. Thompson, 109
Mass. 280, where it is said that a patient
cannot recover, either in contract or in tort,
for injuries consequent upon unskilful or
negligent treatment by his physician, if his
own negligence directly contributed to them
to an extent which cannot be distinguished
and separated.
Michigan. — Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich.
501.
Minnesota.—Chamberlain v. Porter, 9
Minn 260.
Missouri. — West v. Martin, 31 Mo. 375, 80
Am. Dec. 107.
'New York.— Becker v. Janinski, 15 N. Y.
Suppl. 075, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45.
Ohio.— Geiselman r. Scott, 25 Ohio St.
86.
Oregon. — Beadle r. Paine, 46 Oreg. 424,
80 Pac. 903.
Pennsylvania. — Richards r. Willard, 176
Pa. St. 181, 35 Atl. 114; Potter v. Warner,
91 Pa. St. 302, 36 Am. Rep. 668; MeCand-
less v. McWha, 22 Pa. St. 261; Ilaire v.
Reese, 7 Phila. 138.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. "Physicians and
Surgeons," $ 33.
Failure to return to physician.— In an ac
tion for malpractice, an instruction that, if
plaintiff was told by defendant to visit him
again as soon as he felt any pain, and, al
though feeling pain for a week, he neglected
to call, he was guilty of contributory negli
gence preventing recovery was correct. Jones
V. Angell, 95 Ind. 376.
Refusal to permit proper treatment.—
Where a patient is delirious, and the mem
bers of his family having him in»charge re
fuse to allow the proposed treatment, the
physician or surgeon will not be required to
use force, and will not be liable for any in
jury to limb or health resulting from a fail
ure to use the proposed treatment. Little-
john v. Arbogast, 95 111. App. 605. Where
a surgeon is prevented from reducing a dis
location by the refusal of his patient to
submit to the operation, the surgeon cannot
be held liable for damaces resulting there
from. Littlejohn v. Arbo"ast. supra.
Operation performed at instance of patient.
— If a surgeon, when called on, advises the
patient, who is of mature years and of sound
mind, that the proposed operation is un
necessary and improper, and the patient still
insists on its performance, and the surgeon
thereupon performs it, he cannot be held re
sponsible to the patient for damages, on the
ground that the operation was improper and
injurious, as in such case the patient relies
on his own judgment, and not on that of the
surgeon, as to the propriety of the opera
tion ; and he cannot complain of an operation
performed at his own instance and on his
own judgment. Gramm r. Boener, 56 Ind.
497.
Information given to patient mast be con
sidered. — The information given by a sur
geon to his patient concerning the nature of
his malady is a circumstance that should be
considered in determining whether the pa
tient, in disobeying the instructions of the
surgeon, was guilty of contributor}' negli-
f;nce
or not. Geiselman c. Scott, 25 Ohio
t. 80.
" Directly " contributed proper.— In an ac
tion for malpractice, an instruction requir
ing the jury to find that plaintiff's own negli
gence directly contributed to the injury,
before they could on that ground rind for
defendant, is not erroneous for using the
word " directly," instead of " proximately."
Davis r. Spicer, 27 Mo. App. 279.
10. Illinois.— Morris c. Despain, 104 111.
App. 452.
Missouri. — Sanderson t. Holland, 39 Mo.
App. 233.
New York.— Du Bois r. Decker, 130 K. Y.
325, 29 N. E. 313, 27 Am. St. Rep. 529. 14
L. R. A. 429 [affirming 4 N. Y. Suppl. 768] :
Carpenter v. Blake, 75 N. Y. 12.
North Carolina. — McCracken t>. Smathers.
122 N". C. 799, 29 S. E. 354.
Oregon. — Beadle v. Paine, 46 Oreg. 424,
80 Pac. 903.
Pennsylvania. — Fowler r. Sergeant, 1
Grant 355.
Fertnonf.— Wilmot c. Howard, 39 Vt. 447,
94 Am. Dec. 338.
West Virginia. — Lawson v. Conawav. 37
W. Va. 159, 16 S. E. 564, 38 Am. St.* Rep.
17, 18 L. R. A. 627.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. "Physicians and
Surgeons," § 33.
The natural temperament or weakness of
a patient contributing to produce the injury
primarily caused by the unskilful treatment
of a physician is no bar to an action against
such physician for malpractice, but may be
shown in mitigation of damages. Mullin r.
Flanders, 73 Vt. 95, 50 Atl. 813.
[IV, B, 16]
PHYSICIANS AND SUIiGEONS [30 Cyc] 1581
17. Effect of Admission of Want of Sufficient Skill. If a practitioner frankly
informs a patient of his want of skill, or the patient is in some other way fully aware
of it
,
the latter cannot complain of the lack of that which he knew did not exist."
C. To Whom Liable — Gratuitous op Charity Patient. A physician may
decline to respond to the call of a patient unable to compensate him ; hut, if he
undertakes the treatment of such a patient, his liabilities for negligence or mal
practice are the same as in the case of any other patient.12 So a physician
employed by a city to treat patients at the city almshouse is liable to one ,of such
patients who is injured through the physician s negligence, although there is no
contractual relation between such patient and the physician.18
D. For Whose Acts or Omissions Physician Liable— I. Assistant. A
physician is responsible for an injury done to a patient through the want of
proper skill and care in his apprentice or assistant."
2. Substitute. If a family physician or railway surgeon, on leaving town,
recommends, in case of need, some other physician, who is not, however, in any
sense in his employment, it does not make him liable for injuries resulting from
the latter's want of skill.15
8. Partner. Partners in the practice of medicine are all liable for an injury
to a patient resulting from the negligence, either of omission or commission, of
any one of the partners, within the scope of their partnership business ; but, for
an injury resulting from the act of one partner outside of the common business,
the offending partner is alone responsible.16 ,
4. Nurse or Attendant. Physicians are not as a rule liable for the negligence
of hospital nurses or attendants of which they are not personally cognizant."
E. Actions For Negligence or Malpractice — l. Nature and Form of
Remedy. Where a physician or surgeon is employed to treat a patient without
any express contract defining the character and extent of his duty and under
taking, either an action in contract or in tort may be maintained for the breach
of the implied obligation arising from such employment caused by unskilful,
negligent, and improper treatment.18 When the action is in tort, case is the
proper form of action,1* and, although an operation is performed with malice, the
11. Lorenz r. Jackson, 88 Hun (N. Y.)




12. Becker v. Janinski, 15 X. Y. Suppl.
675, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45. See also cases
cited supra. III, B. 6.
13. Du Bois v. Decker, 130 N. Y. 325, 29
N. E. 313, 27 Am. St. Rep. 529, 14 L. R. A.
429 [affirming 4 N. Y. Suppl. 708].
14. Hancke c. Hooper, 7 C. & P. 81, 32
E. C. L. 510.
The surgeon and the assistant are jointly
and individually liable for unskilful or negli
gent services of the assistant. Tish r.
Welker, 5 Ohio S. & C. PI. Dec. 725, 7 Ohio
N. P. 472.
15. Keller r. Lewis, 05 Ark. 578, 47 S. W.
755; Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich. 501;
Mvers t>.Holborn, 58 N. J. L. 193, 33 Atl.
389. 55 Am. St. Rep. 000, 30 L. R. A. 345.
16. Whittaker V. Collins, 34 Minn. 299, 25
N. W. 032; Hyrne v. Erwin, 23 S. C. 220,
55 Am. Rep. 15, holding that in an action
against a firm of doctors for malpractice, it
is not error to instruct that partners in the
practice of medicine are " sureties " for the
faithful performance of their engagements
bv each of them. See Haase v. Morton,
(Iowa 1908) 115 N. W. 921. where one part
ner was held liable for the negligence of
another partner in superintending the re
turn of a patient from the operating room
of a hospital to her apartment. See also 6
Mich. L. Rev. 683-086.
17. Perionowsky r. Freeman, 4 F. & F.
977. But see Stanley r. Schumpert, 117 La.
255, 41 So. 505, 116 Am. St. Rep. 202, 6
L. R. A. N. S. 300, holding that where an
attendant at a sanitarium was not sufficiently
careful and did not follow the prescriptions
of the physicians, and the physicians did not
see to it to some extent at least that the
medicines prescribed were properly adminis
tered, and to an extent neglected the patient,
thev are liable for resulting injuries.
18. Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252,
12 S. E. 519, 11 L. R. A. 700. Compare
Tucker r. Gillette, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 004, 12
Ohio Cir. Dec. 401; McCrorv v. Skinner, 2
Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 208, 2 West. L. Month.
203.
Waiver of tort.— In an action against a
physician for malpractice, plaintiff may elect
to sue on contract and thus waive the tort.
Lane V. Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N. E.
1111, 25 Am. St. Rep. 442; Goble r. Dillon,
80 Ind. 327, 44 Am. Rep. 30R.
19. Cadwell v. Farrell, 28 III. 438; Mullin
r. Flanders, 73 Vt. 95, 50 Atl. 813.
Case see Case, Action on, 0 Cyc. 681.
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patient having consented thereto, no recovery in trespass can be had therefor*
Where an express promise on the part of the physician is alleged and counted
upon, the action is in contract, and not in tort.2*
2. Time to Sue and Limitations. The particular statute of limitation applicable
in actions for malpractice depends upon whether the action is in contract or in
tort.28 As the gist of an action to recover damages for unskilful treatment is the
negligence of the surgeon, the statute begins to run from the time of the alleged
negligence.23 In some jurisdictions limitation of one year is expressly provided
by statute in malpractice cases,24 to run from the date of the termination of the
professional services.25
3. Survival of Action. At common law an action for an injury to the pereon
caused by the want of skill or negligence of a physician or surgeon does not
survive the death of either party.2" In many states, however, statutes provide
for the survival of the action in such cases.27
4. Defenses.28 A medical practitioner may perhaps protect himself from lia
bility for malpractice by a special contract that he 6hall not be so liable.29 Con
sent of the patient to the abandonment of the case by a physician may be a
defense to a subsequent action for malpractice,80 if such consent was not obtained
by false representations.31 It is no defense to a suit for malpractice that defend
ant was practising in violation of a statute making it an offense to practise physic
without certain preliminary qualifications,82 unless perhaps where the patient knew,
when employing the physician, that he had not the qualifications.88 Nor can a physi
cian not belonging to one of the regular schools of medicine, such as a clairvoyant,
relieve himself from liability by the contention that the patient was negligent in
employing him with full knowledge of his methods of diagnosis and prescription.5*
20. Cudwcll v. Farrell. 28 111. 438.
. 21. Burns v. Barenfield, 84 Ind. 43.
22. See Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc.
1032, 1047.
Indiana.— If the complaint is on contract,
tbe statutory limitation of six years applies.
Burns r. Barenfield. 84 Ind. 43; Staley r.
Jameson, 4fi Ind. 150, 15 Am. Rep. 285.
23. See Limitations of Actions, 25 Cyc.
1116 note 07. But see Gillette P. Tucker. 67
Ohio St. 106, 65 X. fe
.
865, 93 Am. St. Rep.
639 [affirming on equal division of the court
22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 664, 12 Ohio Cir. Dec. 401],
holding that since want of. skill or negligence
on the part of a physician gives rise to no
canse of action unless injurious consequences
follow, a cause of action accrues when injury
occurs^
If the injuries blend and extend over the
whole period the physician has charge of the
case, the right of action, it seems, becomes
complete when the physician gives up the
case without performing his duty, and limita
tions begin to run at this time. Gillette v.
Tucker, 07 Ohio St. IOC, 65 X. E. 865, 93
Am. St. Rep. 639 [affirming on equal division
of the court 22 Ohio Cir. Ct. 664, 12 Ohio
Cir. Dec. 401].
24. Tucker v. Gillette, 22 Ohio Cir. Ct.
664. 12 Ohio Cir. Dec. 401 [affirmed in 67
Ohio St. 106. 65 X. K. 865, 93 Am. St. Rep.
639]; Tucker r. Gillette, 11 Ohio S. & C. PI.
Dec. 226, 8 Ohio X. P. 389.
25. Miller p. Ryerson, 22 Ont. 369; Town
v. Archer. 4 Ont. L. Rep. 383.
26. See Abatement and Revival, 1 Cyc.
62 text and note 20. See also MeCrorv r.
Skinner, 2 Ohio Dec. (Reprint) 268, 2 West.
L. Month. 203; Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34
YV. Va. 252, 12 S. E. 519, 11 L. R. A. 700.
It is immaterial whether the action is in
form ex contractu or ex delicto; in either
case the injury is to the person and not to
the estate of the patient. Boor c. Lowrey,
103 Ind. 408, 3 N. E. 151, 53 Am. Rep. 519;
Jenkins v. French, 58 X. H. 532; Vittum r.
Gilman, 48 X. H. 416; Best v. Vedder. 58
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 187.
27. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 7" Am.
Dec. 72; Xorris v. Grove, 100 Mich. 256. 5S
X. W. 1006.
Continuing action once commenced. — X. H.
St. (1844) c. 139, providing that all actions in
which the right of action does not now by
law survive the death of either party, which
have been commenced in any court, may be
prosecuted to final judgment at the election
of " the surviving or legal representative of
the deceased party," authorizes plaintiff to
proceed with an action for malpractice on the
death of defendant pending the action. Bedel
v. Flanders, 51 X. H. 73 note.
28. Contributory negligence as a defense
see supra, IV. B, 16. .
29. Xelson c. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40
X. W. 228, 7 Am. St. Rep. 900, 1 L. R. A.
719.
30. Carpenter t:. Blake, 60 Barb. (X. Y.)
488 [reversed on other grounds in 50 X. Y.
696].
31. Carpenter p. Blake, 60 Barb. (X. Y.)
488 [reversed on other grounds in 50 X. Y.
096].
32. Musser ;:. Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577.
33. Musser t. Chase, 29 Ohio St. 577.
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5. Pleading83 — a. In General. It is ordinarily sufficient for plaintiff, in an
action for malpractice, to aver that defendant was a physician and surgeon ; that
plaintiff retained and employed him as such to attend upon him ; that he accepted
and entered upon such employment, yet conducted himself in an unskilful and
negligent manner, whereby plaintiff was injured, to his damage, etc.38 Want of
skill and care on the part of the physician must be alleged,37 and also the specific
acts of commission or omission concerning which negligence is imputed.33 It is
not necessary to aver expressly that it was the physician's duty to act skilfully,39
or that any consideration was to be paid for the services rendered,40 since these
facts will be implied from the employment. Since an action for malpractice is
founded on contract, although sounding in tort, it is unnecessary for the complaint
to aver expressly that there was no negligence on the part of plaintiff.41 To a
complaint for malpractice, sounding in tort against two surgeons, an answer that
each was separately employed is bad.4*
b. Amendment. A plaintiff in an action to recover damages for malpractice by
a physician may be allowed to amend his complaint to correspond with the proof.
6. Issues and Proof. Plaintiff in an action for malpractice must recover, if at
all, in accordance with his allegations ; the evidence must be restricted within the
issues as made by the pleadings.44 Where the language of a complaint implies
no more than the duty imposed by law to exercise reasonable skill and care, evi-
N. W. 228, 7 Am. St. Rep. 900, 1 L. R. A.
719.
35. Pleading generally see Pleading.
36. Hanselman v. Ca'rstens, 60 Mich. 187,
27 N. W. 18; Morrill t>.Tegarden, 19 Nebr.
534, 26 N. W. 202; Crowty v. Stewart, 95
Wis. 490, 70 N. W. 558; Jones v. Burtis, 88
Wis. 478, 60 N. W. 785. See also Lane v.
Boicourt, 128 Ind. 420, 27 N. E. 1111, 25 Am.
St. Rep. 442; Burns v. Barenfield, 84 Ind.
43.
Allegation of professional character of de
fendant.— A petition for malpractice, alleg
ing that defendant " is a physician . . .
engaged in the practice of medicine . . .
and has been so engaged for several years last
past " is sufficient, without alleging that he
was a physician when he treated his patient.
Bower v. Self, 68 Kan. 825, 75 Pac. 1021.
37. Barney v. Pinkham, 29 Nebr. 350, 45
K. W. 694, 26 Am. St. Rep. 389.
38. De Hart v. Etnire, 121 Ind. 242, 23
N. E. 77 (holding, however, that in an action
for malpractice, a complaint is not demurra
ble for failure of plaintiff to set forth in
what particular defendant was negligent in
the performance of his duties as physician
and surgeon, as the remedy for uncertainty
is bv motion to make more specific) ; Haw-
ley (?.Williams, 90 Ind. 160.
Allegations held sufficient see Grannis r.
Branden, 5 Day (Conn.) 260, 5 Am. Dec.
143; Carpenter V. McDavitt, 53 Mo. App.
393; Brown v. Cadr, 91 K. Y. App. Div. 415,
86 N. Y. Suppl. 959.
39. Peck e. Martin, 17 Ind. 115; Hansel-
man v. Carstens, 60 Mich. 187, 27 N. W. 18;
Jones r. Burtis, 88 Wis. 478, 60 N. W. 785.
40. Peck v. Martin, 17 Ind. 115.
41. Coon V. Vaughn, 64 Ind. 89; Scudder
r. Crossan, 43 Ind. 343. See also Williams
r. Nally, 45 S. W. 874, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 244,
holding that even if such an allegation is
necessary, the defect in failing to allege that
plaintiff was free from negligence is cured
where the answer and reply make up the
issue on that behalf.
Indiana.— Under Burns Rev. St. (1901)
§ 359a, making contributory negligence a
matter of defense, the complaint need not
allege the want thereof on the part of
plaintiff. Aspy v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170,
06 N. E. 462.
42. Goble v. Dillon, 86 Ind. 327, 44 Am.
Rep. 308.
43. Wormell v. Reins, 1 Mont. 627.
44. Goodwin v. Herson, 65 Me. 223.
Illustrations. — In an action against a sur
geon to recover damages for injuries alleged
to have ensued from his want of ordinary
care and skill in the treatment of a fracture,
proof that he gave assurances to plaintiff
that he possessed and would exercise extraor
dinary skill, and effect a cure, is not ad
missible to support the declaration. Good
win v. Hersom, 65 Me. 223. In an action
by a husband and wife againBt a physician
for malpractice in treatment of the wife,
there being no allegation of loss of the wife's
services, evidence that the husband was de
pendent on his wife for support is inad
missible. Twombly r. Leach, 11 Cush.
(Mass.) 397. Where the declaration in an
action against a physician for malpractice
does not allege general incompetency in de
fendant, plaintiff cannot 'recover on that
ground, but must show that defendant did
not properly exercise the skill which he in
fact possessed. Mayo v. Wright, 63 Mich. 32,
29 N. W. 832. Where a complaint in an
action for malpractice alleged that by reason
of defendant's negligence in the treatment of
plaintiff's fractured limb it became necessary
to amputate it, and that by reason of the
said negligence plaintiff suffered pain and
anguish, this limited defendant's liability to
neglect causing loss of the limb, and no re
covery could be had for pain or anguish if
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dence of an express promise to cure is not necessary to sustain it.45 One holding
himself out as a surgeon is liable as well for want of skill as for negligence ; and
an injured party may sue for damages resulting from both, and recover, on proving
damages resulting from either."
7. Evidence47 — a. Presumptions and Burden of Proof— (i) As to Negligence OR Want of Skill. In an action against a physician for malpractice,
no presumption of negligence or want of skill can arise from the fact that defend
ant failed to effect a cure.48 The burden of proof in such a case is on plaintiff lo
show the physician's want of reasonable care, skill, and diligence in his treatment
of the case,4' and also that the injury complained of resulted from a failure to
exercise theee requisites.50 Consent to an operation will be presumed from volan-
8ueh loss was not caused by his negligence.
Jacobs v. Cross, 19 Minn. 523. On a com
plaint for malpractice, charging negligence
and want of skill in treating a fractured
limb, by reason of which the same had to
be amputated, evidence of the manner in
which such amputation was performed is not
competent, no lack of care or skill in that
respect being charged. Jacobs v. Cross, su
pra. Where, in an action against a surgeon
for alleged malpractice, the petition alleged
unskilfulness in the treatment of the broken
limb, and the answer traversed such allega
tion, without averring any hereditary peculi
arity as a special defense, evidence as to the
weakness of the bones of plaintiff's family
was inadmissible. West v. Martin, 31 Mo.
375, 80 Am. Dec. 107. Where, in an action
for malpractice, the character of the wound
is stated in the answer, and not disputed by
the replication, plaintiff will not be permit
ted to prove that it was not of the character
alleged. Williams v. Poppleton, 3 Oreg. 139.
The averment, in an action against a
physician for malpractice, that defendant
was employed at his special instance and
request, is technical, and is sufficiently
proved by showing that defendant held him
self out as a practitioner soliciting public
patronage, and that the employment was by
mutual consent. Musser v. Chase, 29 Ohio
St. 577. In an action for malpractice, plain
tiff cannot give evidence that the physician
abandoned the patient, and refused to pre
scribe, unless it is so laid in the declaration.
Bemus v. Howard, 3 Watts (Pa.) 255. See
also Dashiell v. Griffith, 84 Md. 363, 35 Atl.
1094. Compare Lawson v. Conaway, 37 W.
Va. 159, 16 S. E. 564. 38 Am. St. Rep. 17,
18 L. R. A. 627. Under an allegation that
" the defendant wrongfully, carelessly, negli
gently, and unakillfully performed said am
putation," evidence is admissible showing
that " the point of amputation was too
high, and that the danger of death was some
what increased by the selection of that
point." Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348.
45. Hoopingarner v. Levy, 77 Ind. 455.
46. Carpenter v. Blake, 60 Barb. (N. Y.)
488 [reversed on other grounds in 50 N. Y.
696].
47. Evidence generally see 16 Cyc. 821
et seq.
48. Illinois.— Red Cross Medical Service
Co. v. Green, 126 111. App. 214; Sims v.
Parker, 41 111. App. 284.
Iotca.— Tomer v. Aiken, 126 Iowa 114, 101
N. W. 769; Piles v. Hughes, 10 Iowa 579.
Kansas.— Pettigrew t-. Lewis, 46 Kan. 78,
26 Pac. 458.
Michigan. —■Wood r. Barker, 49 Mich. 295,
13 N. W. 597.
Minnesota.— Staloch v. Holm, 100 Minn.
276, 111 N. W. 264, 9 L. R. A. N. S. 712.
Nebraska.— Barney f. Pinkham, 29 Nebr.
350, 45 N. W. 694,"26 Am. St. Rep. 389.
New York.— Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb.
534.
Ohio.— Craig C. Chambers, 17 Ohio St.
253.
Pennsylvania. — Wohlert t. Seibert, 23 Pa.
Super. Ct. 213; Haire e. Reese, 7 Phila. 138.
West Virginia. — Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va.
260, 53 S. E. 147.
Canada. — Hodgins v. Banting, 12 Ont. L.
Rep. 117.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 39.
49. Georgia.— Georgia Northern R. Co. c.
Ingram, 114 Ga. 039, 40 S. E. 708.
Illinois.— Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 111. 534,
8 N. E. 832, 59 Am. Rep. 390; McK.ee v.
Allen, 94 111. App. 147; Sims r. Parker, 41
111. App. 284.
Ioioa.— Robinson v. Campbell, 47 Iowa 625.
Kansas.— Pettigrew B. Lewis, 46 Kan. 78,
26 Pac. 458.
Maryland. — State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md.
162, 16 Atl. 382, 14 Am. St. Rep. 340, 2
L. R. A. 587.
Minnesota.—Getchell v. Hill, 21 Minn. 464.
New Hampshire.— Leighton v. Sargent. 31
N. H. 119, 64 Am. Dec. 323.
New York.— Wood v. Wyeth, 106 N. Y.
App. Div. 21, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 360; Wells
v. World's Dispensary Medical Assoc., 9 N. Y.
St. 452.
Ohio. — Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St.
253.
West Virginia. — Dye v. Corbin, 59 W. Va.
266, 53 S. E. 147.
United States. — Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed.
442.
Canada. — McQuay v. Eastwood, 12 Ont
402.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 39.
50. Georgia.— Georgia Northern R. Co. r.
Ingram, 114 Ga. 639, 40 S. E. 708.
Illinois.— McKee v. Allen, 94 111.App. 147.
Kansas.— Pettigrew r. Lewis, 46 Kan. 78,
26 Pac. 458.
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tary submission to it
,
and the burden is o
n plaintiff to prove the contrary.” Where
the physician sets u
p
a
n affirmative defense, the burden is on him to prove it.”
(II) As To CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. The general rules as to the burden
o






. Admissibility—(1) KNo WLEDGE AND SKILL or DEFENDANT. While there
is some difference o
f opinion in the cases, the weight of authority is to the effect
that, although the skill o
f defendant, or the want o
f it
,
is put in issue in a suit for
malpractice, his reputation in that respect is not a defense, and evidence to
establish it will be excluded.” Other cases hold that, where the action is for
negligence, and the skill o
f
the physician is not put in issue, he cannot show his
general reputation for skill; * but where both negligence and want of skill are
charged, it is competent for defendant to show his skill and reputation in that
behalf.” sº acts, however, are never competent to prove skill and competency.” Nor can the fact that a physician is reputed to be negligent and
unskilful be allowed as proof to establish negligence or unskilful treatment in a
particular case.”. It has been held competent, however, for plaintiff to show, as
affecting the skill and knowledge o
f





was engaged largely in pursuits other than his profession o
f
medicine and
surgery.” But it is proper to exclude, on the ground of remoteness, testimony as
Minnesota.-Getchell r. Hill, 21 Minn. 464.
Ohio.—Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St.
253.
Pennsylvania.- Wohlert v. Seibert, 23 Pa.
Super. Ct. 213.




United States.— Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed.
442.
Canada.-McQuay v. Eastwood, 12 Ont.
402.
See 3
9 Cent. Dig. tit. “Physicians and
Surgeons,” $ 39.
51. State v. Housekeeper, 70 Md. 162, 16










52. Chase v. Nelson, 39 Ill. App. 53, hold
ing, however, that in an action against a
physician for malpractice alleged to have
caused the death o
f plaintiff's intestate,
where defendant pleads the general issue,
h
e may show the condition o
f
the patient’s
health, and that death would have resulted
in any event, without assuming the burden
o
f proving that the negligent act o
f
his own
did not produce death.
Discharge by patient.— If a surgeon, called
to attend one who has long been his em
ployer, leaves his patient before he has been
properly cared for professionally, o
r
while he
needs further attention, and relies on an
alleged discharge by the patient as a defense
to a suit brought for the abandonment, this
being a new substantive matter o
f defense,
the burden o
f proving it is on defendant.
Ballou r. Prescott, 64 Me. 305.
53. See NEGLIGENCE, 29 Cyc. 601.
In Indiana in an action against a physician
for unskilfulness, the burden o
f proving that
the negligence o
f plaintiff contributed to the
injury is on defendant. Gramm v. Boener,
56 Ind. 407.
In Iowa in an action for malpractice, the
burden is on plaintiff to show his freedom
from negligence contributing to the result
complained of. Whitesell v. Hill, (1896) 66
N. W. 894.
54. Holtzman v. Hoy, 118 Ill. 534, 8 N. E.
832, 59 Am. Rep. 390 [affirming 19 Ill. App.
459]; Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe, 10 Mont. 563,
2. Pac, 404; Williams r. Pºppleton, 3 Qreg.
139; Mertz v. Detweiler, 8 Watts & S
. (Pa.)
376.
The general reputation among the profes
sion of the medical institution at which a sur
geon may have attended lectures on the sub
ject o
f surgery is not competent evidence,
on the question o
f
his professional skill.
Leighton v. Sargent, 31 N. H. 119, 64 Am.
Dec. 323.
Evidence o
f prior good character.— Evi
dence o
f good character as a physician, sev
eral years prior to the time of injury, caused
b
y







jury. Smith r. Stump, 12 Ind. App. 359,
40 N. E. 279.
-




3 Ky. L. Rep. 1151; Degnan v. Ransom, 83
Hun (N.Y.) 267, 31 N
.
Y. Suppl. 966. But
see Carpenter r. Blake, 50 N
.
Y. 696 [revers
ing 60 Barb. 488]. .
-
56. Vanhooser v. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 3
S
.





50 Am. Dec. 388. -
57. Baker r. Hancock, 29 Ind. App. 456, 63
N. E. 323, 64 N. E
. 38; Lacy v. Kossuth
County, 106 Iowa 16, 75 N
.
W. 689; Link
r. Sheldon, 18 N
.
Y
. Suppl. 815 [affirmed







58. Stevenson v. Gelsthorpe, 10 Mont. 563,
27 Pac. 404. -










In rebuttal.— In an action for malpractice,
it is competent for plaintiff to show that de
fendant was not a regularly bred physician
and surgeon, for the purpose o
f rebutting evi
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to how defendant's treatment of like cases differed from that of other physicians."
So also evidence that defendant procured his certificate of proficiency from the
state board of examiners without examination, by means of diplomas irregularly
obtained from medical schools, is irrelevant, as are also defendant's statements
concerning sucli diplomas.61
(n) Negligence. In an action for malpractice evidence on the question of
negligence, forming a part of the res gestae, is admissible.®4 Plaintiff may show,
by any legal evidence, that the method of treatment followed by the physician,
was improper.63 Defendant may give in rebuttal any proper evidence tending to
show want of negligence on his part.64 Defendant may state what, from his
study and experience, he deems proper treatment of the case in question,65 and
may show by experts that the treatment he gave was such as a physician of ordi
nary knowledge and skill would have given.66 Evidence that he employed
another skilful physician to assist him is competent,67 but not to prove either
dence introduced by him to support his gen
eral professional character. Grannis v.
Branden, 5 Day (Conn.) 260, a Am. Dec.
143.
60. Challis v. Lake, 71 X. H. 90, 51 Atl.
260.
61. Bute v. Potts, 76 Cal. 304, 18 Pac.
329.
62. See cases cited infra, this note.
Declarations of plaintiff. — O'Hara v. Wells,
14 Nebr. 403, 15 N. W. 722.
Declarations of defendant.— Piles v. Hughes,
10 Iowa 579; Moody v. Sabin, 9 Cush. (Mass.l
505.
Exclamations of pain.—In an action against
a surgeon for malpractice in treating a
broken leg, evidence as to complaints made
by plaintiff in regard to the pain suffered is
admissible (Spaulding v. Bliss, 83 Mich. 311,
47 X. W. 210; Mayo B. Wright, 63 Mich. 32,
29 X. W. 832; Hvatt v. Adams, 16 Mich.
180; Link v. Sheldon, 18 X. Y. Suppl. 815
[affirmed in 136 X. Y. 1, 32 X. E. 696] ) ; but
his conclusion as to the cause of the pain is
not admissible (Spaulding v. Bliss, supra.
See also Mayo c. Wright, supra).
Intoxication of defendant.— Defendant's
condition, as to being intoxicated, at the time
he treated plaintiff, may be shown. Merrill
r. Pepperdine, 9 Ind. App. 416, 36 X. E. 921.
Remarks of bystanders at time of examina
tion.— Where, in an action for injury, re
sulting from a surgeon's unskilfulness in
treating a dislocation as a fracture, it was
shown that, if his diagnosis was correct, a
grating sound would hlive been heard on
manipulation of the limb, evidence may be
given of remarks made by bystanders at the
time of the examination that they heard such
a sound. Hitchcock f. Burgett, 38 Mich. 501.
A consultation held on the occasion of the
alleged improper treatment may be given in
evidence as a part of the res gestae. Williams
v. Poppleton, 3 Oreg. 139.
63. Kendall r. Brown, 86 HI. 387.
Failure to demand compensation. — Evi
dence that defendant had not asked any pay
for his services is inadmissible since this
raises a collateral issue. Baird !". Gillett, 47
X. Y. 186. See also Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind.
376.
64. See cases cited infra, this note.
Illustrations. — Where the manner of the
treatment is in issue, defendants may prop
erly be asked if therein they exercised their
best judgment and skill. The answer may
rebut the charge of negligence. Fisher r.
Xiccolls, 2 III. App. 484. A physician, sued
for negligently applying to plaintiff's ankle
liquid glass made by W, a druggist, and not
so compounded as to neutralize the caustic
elements, whereby the ankle was burned, may
testify to his knowing of W holding himself
out and advertising himself as a manufactur
ing chemist, at the time the solution was
obtained; as in such case, in the absence of
some circumstance which should have put the
physician on his guard, he would not be
chargeable with negligence in using the solu
tion. Ball v. Skinner, 134 Iowa 298, 111
X. W. 1022. In an action for negligently
performing a surgical operation on plaintiff's
eye, alleged to have caused a loss of plain
tiff's sight, evidence that the disease from
which plaintiff was suffering generally re
sulted in a loss of sight is competent. Peck
v. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa 320, 55 X. W. 511.
In an action for malpractice in treating a
cut on plaintiff's thumb, defendant may show
that it is good medical treatment in some
cases to withhold from a patient the extent
of the disease and his actual condition.
Twombly v. Leach, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 397.
Defendant may testify that he refrained from
making further visits on plaintiff because
defendant was told by a third person that he
(defendant) had been discharged, but he can
not detail the conversation with such third
person unless held in the presence of plain
tiff. Lawson t:. Conawav, 37 W. Ya. 159, 16
S. E. 564, 38 Am. St. Rep. 17, 18 L. R. A.
627.
65. Link v. Sheldon, 136 X. Y. 1, 32 X. EL
696.
66. Twomblv r. Leach, 11 Cush. (Mass.)
397; Spaulding v. Bliss, 83 Mich. 311. 47
X. W. 210; Leisenring v. La Croix. 68 Xebr.
803, 94 X. W. 1009; Quinn f. Higgins. 63
Wis. 664, 24 X. W. 482, 53 Am. Rep. 305;
Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348.
67. Jones v. Angell, 95 Ind. 376, opinion
by Colerick, C.
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skill or diligence on his part.” It is not proper, in making out, a case for plain
tiff, to show negligence in other cases by proving the results of defendant's treat
ment in such cases; * but the treatment received by the patient after defendant
gave up the case may be shown.”. The opinion of a physician is admissible, as a
general rule, upon questions peculiarly within his knowledge as such." A non
expert witness should not be
H.;
to testify as to the existence of a particular
injury, but he may testify as to the actual condition of the injury, no opinion
being expressed.” Immaterial” and hearsay “evidence is of course inadmissible.
(III) CoNTRIBUTORY MEGLIGENCE. In an action for injury from a physician's
negligence, it is proper for the defense to show that it resulted from plaintiff's
negligence; * but that fact cannot be shown by the statements of one who had
no personal knowledge of it.”
(iv) DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE, On a trial against a physician for mal
practice, it is proper to allow plaintiff to exhibit his injured limb to the jury."
e. Weight and Sufficiency —(1) IN GENERAL. . A mere preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to prove an issue in an action for malpractice.” Although the
fact that a patient fails to recover, or suffers inegligence on the part of the physician,” yet t ury, is not in general evidence ofhe injury may be of such a nature
that negligence must be assumed from the unexplained fact of its happening.”
68. Leighton v. Sargent, 31 N. H. 119, 64;
Am. Dec. 323.
69. Shockley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103
N. W. 360. - -
70. Bower v. Self, '68 Kan. 825, 75 Pac.
1021 ; Leisenring v. La Croix, 68 Nebr. 803,
94 N. W. 1009. - -
71. Purcell v. Jessup, 99 N. Y. App. Div. '
556, 91 N. Y. Suppl. 165.
72. Williams v. Nally, 45 S. W. 874, −20
Ky. L. Rep. 244; O'Hara v. Wells, 14 Nebr.
403, 15 N. W. 722. . . .
-
73. Wright v. Hardy, 22 Wis. 348. -
74. Sims v. Moore, 61 Iowa 128, 16 N. W.
58, holding that, in an action for damages
against a surgeon for malpractice, plaintiff
cannot, under the guise of a conversation :
with defendant, testify to the opinion of an
other surgeon, who examined the parts op
erated on. **
75. Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich. 501,
76. Hitchcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich. 501.
77. Hess v. Lowrey, 122 Ind. 225, 23 N. E.
156, 17 Am. St. Rep. 355, 7 L. R. A. 90;
Freeman v. Hutchinson, 15 Ind. App. 639,
43 N. E. 16; Williams v. Nally, 45 S. W.
874, 20. Ky., L. Rep. 244; Walsh v. Sayre, 52
How. Pr. (N. Y.) 334; Fowler v. Sergeant, :
1.Grant (Pa.) 355. But see Carstens v. Han
selman, 61 Mich. 426, 28 N. W. 159, l Am...
St. Rep. 606, after lapse of several years
from date of treatment. . - •, . ."
78. Hoener v. Koch, 84 Ill. 408; Wood v.
Wyeth, 106 N. Y. App. Div. 21, 94 N. Y.
Suppl. 360. -
Evidence held sufficient to support verdict
for plaintiff see McGehee v. Schiffman, 4 Cal.
App. 50, 87 Pac. 290; Davis v. Spicer, 27
Mo. App. 27.9; Boom v. Reed, 69 Hun (N. Y.)
426, 23 N. Y. Suppl. 421; Barton v. Govan,
4 N. Y. St. 876; Froman v. Ayars, 42 Wash.
385, 85 Pae. 14; Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis.
504, 30 N. W. 674. -
Evidence held insufficient to support ver
dict for plaintiff.- Where, in an action
against a surgeon for damages caused by his
unskilfulness or negligence, there is no evi
dence of want of ordinary skill, or failure
to use the best skill possessed by defendant,
- or any negligence in the care of the case,
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, a ver
dict for plaintiff must be set aside. Winner
c. Lathrop, 67 Hun (N. Y.) 511, 22. N. Y.
Suppl. 516. See also Feeney v. Spalding, 89
Me. 111, 35 Atl. 1027; Neifert v. Hasley, 149
Mich. 232, 112 N. W. 705; Staloch v. Holm,
100 Minn. 276, 111 N. W. 264, 9 L. R. A.
N. S. 712; Wood v. Wyeth, 106 N. Y. App.
Div. 21, 94 N. Y. Suppl. 360; MacKenzie
v. Carman, 103 N. Y. App. Div. 246, 92
N. Y. Suppl. 1063; Smith v. Dumont, 3 Silv.
Sup. (N. Y.) 358, 6 N. Y. Suppl. 242; Eng
lish v. Free, 205 Pa. St. 624, 55 Atl. 777 ; .
Bigney v. Fisher, 26; R. I. 402, 59 Atl. 72;
Wurdemann v. Barnes, 92 Wis. 206, 66 N. W.
111. - - * *
Evidence held sufficient to authorize ver
dict for defendant see Akridge. v. Noble, 114
Ga. 949, 41. S. E. 78; Pepke v. Grace Hos
pital, 130 Mich. 493, 90 N. W. 278; Martin
v. Courtney, 87 Minn. 197, 91 N. W. 487;
Gedney v. Kingsley, 16 N. Y. Suppl. 792.
Evidence held sufficient to show contribu
tory negligence see Richards v. Willard, 176
pa's: ii. 35 Åil. iii, where plaintiff pre:
maturely left the hospital.
79, See supra, IV, F, 7, a, (I). *
80. See cases cited infra, this note. º
Illustrations.— That plaintiff was severely
burned by X-rays while being treated by de
fendant for appendicitis is of itself evidence
that the treatment was improper. Shock
ley v. Tucker, 127 Iowa 456, 103 N. W. 360.
Evidence showing that after a broken ankle
was reset the ankle and foot were crooked,
and the ankle joint stiff, tends to prove negli
gence on the part of the physician in replac
ing the broken bones, and should be sub
mitted to the jury. Hickerson v. Neely, 54
S. W. 842, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 1257. Unex
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It is not necessary, to sustain a verdict for plaintiff, that al
l
the expert witnesses
called should consider the treatment pursued b
y
defendant improper, nor will the
fact that a
ll
such witnesses agree that a portion o
f
the treatment is proper under





medical experts in a
n
action for surgical malpractice, the
jury are to consider their professional knowledge and experience, freedom from
bias, and the reasons they are able to give for their conclusions.”
(II) To ſºEQUIRE SUBMISSION To JURY. Where the evidence is as consistent
with the absence as with the existence o
f negligence, the case should not be left
to the jury.*
8





a physician and surgeon is a question o
f law, in this view at least,
that it must be stated b
y
the court as defined b
y
the books;* but when con
sidered in connection with the facts which it is necessary for the jury to under
stand in order to b
e
able to apply it to a particular case, it becomes a mixed
question o
f
law and fact.” Where the evidence is conflicting as to the facts on
which the opinions o





a given state o
f
facts in the case, materially differ, it is for the jury
to determine, and their finding is conclusive.” If the treatment is in accordance
with a recognized system o
f surgery, it is not for the court or jury to undertake




which surgeons differ among themselves.”
9
. Instructions—a. In General. In an action for malpractice, the court
should make a
n adequate presentation o
f
the case to the jury, explaining the
precise questions a
t issue, and directing attention to the material evidence o
n
both
sides.” The jury should be instructed as to the necessity of the employment of
plained, the fact that the physician attend
ing a woman a
t
child-birth failed to remove
all of the placenta, thereby occasioning bloodK. justifies a conclusion of negligence.Moratzky v. Wirth, 67 Minn. 46, 69 N. W.
480.
81. Hewitt v. Eisenbart, 36 Nebr. 794, 55
N. W. 252. See also Barker v. Lane, 23 R. I.
224, 49 Atl. 963.
82. Bennison v. Walbank, 38 Minn. 313, 37
N. W. 447.
83. McQuay v. Eastwood, 12 Ont. 402;
















Testimony which does not show want o
f
ordinary care and skill is not entitled to go
to the jury. Havens v. Hardesty, 18 Ohio
Cir. Ct. 891, 9 Ohio Cir. Dec. 850.
Evidence held sufficient to require submis
sion to jury see Degelau v. Wight, 114 Iowa
52, 86 N. W. 36; Peterson v. Wells, 41 Wash.
693, 84 Pac. 608.
Evidence held sufficient to warrant direc
tion o
f
nonsuit see De Long v. Delaney, 20
Pa. St. 226, 55 Atl. 965. -
84. Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46.
85. Tefft r. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46; Chamber
lain r. Porter, 9 Minn. 260.
It is the duty of the court to say whether
any facts have been established by evidence
from which negligence may be reasonably in
ferred: the jury have to say whether, from
those facts, negligence ought to be inferred.












Wilson, J., delivering the opinion of the court.
86. California.-Bailey v. Kreutzmann, 141
Cal. 519, 75 Pac. 104.
Georgia.-Moon v. McRae, 111 Ga. 206,
36 S. E. 635.
Iowa.-Tomer v. Aiken, 126 Iowa 114, 101
N. W. 769.
Minnesota.- Bennison v.
Minn. 313, 37 N. W. 447.





Nebr. 727, 66 N. W. 819.

















Wells v. World's Dispensary Medical Assoc.,
120 N. Y. 630, 24 N. E. 276; Carpenter v.
Blake, 60 Barb. 488 [reversed on other
grounds in 50 N
.
Y
. 696); Boldt v. Murray,
2 N. Y
.
St. 232; Keily v. Colton, 1 N. Y
.
City Ct. 439.





9 Cent. Dig. tit. “Physicians and
Surgeons,” $ 44.
But see Woodward v. Hancock, 52 N. C
.
384, holding that what is reasonable skill
and due care in a physician in the treatment
o
f
a patient is a question o
f law; and it is




87. Williams r. Poppleton, 3 Oreg. 139.
88. Richards r. Willard, 176 Pa. St. 181,
35 Atl. 114; Reber v. Herring, 115 Pa. St.
599, 8 Atl. 830.
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the physician,88 and as to the duty of the physician to exercise reasonable skill
and care in his treatment of the case.*0 Instructions should be given relative to
the burden of proof,91 and, if the issue is raised, as to the care required of plain
tiff, and the effect of his contributory negligence.9* It is not sufficient to give a
general instruction on the subject.93 The instructions given should bo coutined
89. Miller r. Dumon, 24 Wash. 648, 04
Pae. 804, holding that a charge that, in
order to recover for malpractice, the jury
must be satisfied by a preponderance of evi
dence that defendant, acting as a surgeon,
unskilfully and negligently treated plaintiff,
followed by a charge to the effect that the
fact that a physician responds to a call for
his professional services does not necessarily
constitute an employment unless some act
is done or advice given by him which indi
cates an intention on his part to enter on
the employment, sufficiently submits the issue
as to whether the phvsician was emploved.
90. Akridge r. Noble, 114 Ga. 949, 4i S. E.
78; Aspv c. Botkins, 100 Ind. 170, 00 N. E.
462 (hofding that an instruction relating to
the degree of skill required by a person hold
ing himself out as a physician and surgeon
was not erroneous for failure to state that
he must have had a license to practise) ;
Carpenter r. Blake, 50 N. Y. 696 [reversing
60 Barb. 488] (holding that it is error to
instruct the jury that it is immaterial
whether defendant was or was not skilful
in his profession) ; Lawson v. Conaway, 37
W. Va. 159, 16 S. E. 564, 38 Am. St. Rep.
17, 18 L. R. A. 627 (holding that an in
struction that defendant was bound to use
the ordinary degree of care and skill of the
" profession " in his community is not ob
jectionable because the word " profession "
is used instead of the more accurate term,
" physician in good standing."
Degree of skill and care.— There is no sub
stantial difference in the use of the words
" ordinary " and " reasonable " in defining
the care and skill required of a surgeon or
phvsician in his employment. Kendall c.
Brown, 74 111. 232. The words "fair" and
" reasonable " are synonymous. Jones f. An-
gell, 95 Ind. 376.
As dependent on locality.— An instruction
that defendant was required to use only the
degree of care and skill of the physicians in
his neighborhood is not ground for reversal,
where there was evidence that there were
other physicians in the neighborhood pre
sumably of nverage ability, when compared
with similar localities. Pelkv v. Palmer, 109
Mich. 501. 07 N. W. 501. See also WHtesell
t>. Hill, 101 Iowa 029, 70 N. W. 750, 37
L, R. A. 830, Robinson, J., delivering the
opinion of the court, and Kinne, C. J., dis
senting.
Continuance of attention.— Instructions
that it was the duty of defendant to give
the patient such continued attention after
the operation as the necessity of the case
required, in the absence of special agreement
or reasonable notice to the contrary, are cor
rect, although the declaration only alleges
a want of care and skill with reference to
the operation itself. Williams v. Gilman,
71 Me. 21.
Depaiture from approved methods. — An
instruction that " a departure from approved
methods in general use, if it injures the
patient, will render him (the physician)
liable, however good his intentions may have
been," is not improper, notwithstanding t'ie
rule may render a physician liable in case
he adopts new methods, although improved
ones. Allen v. Voje, 114 Wis. 1, 89 N. W.
924. An instruction that it is incumbent on
surgeons to conform to the established sys
tem of treatment of a particular disease is
not erroneous or misleading on the ground
that the treatment referred to is one pre
scribed by some writers and surgeons, and
not that universally commended, where there
is no conflict as to the proper mode of
treatment. Jackson V. Burnham, 20 Colo.
532, 39 Pae. 577. Such an instruction is not
misleading, where there is no claim that the
case was one involving doubt as to the proper
mode of treatment, and the issue and testi
mony relates solely to the question whether
defendant neglected to follow the ordinary
and clearly established practice in treating
plaintiff. Jp-kson v. Burnham, supra.
91. Swanson r. French, 92 Iowa 095, 61
N. W. 407 (holding that a charge that, if
plaintiff disobeyed defendant's orders, he can
not recover, does not shift to defendant the
burden of proof no to contributory negli
gence, when a former instruction clearly
placed the burden on plaintiff) ; Vanhooser
p. Berghoff, 90 Mo. 487, 3 S. W. 72 (hold
ing that an instruction is erroneous which
is open to the construction that the burden
is on defendant to show the possession and
exercise of skill and care).
92. Whitesell r. Hill, (Iowa 1896) 66
N. W. 894; O'Hara v. Wells, 14 Nebr. 403,
15 N. W. 722; Carpenter v. Blake, 00 Barb.
(N. Y.) 488 [reversed on other grounds in
50 N. Y. 090] ; Beadle v. Paine, 40 Oreg.
424, 80 Pae. 903.
Necessity of following instructions see
Whitesell v. Hill, (Iowa 1890) 00 N. W. 894.
Evidence of disobedience by the patient of
the instructions of the physician may prop
erly be referred to by ti e court in its in
structions, in directing the attention of the
jury to the question of contributory negli
gence. .T^nes f. An^ell, 95 Ind. 376.
93. Reber r. Herring, 115 Pa. St. 599, 8
Atl. 830, holding that the jury should be
distinctly charged that if the patient was
guilty of contributory negligence in pro
ducing the injury complained of he cannot
recover.
Refusal to charge on contributory negli
gence is cured by the subsequent giving of
an instruction on the subject. Link t>. Shel-
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to the issues as made by the pleadings and the evidence,” and should not assume
facts not proved,” or be inconsistent or misleading.”
b. As to Damages. An instruction that the measure of damages is full, com
plete, and ample compensation to the injured person is erroneous, since com
pensation is
j
that is required, and the use of the adjectives “full,” “complete,”
and “
ample ” may lead the jury to believe that more than compensation is
required.”
10. DAMAGEs” —a. Nominal. Where it is impossible to distinguish between
the consequences of the trouble for which a physician was called and the con
sequences of the maltreatment, only nominal damages can be given.” Accelera
tion of the death of a patient is more than a mere technical injury, and demands
an award of more than nominal damages."
b. Compensatory. Where a patient is injured by a physician's negligent and
unskilful treatment, the loss or injury directly and naturally resulting from
his fault or negligence is the measure of damages.” The amount is to be deter
mined by the{. from the facts and circumstances of the case,” and the pecuniary loss, resulting from inability to labor," bodily and mental pain and suffer
don, 18 N. Y. Suppl. 815 [affirmed in 136
N. Y. 1, 32 N. E. 696].
94. Colorado.— Burnham v. Jackson, 1
Colo. App. 237, 28 Pac. 250.
Illinois.- Wenger r. Calder, 78 Ill. 275,
holding that, in an action against a surgeon
for malpractice, where there is no evidence
tending to prove wilful negligence, it is
error to instruct the jury that they may
find for plaintiff in any amount they deem
proper, under the evidence, if they believe
from the evidence that defendant was wil
fully negligent.
Pennsylvania.-- Richards v. Willard, 176
Pa. St. 181, 35 Atl. 114.
Teras.-Payne v. Francis, 37 Tex. 75, hold
ing that in an action against a physician for
damages alleged to be due to his unskilful
treatment of a patient, it was error to in
struct the jury that, if plaintiff was injured
by unskilful treatment, ignorance, careless
ness, or neglect, he might recover; no al
legation being contained in the complaint
as to carelessness or neglect.
-
Vermont.— Wilmot v. Howard, 39 Vt. 447,
94 Am. Dec. 338. -
Wisconsin.—Prahl v. Gerhard, 25 Wis. 466,
holding, however, that it was not error to
instruct the jury that “if the injury was
purely an accident, or from some other cause,
while the defendant used and exercised a
proper degree of skill, then the defendant is
not liable,” although there was no positive
evidence of such accident or other cause.
See 39, Cent. Dig. tit. “Physicians and
Surgeons,” $ 45.
-
95. Link v. Sheldon, 18 N. Y. Suppl. 815
[affirmed in 136 N. Y. 1, 32 N. E. 696],
holding that the court properly refused to
give instructions which assumed that the
treatment of the physician who attended
plaintiff after defendants were discharged
was improper. -
96. Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629, 70
N.W. 750, 37 L. R. A. 830; Spaulding 'c.
Bliss, 83 Mich. 311, 47 N. W. 210.
97. Sale v. Eichberg, 105 Tenn. 333, 59
S
.





98. Damages generally see 13 Cyc. 1.
99. Becker v. Janinski, 15 N
.
Y. Suppl.
675, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45.
1








Dorris v. Warford, 100 S
.
W. 312, 30





Challis v. Lake, 71 N. H. 90, 51 Atl. 260.
It is the damage accruing to plaintiff in ex
cess of that which would have accrued na
turally from the illness or injury had he




surgeons, and not the
damage resulting from the illness o
r injury.
Wenger v. Calder, 78 Ill. 275; Carpenter v.
McDavitt, 53 Mo. App. 393; Miller r. Frey,










Chamberlain v. Porter, 9 Minn. 260.
The jury are the proper judges of the
amount o
f
the damages to be allowed, and
unless there is something in the case show
ing that the jury, in their determination,
were influenced by passion, prejudice, or
some other improper motive, the court will




f damages permitted to stand.—
One thousand dollars for negligence in the
case o
f
a broken leg whereby it was short
ened three fourths of an inch. Hallam r.
Means, 82 Ill. 379, 25 Am. Rep. 328. Two
thousand dollars for the unwarranted aban
donment o
f
a confinement case. Lathrope v.
Flood, (Cal. 1901) 63 Pac. 1007. Four
thousand five hundred dollars where plain
tiff was left helpless for life. Kelsey v. Hay,
84 Ind. 189. Seven thousand dollars for
malpractice in setting a broken arm. Get
chell v. Lindley, 24 Minn. 265.
4
.
Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46; Dorris r.
Warford, 100 S
. W. 312, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 963,
9 L. R. A. N. S. 1090.
A married woman who is not carrying on
business o
r performing labor on her sole and
separate account cannot, in an action against
a physician for malpractice, recover for loss
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ing,s loss of time,* and actual expenses incurred,7 if resulting from or through
the want of skill or care of the physician, may be taken into account, as so likewise
may the character of the injury, as whether it is permauent or temporary,8 and the
condition or circumstances of the injured party.9 Where the defense of contribu
tory negligence is interposed, the jury should be warned to allow nothing for any
aggravation of injury or new injury caused by plaintiff's own imprudence,10 and
evidence that another physician subsequently treated plaintiff improperly is
competent to reduce the amount to be allowed.
c. Exemplary or Punitive. While it has been held that exemplary damages
for malpractice can be recovered only where the evidence shows an evil motive
in the act complained of,12 the weight of authority is to the effect that such dam
ages may also be recovered where a physician has been guilty of gross negligence
amounting to reckless indifference in treating a patient.13
of services nnd earnings. Becker v. Janinski,
15 N. Y. Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. N. Cas. 45.
5. California. — Lathrope v. Flood, (1901)
63 Pac. 1007.
Georgia. — Smith v. Overby, 30 Ga. 241,
holding that in an action by a husband and
wife against a physician for an injury to
the wife in delivering her of a child, dam
ages may be given for the mental suffering
of the wife produced by the destruction of
the child..
Kansas.— Tefft r. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46.
Kentucky.-— Piper v. Menifee, 12 B. Mon.
465, 54 Am. Dec. 547; Dorris v. Warford, 100
S. VV. 312, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 963, 9 I* R. A.
N. S. 1090.
Minnesota.— Chamberlain v. Porter, 9
Minn. 260.
New York.— Becker v. Janinski, 15 N. Y.
Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. X. Cas. 45.
North Carolina.— McCracken p. Smathers,
122 N. C. 799, 29 S. E. 354.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 46.
Suffering caused by malpractice only to be
considered. — The jury should be warned, in
an action for malpractice, to allow nothing
for the pain and suffering caused by the
original injury, but only for what was added
by the lack of care and skill in its treatment.
Carpenter v. McDavitt, 53 Mo. App. 393.
See also Wenger r. Caldcr, 78 111. 275.
Action by husband for wife's injury. — For
injuries inflicted on a wife during a surgical
operation, which resulted in her death, the
husband is entitled to recover only for the
actual damage caused to him by the injury,
and which accrued prior to her death ; and
he can have no action for his or her mental
suffering, as such action must be restricted
to the person who received the physical in
jury. Hvatt v. Adams. 16 Mich. 180.
6. Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46; Piper v.
Menifee, 12 B. Moh. (Ky.) 465, 54 Am.
Dec. 547; McCracken r. Smathers, 122 N. C.
799, 29 S. E. 354.
7. Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46; Hewitt v.
Eisenbart, 36 Nebr. 794, 55 N. W. 252 (hold
ing, however, that there can be no recovery
for expense incurred in efforts to cure an in
jury, unless it be shown that the expense was
the result of defendant's negligence, and that
it was reasonablv necessary) ; Becker v. Ja
ninski, 15 N. Y. Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. N. Cas.
45.
8. Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46; Dorris v.
Warford, 100 S. W. 312, 30 Ky. L. Rep. 903,
9 L. R. A. N. S. 1090; Chamberlain P.
Porter, 9 Minn. 260 ; McCracken c. Smathers,
122 N. C. 799, 29 S. E. 354. But see Du-
laney v. Nunnery, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 292, hold
ing that, in an action against a surgeon for
malpractice, plaintiff's expectancy of life had
nothing to do in estimating the damages he
was entitled to recover, although his arm
had become useless as the result of defend
ant's negligence ; and it was error to admit
life-tables as evidence, for the purpose of
showing his expectancy of life.
Prospective damages. — Recovery for mal
practice by a physician may embrace pros
pective as well as accrued damages. Howell
v. Goodrich, 69 111. 556; Becker r. Janinski,
15 N. Y. Suppl. 675, 27 Abb. N. Cas.
45.
Testimony as to the physical condition of
plaintiff just before trial, and two or mora
years after undergoing the treatment com
plained of, is competent, when such condi
tion is shown to be the result of the injury
in question, and is of a permanent nature.
Hewitt v. Eisenbart, 36 Nebr. 794, 55 N. W.
252.
9. Tefft r. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46; Chamber
lain v. Porter, 9 Minn. 260; Fowler v. Ser
geant, 1 Grant (Pa.) 355.
10. Carpenter v. McDavitt, 53 Mo. App.
393.
11. Doyle f. New York Eye, etc., Infirmary,
80 N; Y. 631.
12. Hyatt v. Adams, 16 Mich. 180.
13. Cochran v. Miller, 13 Iowa 128; Gray
r. Little, 126 N. C. 385, 35 S. E. 611;
Brooke r. Clark, 57 Tex. 105.
Operation by unlicensed dentist.— Ex
emplary damages are recoverable from de
fendants who, in conducting the business of
dentistry, caused plaintiff to be operated on
by an employee who was unlicensed as a
dentist, and through whose negligence and
want of skill he suffered a severe injury.
Mandeville v. Courtright. 142 Fed. 97, 73
C. C. A. 321, 6 h. R. A. N. 8. 1003 [revers
ing 126 Fed. 1007].
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11. New Trial.1* Where the verdict in a malpractice case is manifestly againet
the great preponderance of the evidence, it is an abuse of discretion not to grant a
new trial.15 A new trial on account of excessive damages for malpractice will only
be granted where they are 60 excessive as to indicate that the jury acted from
prejudice, partiality, or corruption, or were misled as to the proper measure of
damages.16
12. Review. The admission of evidence,17 or the giving of an instruction,11
not prejudicial to either party, is not fatal error. "Where there is a conflict in the
testimony of the experts, and no great preponderance either way, the verdict of
the jury will not be disturbed.1' Where, however, the evidence greatly prepon
derates against the verdict, it will be set aside.30
V. COMPENSATION.51
A. Right to Compensation22 — 1. In General. In England, under the com
mon law, a medical practitioner had no remedy at law to recover a remuneration
for his services. Ho was presumed to act with a view only to an honorary
reward.23 He might, however, recover on an express contract to remunerate him
for his attendance.24 This rule has never been in force in this country, and a phy
sician is entitled to recover for his services in the same manner as any other per
son who performs services for another.25 And since 21 & 22 Vict. c. 90, a physician
may also recover for his services in England without an express contract.2* An
employment of a physician by a party, without express agreement as to compen
sation, raises an implied agreement on the part of the employer to pay what the
services are reasonably worth.27 Physicians and surgeons can recover for the
services of their students in attendance on their patients,28 and also for the services
of such assistants as they may require.28
14. New trial generally see Xew Triax,
29 Cyc. 707.
15. Martin v. Courtney, 75 Minn. 255, 77
X. W. 813.
16. Kelsey r. Hay, 84 Ind. 189.
17. Jones C. Angell, 95 Ind. 376; Prahl
v. Gerhard, 25 Wis. 400.
18. O'Hara v. Wells, 14 Nebr. 403, 15
N. W. 722.
19. Whitesell V. Hill, (Iowa 1896) 66
N. W. 894; Getchell r. Lindley, 24 Minn.
205; Van Skike v. Potter, 53 Nebr. 28, 73
N. W. 295; Van- Mere r. Farewell, 12 Ont.
285
20. Yaggle r. Allen, 24 X. Y. App. Div.
594, 48 N. Y. Suppl. 827.
21. Compensation: As witness see Wit
nesses. For examining person for insanity
see Insane Persons. For services to poor
persons see Palters.
Account stated between physician and
patient see Accounts and Accounting, 1
Cyc. 387 text and note 2.
22. Port physician's fee invalid see Com
merce. 7 Cvc. 437 note 5.
23. Chorfev C. Bolcot, 4 T. P. 317, 2 Rev.
Rep. 395 ; Chitty Contr. 573. See also Ups-
combe v. Holmes, 2 Campb. 441.
24. Veiteh v. Russell, 3 Q. B. 928, 43
E. C. L. 1041, C. & M. 302, 41 E. C. L. 201,
3 G. & D. 198, 7 Jur. 60, 12 L. J. Q. B. 13
(holding that proof of an express contract
must be clear) ; Attv.-Gen. V. Rival College
of Physicians, 1 Johns. & H. 561," 7 Jur. N.
S. 511, 30 I,. J. Ch. 757. 4 I,. T. Rep. N. S.
356, 9 Wkly. Rep. 590, 20 Eng. Reprint 868.
25. Peck r. Martin, 17 Ind. 115; Judah
V. McXamce, 3 Blackf. (Ind.) 209; Green r.
Higenbotam, 3 N. J. L. J. 60; Mooney r.
Llovd, 5 Scrg. & R. (Pa.) 416; Graham
f. Gautier, 21 Tex. 111.
The right to adequate compensation for
medical services rendered by a physician
arises upon their rendition wherever fees are
otherwise recoverable by suit at law. Ely
v. Wilbur, 49 X. J. L. 358, 10 Atl. 441, 60
Am. Rep. 068.
26. Gibbon v. Budd, 2 H. 4 C. 92, 9 Jur.
N. S. 525, 32 L. J. Exch. 182, 8 L. T. Rep.
N. S. 321, 11 Wkly. Rep. 026.
Traveling expenses. — When no special
agreement is made to remunerate a physician,
he cannot recover expenses out of pocket, in
traveling to attend his patient, for such ex
penses are incidental to the attendance, and
to be considered as money paid to the
physician's own use in the ordinary exercise
of his profession. Veitch r. Russell. 3 Q. B.
928, 43 E. C. L. 1041, C. & M. 302, 41 E. C.
L. 201, 3 G. t D. 198, 7 Jur. 60, 12 L. J.
Q. B. 13.
27. Peck v. Martin, 17 Ind. 115; Pryor
r. Milburn, 51 Misc. (X. Y.) 596, 101 N. Y.
Suppl. 34.
28. People a Monroe Ct. C. PI., 4 Wend.
(N. Y.) 200, holding that a statute prohibit
ing the recovery of fees by unlicensed physi
cians does not prevent recovery for such serv
ices.
29. Jny County r. Brewington. 74 Ind. 7.
Unqualified assistant. — But it has been
held that a qualified practitioner is not
[IV, E, 11]
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS [30 Cyc] 1593
2. As Dependent on Right to Practice — a. In General. In the absence of
a statute requiring a license, or prohibiting the practice of medicine without it
for a fee or reward, an unlicensed physician is entitled to recover for his services.80
Every state has now enacted statutes regulating the practice of medicine,81 and in
several unqualified practitioners are expressly prohibited from recovering for
their services.8* In the majority of the states, however, no express provision on
the subject exists, but the courts have held, almost without exception, that even
in the absence of an express prohibition, a physician may not recover for pro
fessional services unless he shows compliance with the requirements of the statute
as to qualification.38 Where the statute further requires that the certificate of
qualification be registered, a physician who has not complied with such require
ment is not entitled to recover his fees,84 unless such registration is not made a
entitled to recover for services rendered by
an unqualified assistant without consulting
him. Howarth v. Brearley, 19 Q. B. D. 303,
51 J. P. 440, 50 L. J. Q. B. 543, 56 L. T.
Rep. N. S. 743, 36 Wklv. Kep. 302.
30. Bronson v. Hoffman, 7 Hun (N. Y.)
674; Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Den. (If. Y.) 60.
31. See supra, ITT
32. Louisiana. — Czarnowski v. Zeyer, 35
La. Ann. 796.
Maine.— Holmes v. Halde, 74 Me. 28, 43
Am. Rep. 567.
Massachusetts.— Hewitt v. Charier, 16
Pick. 353.
Nebraska.— Maxwell v. Swigart, 48 Nebr.
789, 67 N. W. 789.
Xorth Carolina. — Puckett v. Alexander,
102 N. C. 95, 8 S. E. 767, 3 L. R. A. 43.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," $ 51.
Maryland — Notice of intention to dispute
claim.—Acts (1821), c. 217, prohibiting an
unauthorized practitioner " from and after
the passage " thereof from recovering bis
fees, provided defendant gives ten days' no
tice of his intention to dispute the claim,
embraces all cases where the attempt to re
cover is subsequent to its passage. Berry
v. Scott, 2 Harr. & G. 92.
33. Alabama.— Harrison v. Jones, 80 Ala.
412. Otherwise under a former statute.
Richardson v. Dorman, 28 Ala. 679.
California. — Roberts v. Levy, (1892) 31
Pac. 570; Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370, 22
Pac. 880.
Georgia.— Murray v. Williams, 121 Ga. 63,
48 S. E. 686.
Indiana. — Orr V. Meek, 111 Ind. 40, 11
X. E. 787; Mayfield v. Nale, 26 Ind. App.
240, 59 N. E. 415.
Louisiana. — Dickerson v. Gordy, 5 Rob.
489.
Mississippi. — Bohn v. Lowery, 77 Miss.
424, 27 So. 604.
~Sew York.— Accetta v. Zupa, 54 N. Y.
App. Div. 33, 66 X. Y. Suppl. 303, 8 N. Y.
Annot. Cas. 190; Fox r. Dixon, 12 N. Y.
Suppl. 267; Timmerman v. Morrison, 14
Johns. 369.
Tennessee. — Haworth v. Montgomery, 91
Tenn. 16, 18 S. W. 399.
Texas.— Wooley v. Bell, 33 Tex. Civ. App.
399, 76 S. W. 797 ; Kenedv !'. Schultz, 6 Tex.
Civ. App. 461, 25 S. W. 667.
England.— De la Rosa r. Prieto, 16 C. B.
N. S. 578, 10 Jur. N. S. 851, 33 L. J. C. P.
202, 10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 757, 12 Wkly. Rep.
1029, 111 E. C. L. 578.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 51.
Contra.— Smythe v. Hanson, 61 Mo. App.
285; Davidson v. Bohlman, 37 Mo. App. 570,
was decided under a statute expressly pro
hibiting a recovery by unqualified practition
ers.
A note given in consideration of services
rendered by the payee as a physician, when
he has not obtained a license, is void. Hol
land v. Adams, 21 Ala. 680; Coyle v. Camp
bell, 10 Ga. 570.
Practice under unauthorized temporary
certificate. —A contract to render medical
services, made by a physician who is prac
tising under an unauthorized temporary cer
tificate from one of a board of medical
examiners, is not enforceable. Peterson c.
Seagraves, 94 Tex. 390, 60 S. W. 751.
Certificate of good character.— One who is
not allowed by law to collect his dues for
medical or surgical services as a regular
practitioner cannot recover compensation
therefor, unles9, prior to their performance,
he obtained a certificate of good moral char
acter, in the manner prescribed by Me. St.
(1838) c. 353, | 2. Thompson v. Hazen, 25
Me. 104. Assumpsit lies on an express prom
ise to pay for services rendered by one
practising the healing art according to the
methods of those calling themselves
" Christian Scientists," plaintiff having com
plied with Me. Rev. St. c. 13, § 9, requiring
persons not licensed by medical associations
to obtain a certificate of good moral char
acter from the officers of the town where
thev then reside. Wheeler v. Sawyer, (Me.
1888) 15 Atl. 67.
Qualification at time of trial sufficient. —
In England it has been held that a physician
may recover for his services, although not
registered at the time they are rendered, if
he appears to be duly registered at the
time of the trial. Turner v. Reynall, 14
C. B. N. S. 328, 9 Jur. N. S. 1077, 32 L. J.
C. P. 164, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 281, 11 Wkly.
Rep. 700, 108 E. C. L. 328.
34. Maxwell v. Swigart, 48 Nebr. 789, 67
X. W. 789; Wickes-Nease v. Watts, 30 Tex.
Civ. App. 515, 70 S. W. 1001. .
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prerequisite to the right to practise.” These decisions apply the principle that
where a statute has for it
s




policy, and prohibits the carrying o
n o
f
a profession, occupation, trade, o
r busi
ness, except in compliance with the statute, a contract made in violation o
f
such
statute cannot be enforced.” The mere fact that the practice o
f
medicine is not
punishable under the penal code, but is in violation o
f




Excuse For Failure to Qualify. A physician is not prevented from recover
ing for attendance before he had registered, where his delay in registering was
owing to the registry clerk's negligence.” S
o
also a physician practising without




law for his services, if
,
during the time o
f
those services, there was no existing board o
f
examiners.” But it has been held





the board, although h
e
made application therefor before his
employment began."
c. Effect o
f Repeal or Amendment of Disqualifying Act. Where a disqualify








unlicensed physician, but renders a contract to perform such services void in it
s
inception, the repeal o
f
such statute does not validate prior transactions, so as to





the repealing act." The same rule applies where the disqualifying




f legal remedy for recovering compensation for
his services, without preventing the accruement o
f
a valid debt, then when such
statute is repealed, which imposes this restraint upon the physician's remedy, h
e





f Disqualifying Act. The revival of an act which
invalidates the contracts o
f
unlicensed physicians revives also the exception o
f
the














. As DePENDENT ON BENEFICIAL RESULT of Services. In the absence of an
express agreement, the right of a physician to be compensated for his services
does not depend upon the measure o
f }
.
success in effecting a cure b
y
the means
employed, but upon diligent exercise, under his employment, o
f
the skill which
commonly pertains to his profession. Such services are regarded as beneficial in
a legal sense, and the right to adequate compensation arises upon their rendition,
whether the outcome be in fact beneficial to the patient o
r
otherwise.”
35. Riley v. Collins, 16 Colo. App. 280, 64
Pac. 1052; Finch v. Gridley, 25 Wend.
(N. Y.) 469.
36. Haworth v. Montgomery, 91 Tenn. 16,
18 S. W. 399.
A penalty imposed by statute implies a
prohibition, and a contract founded on its
violation is void, although not so expressly
declared by the statute. Harrison r. Jones,
80 Ala. 412. One cannot recover compensa
tion for doing an act, to do which is for
bidden by law, and is a misdemeanor. Fox














43; Kenedy r. Schultz,
6 Tex. Civ. App. 461, 25 S. W. 667.
Validity of contract of unlicensed physician
see CoNTRACTs, 9 Cyc. 478 text and note 6.
38. Parish v. Foss, 75 Ga. 439, Jackson,
C
. J., delivering the opinion of the court.
39. Woodside v. Baldwin, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
17,995, 4 Cranch C. C
.
174.
40. Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370, 22 Pac.
880, holding, however, that where the serv
ices are not rendered under an express con
tract, and the law implies a promise to pay
for each visit as made, he may recover for
services rendered the patient after the issu
ance of his certificate.
-
-
41. Quarles v. Evans, 7 La. Ann. 543;
Bailey v. Mogg, 4 Den. (N. Y.) 60; Nicols
v
. Poulson, 6 Ohio 305; Warren v. Saxby, 12
Vt. 146.
42. Richardson v. Dorman, 28 Ala. 679;




767, 3 L. R. A. 43.
43. Hewitt v. Wilcox, 1 Metc. (Mass.) 154.
44. Maddox v. Boswell, 30 Ga. 38; New
som v
. Lindsey, 21 Ga. 365.
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4. As DEPENDENT on WANT of SKILL or Negligence. Whether a physician is
entitled to compensation for his services when he has failed to exercise ordinary
skill or has been negligent in the treatment of a case is a question upon which
there is a conflict of authority. One line of decisions takes the position that if
a physician fails in his duty to exercise ordinary skill and care in treating a patient,
he is guilty of a default in his undertaking, and can recover nothing for his serv
ices.” Other authorities hold that the fact that a physician was guilty of negli
gence in the treatment of his patient, resulting in damages to the latter, does not
necessarily preclude him from recovering any compensation whatever for his
services; the amount of his recovery, if anything, depending on the amount of
damages suffered because of his negligence; in other words he may recover the
value of his services less the amount of damages suffered by reason of his
negligence."
5. As Dependent on Place of Residence or of PerformANCE of SERVICEs. The
provisions of a statute regulating the practice of medicine and surgery apply to
practitioners living without the state, as well as to those within it; and hence no
physician or surgeon, although he may live without the state, will be entitled to
recover fees for services rendered within it
,
unless previously licensed in the man
ner prescribed thereby.” An exception to this rule exists in the case of an emer
gency,” but the right t
o recover is not to b
e
extended beyond the necessity o
f
the





unlicensed physician does not prevent a recovery in that state for
services rendered in another;* but a contract b
y
a physician duly qualified to
practise in the province o
f Quebec, where he has his domicile, to render profes
sional services in one o
f





from practising, is illegal, and n





. As DEPENDENT on INTENTion That Service Should Be GRATuitous. Whether a
Ark. 601, 104 S. W. 164, 12 L. R. A. N. S.
1090.
Illinois.-Yunker v. Marshall, 65 Ill. App.
667.
New Jersey.— Ely v. Wilbur, 49 N
. J. L.
685, 10. Atl. 358, 441, 60 Am. Rep. 668.
Pennsylvania.-Tiedeman v. Loewengrund,
2 Wkly. Notes Cas. 272.
Wisconsin.— Ladd v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35,
92 N. W. 365.
England.— Hupe v. Phelps, 2 Stark. 480,





Although unsuccessful the physician may
b
e entitled to compensation. McClallen v.
Adams, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 333, 31 Am. Dec.






Am. Dec. 388, 31 N. H
.
119, 64 Am. Dec.
323; Gallaher v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio)
466; McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. St. 261;
Seare v
. Prentice, 8 East 348; Hupe v.
Phelps, 2 Stark. 480, 20 Rev. Rep. 726, 3
#º L






46. Patten v. Wiggin, 51 Me. 594, 81 Am.
Dec. 593; Bellinger v. Craigue, 31 Barb.
(N. Y.) 534; Langolf v. Pfromer, 2 Phila.
(Pa.) 17 (holding that a physician cannot
recover a claim for professional services un
less h
e possesses the requisite skill); Alder
v
. Buckley, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 69 (holding,
however, that a surgeon is entitled to com
pensation for an operation not performed
with the highest degree o
f skill, and which
might have been performed more skilfully
by others, provided the operation was bene
ficial to the patient).
Although a physician does not guarantee a
cure, it seems that he should not be permitted
to recover for worthless professional services,
if he has been negligent, unskilful, or un
faithful. Logan v. Field, 192 Mo. 54, 90
S. W. 127.
A physician's contract is entire and per
formance is necessary to entitle the physi
cian to recover anything. Bellinger v.
Craigue, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 534.
47. Whitesell v. Hill, 101 Iowa 629, 70





N. W. 894; Ressequie v. Byers, 52 Wis. 650,
9 N. W. 779, 38 Am. Rep. 775.
48. Spaulding v. Alford, 1 Pick. (Mass.)
3 3
.




. 912, holding that a physician
called from another county, as being the
nearest physician with the requisite skill to
perform an amputation immediately, neces:
sary to save a patient's life, and who had
not sufficient time to procure the license re
quired, can recover for the amputation, but
not for subsequent visits, after he had time
to procure a license. -
50. Adams County v. Cole, 9 Ind. App.
474, 36 N. E
.
912.
51. Downs v. Minchew, 30 Ala. 86, Stone,
J., delivering the opinion of the court.
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physician's services shall be deemed a gratuity or constitute a claim for compen
sation must be determined, it has been held, by the common understanding of
both parties. If they were intended to be and were accepted as a gift or act of
benevolence, they cannot at the election of the physician create a legal obligation
to pay.53 But their character is not controlled by the inexpressed and revocable
intentions of plaintiff, although his purposes subsequently asserted may aid in
ascertaining it.54 Where a pliysieian renders services upon an understanding
between the parties that he was to be remunerated by a legacy, this amounts to an
agreement that he was to make no charge ;** but if the services are performed
under the mere expectation of a legacy, the physician is entitled, on being disap
pointed in his expectation, to recover compensation therefor.56
7. Under " No Cure No Pay " Contract. If a physician commence attending
on a patient, under a contract that if there is no cure there shall be no pay, lie
cannot recover for his services or medicines, unless he shows a performance of
the terms of the contract on his part.57 When, however, a cure has been fairly
effected, the contract cannot be evaded by the fact that the patient subsequently
suffers a recurrence of the same disease.58 Where the contract contains a condi
tion that if a cure is not at first effected, the patient shall submit to further treat
ment, the physician is entitled to the agreed compensation, even though a cure is
not effected, if the patient refuses or neglects to submit to further treatment.59
8. For Medicine Furnished. Under a statute which prohibits the practising of
medicine hy persons who have not complied with the provisions of the statute, it
is unlawful for such unauthorized person to furnish mediciue to another; and he
is not entitled to recover for medicine so furnished.00 Yet if he sells drugs and
medicines apart from his professional business as a physician, he may recover for
them.61
B. Liability For Compensation 62— 1. Liability of Patient63— a. In General
Where a physician renders services to a patient, either under an express employ
ment or with his consent, the law raises an implied promise on the part of the
patient to pay him what the services are reasonably worth.64 So also where, in a
proper case, a physician renders services to a person without his request or con
sent, as where one is injured by an accident rendering him unconscious, the law
53. Prince r. McRae, 84 N. C. 674.
Services held to have been gratuitous see
Packman v. Vivian, 24 Beav. 290, 53 Eng.
Reprint 309.
54. Prince v. McRae, 84 N. C. 674. But
see Kinner c. Tscliirpe, 54 Mo. App. 575,
holding that where a physician rendered
services to a relative with the intention that
such services should be gratuitous, he can
not recover compensation therefor, even
though his patient expected to pav for them.
55. Shallcross v. Wright, 12 Be*av. 558, 14
Jur. 1037, 19 L. J. Ch. 443, 50 Eng. Re
print 1174.
56. Baxter r. Grav, 11 L. J. C. P. 63, 3
M. & G. 771, 4 Scott N. R. 374, 42 E. C. L.
402.
57. Smith r. Hyde, 19 Vt. 54.
58. Fisk tr. Townsend, 7 Yerg. (Tenn.)
146.
59. Madison v. Mangan, 77 111. App. 651
60. Underwood r. Scott, 43 Kan. 714, 23
Pac. 942: Smith r. Tracv, 2 nail (N. Y.l
501; Bailer r. Mogg, 4 "Den. (N. Y.) 60;
Alcott v. Barber, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) 520; Tim-
morman r. Morrison, 14 Johns. (N\ Y.)
369.
61. Holland r. Adams, 21 Ala. 680.
62. Physician's bill as part of wife'a
maintenance see Husband and Wife, 21
Cyc. 1608 note 66.
'63. Contracts of infants for medical at
tendance see Infants, 22 Cyc. 594, text and
note 57.
Liability of husband or wife for medical
services see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc
1220, 1448.
64. Ostland t. Porter, 4 Dak. 98, 25 N. W.
731 (holding that simply removing a person
affected with smallpox, who is not in indigent
circumstances, to a county pest-house against
his will, by order of the county commission
ers, will not render him a pauper, and he
may be held liable for medicines and medical
attendance furnished by a physician who wajs
employed by the county to attend paupers,
when he accepts such services without ob
jection, and receives the benefit thereof) :
Peck v. Hutchinson, 88 Iowa 320. 55 N. W.
511; Prince v. McRae, 84 NT. C. 674: Garrey
t: Starller, 67 Wis. 512, 30 N. W. 787, 58
Am. Rep. 877.
Where a physician was summoned to at
tend his aunt, not in a professional capacity,
but as an adviser in business matters, and
on his arrival he rendered valuable profes
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will imply a promise from him who received the benefit of the services to pay
for them.65
b. For Fees of Consultants. A patient is liable for the fees of a consulting
physician as well as those of the attending physician.*6
c. Conditional Contract. A conditional contract between a patient and his
physician that if he effected a cure he should receive a reasonable compensation
is valid.67
2. Liability op Person Employing Physician For Another 68— a. In General.
The rule that where a person requests the performance of a service and the
request is complied with and the service performed, there is an implied promise to
pay for the services, does not apply where a person requests a physician to per
form services for a patient, unless the relation of that person to the patient is
such as raises a legal obligation on his part to call in a physician and pay for the
services,69 or the circumstances are such as to show an intention on his part to pay
for the services, it being so understood by him and the physician.70 But in a few
sional services, which were accepted by the
aunt, lie is entitled to compensation. Dick
ey's Succession, 41 La. Ann. 1010, 0 So. 798.
65. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104
S. W. 164, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 1090; Pray v.
Stinson, 21 Me. 402.
66. Sherman's Estate, 6 Pa. Co. Ct. 225.
Extent of rule.— This has been held to be
so notwithstanding an agreement between
the patient and the attending physician that
the latter would pay for such services, un
less the consulting physician expressly or im
pliedly assents to such agreement. Slielton
p. Johnson, 40 Iowa 84; Garrev r. Stadler,
67 Wis. 512, 30 N. W. 7S7, 58 Am. Rep. 877.
67. Mock v. Kelly, 3 Ala. 387.
A promise, made while sober, by a habitual
drunkard to a physician, that he would pay
him one hundred dollars, in consideration
of which the physician promised and under
took to cure him of his appetite for ardent
spirits, is binding. Fisk r. Townsend, 7
Yerg. (Tenn.) 146.
The mere fact that no compensation is
agreed on in case the patient is cured does
not transform the entire express contract
into an implied one, so as to authorize re
covery in case of failure to cure. Davidson
r. Biermann, 27 Mo. App. 655.
68. Liability of husband for medical serv
ices to wife see Husband and Wife, 21 Cyc.
1220, 1449.
Liability of master: For treatment of ap
prentice see Apprentices, 3 Cyc, 552. For
treatment of servant see Mastek and Serv
ant, 26 Cyc. 1049.
Operation of statute of frauds to promises
of third persons to pay for physician's serv
ices see Frauds, Statute of, 20 Cyc. 160
et serj.
Physician or surgeon for wounded em
ployee, authority to employ, see Corpora
tions, 10 Cvc. 926.
69. Starre'tt r. Miley, 79 111. App. 658;
Holmes p. McKim, loo' Iowa 245, 80 X. W.
329: Williams v. Briekell, 37 Miss, f.82, 75
Am. Doc. 88: Meisenbach p. Southern Coop
erage, 45 Mo. App. 232. See also Shaw r.
Graves, 79 Ale. 166, 8 Atl. 884, holding that
an action to recover for medical services
rendered at the request and for the benefit
of a person for whose support a bond has
been given by defendants cannot be main
tained against defendants, there being no
implied authority on the part of such per
son to obtain such assistance at their ex
pense or credit.
A special request by a father to a phy
sician to attend upon a child of full age, for
whom he is not bound to provide, although
lying sick at the father's house, it has been
held, raises no implied promise on the part
of the father to pay for the services. Rankin
l'. Beale, 68 Mo. App. 325 ; Crane v. Baudou-
ine, 55 N. Y. 256; Boyd r. Sappington, 4
Watts (Pa.) 247.
While a child is under no legal obligation
to support a parent or receive him into his
family, yet, if he does receive him into the
family, he is prima facie responsible for
services which he calls upon a physician to
perform for the benefit of such parent. Hen-
tig P. Kernke, 25 Kan. 559. Where parents
conveyed property to their daughter in con
sideration of her agreement to support, and
to pay for necessary medical services ren
dered them, a physician rendering necessary
services to the parents can recover therefor
from the daughter, although he first ren
dered his bill to the mother, without knowl
edge of the agreement. Rounsevel t. Osgood,
68 N. H. 418, 44 Atl. 535.
70. Dorion r. Jacobson, 113 111. App. 563;
Smith v. Watson, 14 Vt. 332.
Illustrations. —Where W ssnt a telegraphic
despatch to an infirmary as follows:
" I have
just learned of L.'s accident. Show him
every attention, and I will pay expenses,"
it was held that the despatch authorized the
procurement of a physician not connected
with the infirmary, and obligated W to pay
for whatever services were rendered by him.
White v. Mastin, 38 Ala. 147. Where an
employee of one of the members of a firm
was seriously injured by machinery, and the
person who telephoned to the surgeon, who
thereupon attended such employee, testified
that both the members of the firm directed
him to say to the surgeon that the firm
sent for him, a verdict against the firm for
[V, B, 2, a]
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states it is held that one who requests a physician to attend another professionally,
without indicating that he acts as agent or messenger, is liable for the physician's
charges.71
b. For Subsequent Visits. If one engages a physician to attend an urgent
case, and makes no limitation as to time, he is liable to such physician for all
subsequent visits, until his services are dispensed with.78
8. Third Person Assuming Liability After Services Begun. There is nothing
in the ordinary relation between a physician and his patient which will prevent
the former from discontinuing his services on the account of the latter, and enter
ing into a contract with another for the payment of the charges for his subse
quent attendance, and the assent of the patient to the making of such contract is
not necessary.73
C. Amount of Compensation — 1. In General — a. In Absence of Contract.
Where the services of a physician are performed on request, and no agreement is
made in respect to them, the law raises an implied promise to pay so much as the
services are reasonably worth.71 There is no presumption of law as to the value
of a physician's services,75 nor that a jury can ascertain their value without testi
mony from persons knowing something about it.76 The question of what is
reasonable is peculiarly within the province of the jury ; 77but they have no right
to ignore the testimony, and form an independent conclusion.78 A physician can-
the surgeon's bill for such attendance should
not be set aside as unsupported by the evi
dence. Till v. Redus, 79 Miss. 125, 29 So. 822.
Intention communicated to physician.—
Where the physician is aware of the fact
that one requesting his services acted merely
as a messenger, and did not intend to make
himself personally liable for the services to
be rendered, there can of course be no re
covery against the messenger. Smith v. Rid-
dick, 50 N. C. 342. If, however, defendant
intended, and gave the physician to under
stand that he was the employer, and the
original credit was given to him, then he
is liable. Clark v. Waterman, 7 Vt. 76, 29
Am. Dec. 150.
The reason of this rule is that to hold one
liable under these circumstances would deter
everyone from doing the charitable office
of going after a doctor for a sick neighbor.
Williams v. Brickell, 37 Miss. 682, 75 Am.
Dec. 88; Meisenbach v. Southern Cooperage
Co., 45 Mo. App. 232; Smith v. Riddick, 50
N. C. 342.
71. Foster v. Meeks, 18 Misc. (N. Y.)
461, 41 N. Y. Suppl. 950. See also Grattop
v. Rowheder, 1 Nebr. (Unoff.) 660, 95 N. W.
C79 (holding that one who calls a physician
for a member of his family, although not
a relative, is liable for services rendered,
without notice that the party who calls him
does not intend to make himself liable) ;
Best v. McAuslan, 27 R. I. 107, 60 Atl. 774.
Illustration. — Where a person calls at the
office of a physician, and in the absence of
the latter leaves his business card, with this
message written on it, " Call on Mrs. D. at
No. 769 Broadway," and gives the card to a
clerk in the office with a request to hand it
to the physician and to tell him to " come
as soon as possible," he becomes liable to
pay the physician*s bill in attending on Mrs.
D in pursuance of such message. Bradley r.
Dodge, 45 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 57.
72. Dale v. Donaldson Lumber Co., 48 Ark.
188, 2 S. W. 703, 3 Am. St. Rep. 224.
73. White v. Mastin, 38 Ala. 147.
74. Starrett V. Miley, 79 111. App. 658;
Peck v. Martin, 17 Ind. 115; Morrell c. Law
rence, 203 Mo. 363, 101 S. W. 571.
Where a patient requires unusual atten
tion, compensation for operations and i-Lme
spent in addition to the regular visits is
properly allowed. Short's Succession, 45 La-
Ann. 1485, 14 So. 184.
A violation of his contract by a physician
should be taken into consideration to reduce
a claim for services rendered. Savles c.
FitzGerald, 72 Conn. 391, 44 Atl. 733" (hold
ing that, in an action by a physician for
services, testimony in defense that an opera
tion was performed in the cellar, and that it
was an unfit place for the operation, was
competent on the question of the reasonable
ness of plaintiff's charge therefor) ; Piper r.
Menifee, 12 B. Mon. (Ky.) 405, 54 Am. Dec.
647.
75. Wood v. Barker, 49 Mich. 295, 13
N. W. 597.
76. Wood v. Barker, 49 Mich. 295, 13
N. W. 597.
77. Marshall v. Bahnsen, 1 Ga. App. 485,
57 S. E. 100G; Crumrine v. Austin, 133 Mich.
283, 94 N. W. 1057.
The infinite variety of the circumstances
surrounding the performance of professional
services precludes the establishment of any
fixed rate of compensation which could be
applied to more than a very restricted class
of cases and the more common class of serv
ices. Heintz v. Cooper, (Cal. 1896) 47 Pac
360.
The existence of epidemics does not au
thorize exorbitant fees. Collins v. Graves, 13
La. Ann. 95.
78. Wood v. Barker, 49 Mich. 295, 13
X. W. 597; Ladd v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35, 92
N. W. 365.
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not sustain a claim for larger compensation for non-expert services than an ordi
nary man would be entitled to for the same services, on the ground alone that, as
an expert in his profession, his time is more valuable than that of ordinary men.79
b. Under Contract. When a valid contract has been made as to the amount
of the compensation to be paid for medical services, no question as to the actual
value of the services can arise.80
2. Elements to Be Considered in Estimating Amount — a. Customary Charge.
A physician is entitled to recover the ordinary and reasonable charges usually
made for such services by members of the same profession of similar standing.81
Therefore, to prove the value of such services, customary charges of physicians
for like services in the same locality or neighborhood may be shown ; 83 but proof
of what plaintiff charged another person for similar services is not admissible,83
except in connection with proof that such charge was made at his usual rate, and
that this rate was known to defendant.84
b. Nature of Disease or Injury. It is competent for a physician to show the
nature of his patient's disease or injury and its mode of treatment, in order to
prove the value of his services.85
e. Professional Standing. In an action by a physician for professional serv
ices, he may show that his professional standing is nigh, as bearing on the value
of his services,84 provided hisgeneral professional reputation is drawn in question.87
d. Skill and Learning. Evidence of a physician's learning and skill is com
petent to be shown in estimating the value of his services.88
e. Daily Income. In determining the value of a physician's services it is
immaterial what his average daily income from his profession was or had been.89
Where witnesses differ as to the proper
charge for a physician's services, it has been
held that the correct rule is to allow the
lowest estimate. Duclos' Succession, 11 La.
Ann. 406.
79. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Friend, 86 111.
App. 157 ; Stockbridge v. Crooker, 34 Me.
349, 56 Am. Dec. 662.
But the jury may take into consideration
the exhausting studies, and the time con
sumed and expense incurred in acquiring pro
fessional knowledge and skill. Stockbridge v.
Crooker, 34 Me. 349, 56 Am. Dec. 662.
80. See cases cited infra, this note.
Where a sum is agreed upon with refer
ence to the length of time the physician
estimated the treatment would continue, the
amount agreed upon may be recovered, al
though the treatment, which continued for
some weeks thereafter, did not continue for
the whole period estimated. Denenholz v.
Kelly, 97 N. Y. Suppl. 389.
A promise not to charge more than a cer
tain amount is binding. Thomas' Estate, 6
Pa. Co. Ct. 642.
A contract in the alternative is valid and
enforceable. Doyle v. Edwards, 15 S. D. 648,
91 N. W. 322, holding that a contract to pay
a physician from two hundred dollars to four
hundred dollars for the performance of a
surgical operation was binding and valid for
two hundred dollars and the value of the
services, up to four hundred dollars, upon
proof of such value.
Money or certificate of skill — Where a
contract for medical treatment called for five
thousand dollars in cash or a certificate of
plaintiff's skill, it was held that the five
thousand dollars was not a penalty for re
fusal of the certificate, and therefore, no cer
tificate being given, such amount could be
recovered as compensation for the services.
Burgoon v. Johnson, 194 Pa. St. 61, 45 Atl.
65.
81. Marshall v. Bahnsen, 1 Ga. App. 485,
57 S. El 1006.
82. Jonas v. King, 81 Ala. 285, 1 So. 591.
Different character of services. — Evidence
as to the customary charge for services of a
different character from those alleged in the
complaint is inadmissible. Trenor v. Cen
tral Pac. R. Co., 50 Cal. 222.
83. Collins v. Fowler, 4 Ala. 647; Marshall
«. Bahnsen, 1 Ga. App. 485, 57 S. E. 1006.
84. Paige v. Morgan, 28 Vt. 565, holding
further that proof of his ordinary charge to
other persons in the vicinity, and that his
rates were well known and by defendant, is
admissible, on the part of a physician, to
show the amount which defendant impliedly
promised to pay.
85. Kendall v. Grey, 2 Hilt (N. Y.) 300.
86. Marshall v. Bahnsen, 1 Ga. App. 485,
57 S. E. 1006; Lange v. Kearney, 4 N. Y.
Suppl. 14 [affirmed in 127 N. Y. 676, 28
N. E. 255].
The extent of a physician's practice is ad
missible as tending to show his professional
standing. Sills v. Cochems, 36 Colo. 524, 85
Pac. 1007.
87. Morrell r. Lawrence, 203 Mo. 363, 101
S. W. 571.
88. Heintz v. Cooper, (Cal. 1896) 47 Pac.
360; Morrell v. Lawrence, 203 Mo. 363, 101
S. W. 571; Millener v. Driggs, 10 N. Y. St. 237.
89. Marion County v. Chambers, 75 Ind.
409: Thomas v. Caulkett, 57 Mich. 392, 24
N. W. 154, 58 Am. Rep. 369.
[V. C, 3, «]
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f. Loss of Other Practice. In determining the compensation of a physician
for services rendered in compliance with a patient's request to give them exclu
sively for a time, to the abandonment of other practice, the probable but not the
actual loss in other practice may properly be considered."0
g. Financial Condition of Patient. There is a conflict in the authorities as to
whether it is proper to prove the value of the estate of a person for whom medi
cal services have been rendered, or the financial condition of the person receiving
such services, to affect the reasonableness of the physician's charge. In some
jurisdictions such evidence is held to be admissible for this purpose.91 In others
the financial condition of the patient may not be considered,98 except in rebuttal
of evidence from the other side attempting to show the custom of a lower stand
ard,93 or where there is evidence of a recognized usage, which has grown into a
custom, to graduate professional charges in reference to the financial condition of
the patient, so that it may be considered that the services were rendered and
accepted in contemplation of it.94 Whatever may be the true principle governing
this matter in contracts, the financial condition of a patient cannot be considered
where there is no contract and recovery is sustained on a legal fiction which raises
a contract in order to afford a remedy which the justice of the case requires.**
3. Opinion Evidence. Physicians may give their opinions as experts as to the
value of the services rendered in an action for compensation.96 But one not a
physician is not competent to express his opinion as to the value of such services.*7
Nor does it make any difference that a competent witness has previously, in his
hearing, testified as to such value.93
D. Actions Fop Compensation 99— l. Nature and Form of Remedy. Indebi
tatus assumpsit lies on a physician's bill for medicines, travel, and attendance.1
2. Defenses. In a suit for services rendered by a physician to his patient, a
showing that plaintiff's services were of no value, and that the treatment nsed
was worthless and could not produce a cure, will in some jurisdictions defeat a
recovery.2 On this same ground a plea of recoupment or counter-claim, spring
ing out of the contract, may be filed ;3 but a plea of set-off, based on a tort in
giving defendant an overdose of medicine, has been held improper as matter of
defense.4 Iutoxication sufficient to render a physician incompetent to perform
his duty is a defense to an action for compensation ; but one who, knowing of the
intemperate habits of a physician, continues to employ him, cannot set up such
defense.5 The fact that a physician was unable, from illness, to render future
90. Maddin r. Head, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 664.
91. Haley's Succession, 50 La. Ann. 840, 24
So. 285; Czarnowski V. Zeyer, 35 La. Ann. 796.
92. Morrissett v. Wood, 123 Ala. 384, 26
So. 307, 82 Am. St. Eep. 127; Robinson r.
Campbell, 47 Iowa 625.
93. Morrell r. Lawrence, 203 Mo. 363, 101
S. W. 571.
94. Morrissett r. Wood, 123 Ala. 384, 26
So. 307, 82 Am. St. Rep. 127; Lange v.
Kearney, 9 N. Y. St. 793.
95. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104
S. W. 164, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 1090, holding
that the financial condition of the patient
may not be considered on the question of
amount of compensation of surgeons who
were called and rendered services to the
patient when unconscious from accident.
96. MacEvitt c. Maass, 64 X. Y. App. Div.
382, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 158 [affirming 33 Misc.
552, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 817].
This is so, although the witnesses state
that they have no knowledge as to what
other physicians charge for such services, but
base their opinions on what they think the
services are worth. Marion County p. Cham
bers, 75 Ind. 409.
97. Mock v. Kelly, 3 Ala. 387.
98. Mock p. Kelly, 3 Ala. 387.
99. Recovery of judgment for compensa
tion as bar to action for malpractice see
Judgments, 23 Cyc. 1205, 1206.
1. Pynchon V. Brewster, Quincy (Mass.)
224. But see Glover v. Le Testue, Quincy
(Mass.) 225 note, holding that indebitatus
assumpsit will not lie for visits and medi
cine where there was no contract for a cer
tain price.
Assumpsit generally see Assumpsit, Ac
tion of, 4 Cyc. 317.
2. Logan r. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594. See
also Coyne v. Baker, 2 Cal. App. 640, 84 Pat
269.
In other words evidence that will sustain
an action against a physician for malpractice
will defeat his recovery in an action for com
pensation. Logan r. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594.
3. McKleroy t. Sswell, 73 Ga. 657.
4. McKleroy r. Sewell, 73 Ga. 657.
5. McKleroy v. Sewell, 73 Ga. 667.
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professional services for winch a note was given is a complete defense to an action
<mthe note.6 A statute prohibiting an unauthorized practitioner from recovering
liis fees may of course be pleaded in defense to an action therefor;1 but the
failure of a physician to register, under an ordinance imposing a penalty for
practising in the city without having registered, is immaterial in such an action.8
3. Pleading 9— a. Declaration or Complaint. In an action by a physician for
services rendered, it is almost uniformly held that it will be presumed that he has
complied with all statutory requirements essential to his authority to practise
medicine, and the complaint need not allege such compliance.10 An allegation of
qualification at the time of filing the pleading is not a sufficient allegation of
qualification and authority to engage in practice and recover compensation for
services performed months before the commencement of the action.11
b. Plea or Answer. Want of authority to practice need not be specially
pleaded in defense to an action for medical services rendered.13 But to authorize
the defense of recoupment or counter-claim, defendant should either plead the
matter specially, or else plead the general issue, and, at the same time that plea is
interposed, give notice of the special matter relied on.13 .
4. Issues and Proof. Malpractice, if given in evidence to defeat entirely a
physician's claim, is admissible under the general issue without notice ; if merely
to reduce the claim, then notice should be given.14 So where the answer in an
action for medical services admits the services, but denies the value alleged,
defendant may show under such allegation that the treatment by plaintiff was
unskilful.15 Under the common counts for a quantum me?'uit, it is competent for
defendant to prove the real value of the services, or that they were of no value.1*
In an action by a physician for servicee, under an allegation that " plaintiff
rendered professional services," he cannot prove services rendered by another
physician acting for him."
5. Evidence 18— a. Presumptions and Burden of Proof— (i) In General.
In an action by a physician to recover his fees, the burden is on him to prove that
he is a physician, that he was employed as such by defendant, that he rendered
the services alleged, and the value of such services. He need not prove their
value to defendant.1*
(n) As to Qualification. While there is some conflict in the decisions, the
6. Powell v. Newell, 59 Minn. 406, 61
IT. W. 335.
7. Berry v. Scott, 2 Harr. & G. (Md.) 92.
In Maryland the statute prohibiting an un
authorized practitioner from recovering his
fees cannot be availed of unless notice is
given of intention to dispute the physician's
claim. Berry v. Scott, 2 Harr. & G. 92.
8. Prietto v. Lewis, 11 Mo. App. 601.
9. Pleading generally see Pleading.
The affidavit for arrest in action for medi
cal services, in the Canadian practice, must
allege that plaintiff is a duly registered
physician. Turner v. Connelly, 35 Can. L. J.
N. S. 540; Jones c. Gress, 25 U. C. Q. B.
594.
10. Lyford v. Martin, 79 Minn. 243, 82
N. W. 479; Webster v. Lamb, 15 S. D. 292,
89 N. W. 473. Compare Bedford Belt R. Co.
r. McDonald, 12 Ind. App. 620, 40 N. E. 821.
As against objection to evidence. — A com
plaint in an action for services as physician
ia sufficient, as against an objection to evi
dence, although it does not allege that plain
tiff received a diploma from some medical
college, or was a member of a state or county
medical societv, as provided by Wis. Rev. St.
I 1436. Rider v. Ashland County, 87 Wis.
160, 58 N. W. 236.
11. Westbrook V. Nelson, 64 Kan. 436, 67
Pac. 884.
12. Matthews v. Turner, 2 Stew. & P.
(Ala.) 239.
Under the general issue in assumpsit, evi
dence of want of authority to practise may
be given. Matthews V. Turner, 2 Stew. & P.
(Ala.) 239.
13. McLure v. Hart, 19 Ark. 119.
14. See Schopen v. Baldwin, 83 Hun
(N. Y.) 234, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 581.
15. Schopen r. Baldwin, 83 Hun (N. Y.)
234, 31 N. Y. Suppl. 581.
16. Jones v. King, 81 Ala. 285, 1 So. 591.
17. Sayles v. PitzGerald, 72 Conn. 391, 44
Atl. 733.
18. Evidence generally see Evidence, 16
Cyc. 821.
19. Styles v. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 30 Atl.
165.
Medical services cannot be regarded other
than as beneficial; they are so in a legal
sense. Ely v. Wilbur, 49 N. J. L. 685, 10
Atl. 358, 00 Am. Rep. 668. See also supra,
V A 1.
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decided weight of authority seems to be in favor of the rule that in a suit for
professional services a license or due qualification under the law will be presumed,
and the burden of proving want of authority is upon defendant30
(in) As to Employment. In an action for fees, the burden is on the
physician to prove his employment.'1
(iv) As to Necessity of Visits. In an action by a physician to recover the
value of professional services, plaintiff is deemed the best and the proper judge of
the necessity of frequent visits ; and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, the
court will presume that all the professional visits made were deemed necessary,
and were properly made.28
(v) As to Skill and Care. In an action by a physician to recover for pro
fessional services the presumption is that such services were performed in an
ordinarily skilful manner, and where want of such skill in their performance is
alleged as a defense, the burden of proof is on defendant.23 Furthermore, where
want of skill and care- is set up in defense to his action for services, the burden
of proof is on defendant to show that no want of care on his own part tended to
consummate the injury complained of by him."
(vi) As to Change of Liability For Services. Where a physician in the
beginning renders his services solely on his patient's responsibility, in the absence
of a special contract, he has the right to discontinue, and enter into a contract
with another to become responsible for his subsequent services, and in such case
the burden is on him to show, not only a discontinuance, or a proposal to discon
tinue, but also an agreement on the part of the third person to become responsible.25
20. Illinois.—Jo Daviess Countv v. Staples,
108 111. App. 539; Good v. Las'her, 99 111.
App. 653. Compare North Chicago St. R.
Co. v. Cotton, 140 111. 486, 29 N. E. 899.
Iowa.— Lacy v. Kossuth County, 106 Iowa
18, 75 N. W. 689.
Louisiana. — Dickerson V. Gordy, 5 Rob.
489; Prevosty v. Nichols, 11 Mart. 21.
Montana.— Leggat v. Gerrick, 35 Mont. 91,
88 Pac. 788, 8 L. R. A. N. S. 1238.
Nebraska.— Cather v. Damerell, 5 Nebr.
(Unoff.) 490, 99 N. W. 35.
New York.— Thompson v. Sayre, 1 Den.
175; McPherson v. Cheadell, 24 Wend. 15.
South Carolina. — Crane v. MeLaw, 12
Rich. 129.
South Dakota.— Webster v. Lamb, 15 S. D.
292, 89 N. W. 473.
See 39 Cent. Dig. tit. " Physicians and
Surgeons," § 56.
Contra.— Mays v. Williams, 27 Ala. 267;
Adams r. Stewart, 5 Harr. (Del.) 144;
Bower v. Smith, 8 Ga. 74 ; Dow v. Haley, 30
N. .1. L. 354.
The reason why the license will be pre
sumed, where there is no evidence to the con
trary, rests upon the principle that, when an
act is required by positive law to be done, the
omission of which would be a misdemeanor,
the law presumes that it
,
has been done, and
therefore the party relying on the omission
must make some proof of it, although it be a
negative. Chicago v. Wood, 24 111. App. 40;
Leggat v. Gerrick, 35 Mont. 91, 88 Pac. 788,
8 L. R. A. N. S. 1238; Golder v. Lund, 50
Nebr. 807, 70 N. W. 379.
Where no restrictions imposed by statute.
— In an action to recover for professional
services as a veterinarian, plaintiff must
prove his qualification in such profession,
where the statute imposes no restrictions or
qualifications on a person practising such
profession. Conkey v. Carpenter, 106 Mich.
1
,
63 N. W. 990.
An exception to the rule stated in the
text has been made where the statute ex
pressly provides that no action shall lie in
favor of any person for services as physi
cian unless he shall have been legally licensed
prior to the rendering of the services claimed
for. In such case it is necessary for plain
tiff, in an action for medical services ren
dered, to prove that he was duly licensed in
order to make out a prima facie case.
Cooper v. Griffin, 13 Ind. App. 212, 40 N. E.
710.
21. Weldon t'. Lehigh Valley Traction Co.,
27 Pa. Super. Ct. 257, holding that where a
physician brings an action against a street
railway company to recover for professional
services rendered to an injured passenger,
and plaintiff avers that he was employed to
render such service bv the claim agent o{
defendant, the burden is on plaintiff to show
that the claim agent had general authority
to employ a physician, or special authority
in the particular instance, or that his en
gagement of plaintiff was ratified by de
fendant, or that defendant had so held him
out as its agent that it was estopped in
denving his authority.
22. Todd t?. Myres, 40 Cal. 355; Ebner r.
Mackev, 186 111. 297, 57 N. E. 834, 78 Am.
St. Rep. 280. 51 L. R, A. 29S {affirming 87
111.App. 306].
23. Styles t. Tyler, 64 Conn. 432, 30 AtL
165; Robinson v. Campbell, 47 Iowa 025.
24. Baird v. Morford, 29 Iowa 531.
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(vn) As to Promise to Compensate. Medical attendance being valuable,
the law presumes a promise to pay,58 unless it clearly appears that the services
rendered were intended to be gratuitous.*7
b. Admissibility. In an action by a physician for professional services, evi
dence is admissible to prove or disprove the existence of a special contract;28 to
show want of skill on the part of the physician," and that his treatment was of
no benefit j3
0 to show the understanding of the parties as to the person liable for
the services rendered ;S
1
and to prove or disprove a promise to pay.32 Evidence as
to the result of the treatment by a physician subsequently employed is inadmis
sible, as his treatment cannot alter the value of plaintiff's services.33 Irrelevant
and immaterial evidence is of course inadmissible.34
c. Weight and Sufficiency.
' In an action by a physician for his fees, the cus
tomary rules as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence apply.35 It is not,
however, necessary that all the items of a physician's account should be strictly
proved ; 88 he may recover by establishing the fact of his habit of keeping correct
books of account, and that the account sued upon had been correctly copied from
his books.37 But evidence that plaintiff practised in defendant's family, and was
seen going and returning from defendant's house, coupled with proof that the
26. In re Scott, 1 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.)
234
27. Ross v. Ross, 6 Hun (N. Y.) 182, hold
ing that where it appears that for a portion
of the services included in a physician's ac
count no charge was intended to be made, it
cannot be presumed that it was intended to
charge for the other portions. In this re
spect one part of the account cannot be
legally distinguished from the other.
Affirmative evidence that the services were
gratuitously rendered must be produced in
order to defeat a claim for compensation.
In re Scott, 1 Redf. Surr. (N. Y.) 234.
28. Hollywood t. Reed, 55 Mich. 308, 21
N. W. 313 (holding that one's financial con
dition is irrelevant to the question of whether
he bargained with a physician on the " no
cure no pay" basis) ; Doyle v. Edwards, 15
S. D. 648, 91 X. W. 322 (holding that in an
action to recover for professional services
under a special contract, a bill previously
presented, not mentioning the contract, is in
admissible to disprove that such a contract
was made).
Professional standing.— Evidence that a
physician who is suing for services rendered
is not of good repute is not competent to
disprove his employment. Prietto v. Lewis,
1 1 Mo. App. 601 ; Jeffries v. Harris, 10 N. C.
105.
29. McDonald v. Harris, 131 Ala. 359, 31
So. 548, holding that evidence by the pa
tient's wife that plaintiff had stated that he
would effect a permanent cure in three
months is admissible, but only for the pur
pose of showing a want of ordinary skill.
Evidence of declarations of plaintiff as to
the character of deceased's complaint, and
directions as to its treatment, made out of
the presence and hearing of deceased, are
relevant to show that plaintiff was mistaken
in his diagnosis, and prescribed erroneous
treatment. McDonald v. Harris, 131 Ala.
359. 31 So. 548.
Wortblessness of medicine used.— In an ac
tion by a physician to recover an agreed fee
under a contract to cure defendant " or no
pay," where it is shown that defendant re
fused to submit to treatment, defendant may
prove that the medicine used was worthless,
and to do so may compel plaintiff, on cross-
examination, to testify as to the ingredients
of which it was composed. Jonas v. King,
81 Ala. 285, 1 So. 591.
30. Pickler v. Caldwell, 86 Minn. 133, 90
N. W. 307.
31. Morrell v. Lawrence, 203 Mo. 363, 101
S. W. 571.
32. Bremerman v. Hayes, 9 Pa. Super. Ct.
8
,
holding that evidence that the ethics of
the medical profession forbid physicians from
charging each other for services, and that it
was the custom of physicians in a particular
locality not to charge for such service, is ad
missible to negative an implied promise of
one physician to pay for services rendered by
another.
33. Gardner p. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370, 22 Pac.
880.
34. Curry v. Shelby, 90 Ala. 277, 7 So.
922; Molt v. Hoover, (Ind. App. 1907) 81
X. E. 221 ; Kwiecinski t\ Newman, 137 Mich.
287, 100 N. VV. 391.
35. Simmons v. Means, 8 Sm. & .M. (Miss.)
397.
Evidence held sufficient to support verdict
for plaintiff see Brown v. Murrell, (Ark.
1891) 16 S. W. 478; Head v. American Bridge
Co., 88 Minn. 81, 92 N. W. 467; Atchison,
etc., R. Co. i>. Jones, 9 Nebr. 67, 2 N. W.
363; MacEvitt v. Maass, 64 N. Y. App. Div.
382, 72 N. Y. Suppl. 158 [affirming 33 Misc.
552, 67 N. Y. Suppl. 817] ; McBride v. Watts,
1 McCord (S. C.) 384.
Verdict held contrary to evidence see Mc
Coy v. Fletcher, 89 N. Y. App. Div. 623, 85
N. Y. Suppl. 1022; Abrahams r. Koch, 88
N. Y. Suppl. 148; Abram r. Krakower, 84
N. Y. Suppl. 529.
36. Hazlip t'. Leggett, 6 Sm. & M. (Miss.)
326.






1604 [SO Cye.] PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
items, as charged, were according to customary rules, will not create a legal pre
sumption of indebtedness by defendant.88 Conceding that a physician must prove
his right to practise before he can collect his bill, slight evidence is sufficient as
against one who called him.39 A receipt "in full for medical services" is prima
facie a satisfaction of the claim against the patient,40 and the presumption of pay
ment in full thus raised is not overcome by expert testimony that the services
were worth more than the account receipted for/1
6. Questions For Jury.42 It is for the jury to determine whether or not a
physician has exercised reasonable care and skill in the treatment of his patient*
7. Instructions. The instructions in an action by a physician for his fees must
conform to the pleadings and the evidence,44 and once given need not be repeated.45
Where malpractice is relied upon as a defense, it is reversible error for the court
to refuse to instruct the jury that, if they find as a fact plaintiff was guilty of mal
practice, he cannot recover for such services.46 An instruction is erroneous which
confines the jury, in the determination of the value of the services rendered, to a
consideration of the benefits resulting to defendant therefrom ; 47 but in some juris
dictions an instruction that if the patient received no benefit, and the result was
due to the physician's lack of skill or care or failure to exercise the same, he was
entitled to no compensation, is proper.48
8. Review. A verdict plainly against the evidence will beset aside.4' Where
the evidence is sufficient to raise an inference of malpractice, a verdict for defend
ant will not be 'disturbed.50 Conceding the necessity of proof of due qualification
by a physician in an action to recover for his services, the question cannot be raised
for the first time in the appellate court.51
VI. MEDICAL SOCIETIES."
A medical society, incorporated under the laws of the state, has the power to
make by-laws, even in the absence of express authority, to regulate the condnct
of its members, and provide for their admission and expulsion.53 This power,
even when conferred by statute, is not an arbitrary, unlimited power. The rules
adopted must be reasonable, and adapted to the purposes of the society, and they
38. Simmons v. Means, 8 Sm. & M. (Miss.)
397.
39. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Smith, 21 III.
App. 202, holding that where plaintiff testi
fied, without objection, that he had practised
since 1T72, and that he had a certificate, as
required by the state board, and it appeared
that his name appeared on the register of
physicians in the county clerk's office, it is
enough as against defendant, who called him,
and thereby recognized his right to practise.
40. Danziger r. Hoyt, 120 N. Y. 190, 24
N. E. 294 [affirming 46 Hun 270], holding
that a receipt " in full for his medical serv
ices," given by a physician to the patient's
mother, at whose request the services were
rendered, and who was recognized by the
physician as acting in the patient's behalf in
making payment, is prima facie a satisfac
tion of the claim against the patient,
although the latter did not authorize the
payment.
41. Danziger v. Hovt, 120 N. Y. 190, 24
N. E. 294 [affirming 40 Hun 270].
42. Value of services as question for jury
see supra, V, C, 1, a.
43. Logan v. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594.
44. Hinkle v. Burt, 94 Ga. 506, 19 S. E.
828, holding that where defense is made on
the theory that the services were worthless,
there is no error in not instructing the jury
on the subject of partial failure of considera
tion.
45. McKnight t>. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 135
Mich. 307, 97 N. W. 772.
46. Abbott v. Mayfield, 8 Kan. App. 387,
50 Pac. 327.
47. Ladd v. Witte, 116 Wis. 35, 92 N. W.
305.
48. Logan v. Field, 75 Mo. App. 594.
49. Wheaton v. Johnson, 55 111. App. 53,
holding that where, in an action for physi
cian's services, the rendition of the services
and the value thereof were not disputed, the
only question raised being whether they were
performed under an express contract to pay
a certain sum therefor, a verdict for defendant
will be reversed on appeal.
50. Brinkman v. Kursheedt, 84 N. Y.
Suppl. 575.
51. Durand v. Grimes, 18 Ga. 693; Hud-
eon v. Madison, 75 111.App. 442.
52. Medical college: Appointment of hos
pital physician by see Hospitals, 21 Cyc.
1108 note 22. Cannot enjoin board of health
see Injunctions, 22 Cyc. 881 note 73.
53. Bryant r. District of Columbia Dental
Soc, 26 App. Cas. (D. C.) 461.
An initiation fee may be demanded from
physicians and surgeons becoming members
[V, D, 6, o]
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS— PICKPOCKET [30 Cyc] 1605
cannot be made contrary to or inconsistent with the laws of the state.54 Further
more, the code of medical ethics adopted is obligatory on members alone, and its
non-observance previous to membership furnishes no legal cause either for exclu
sion or expulsion.55 A medical society, being a body corporate, has the power of
removal or expulsion of its members as an incident to its constitution ; but it can
not be exercised without a previous conviction or indictment in a criminal court
for the offense charged, except where the offense relates merely to the official or
corporate character of the accused, and amounts to a breach of the conditions
expressly or tacitly annexed to his franchise or office.56 Whether or not a mem
ber has violated a by-law providing for expulsion for "unprofessional conduct"
is a question to be determined by the corporation ; and the courts cannot sit as
appellate tribunals to review the judgments of the corporate authorities, unless
their authority be transcended, or fraud or bad faith be shown.57 A member of
the medical society of a county who is expelled cannot resort to a court of law
for relief until he has appealed to the state medical society, where such a method
of procedure is provided for.58
PHYSIOLOGY. The science of the functions of all the different parts and
organs of animals and plants, the offices they perform in the economy of the
individual, their properties, etc.1
PIANOS. See, generally, Exemptions.
PIAZZA. An entrance of a dwelling-bouse.8 (See Entry.)
PlCCAGE. In English law, a term applied where the liberty of erecting a stall
in a market is secured and the soil is broken in erecting the same.8
PICKED. Synonymous with selected.4
PICKER. A machine used in connection with the carpet industry.5
PICKET. See Labor Unions.
PICKETING. See Labor Unions.
PICKPOCKET. A thief, one who in a crowd or in other places steals from the
pockets or person of another without putting him in fear.6 (See, generally,
Larceny ; Robbery.)
of county medical societies. People v. New
York Medical Soc, 3 Wend. (N. Y.) 426.
54. People r. Erie County Medical Soc,
24 Barb. (X. Y.) 570, holding that a regu
lation fixing a tariff of fees for medical serv
ices was void, as being unreasonable and
against public policy.
55. People v. Erie County Medical Soc,
32 N. Y. 187 [affirming 25 How. Pr. 333],
56. Fawcett v. Charles, 13 Wend. (N. Y.)
473, holding that a county medical society
cannot expel or remove a member because he
did not possess the requisite qualifications
and obtained his admission by false pretenses.
57. Bryant v. District of Columbia Dental
Soc, 26 App. Cas. (D. C.) 461 (holding that
the action of the society in expelling a mem
ber will not be interfered with by the court,
where it appears that the authorized proce
dure has been duly followed ; and it is not
essential that the evidence on which the
eharpes are based shall have been submitted
to the whole society) ; Gregg v. Massachu
setts Medical Soc, 111 Mass. 185, 15 Am.
Rep. 24 (holding that where the offense with
which a member is charged is against his
duty as an incorporator, it can only be tried
by the corporation, and there can be no inter
ference by injunction on a bill filed against
the society).
58. People v. Dutchess County Medical
Soc, 84 Hun (N. Y.) 448, 32 N. Y. Suppl.
415.
1. In re Hunter, 60 N. C. 372.
2. Henry v. State, 39 Ala. 679, 681, where
it is said: "A piazza is not a house, and
cannot be a dwelling-house It may be at
tached to the house, and may, in some sense,
be a part of the house; but it is not, of
itself, a house. To be in such a piazza, is
not to be in a house."
3. Draper v. Sperring, 10 C. B. N. S. 112,
125, 30 L. J. M. C. 225, 4 L. T. Rep. N. S.
365, 9 Wkly. Rep. 656, 100 E. C. L. 112.
4. Labbe v. Corbett, 69 Tex. 503, 507, 6
S. W. 808.
5. Creachen v. Bromlev Bros.' Carpet Co.,
209 Pa. St. 6, 7, 57 Atl. 1101, where the
machine is described as " composed of a
rotative cylinder with a number of projec
tions — sharp steel projections — that come
in contact with wool that is fed between two
rollers, and that take the stock of wool from
the apron. And while the rollers are hold
ing it these flying projections of steel tear it
apart and cause it to become disintegrated,
so that it follows in the course of the manu
facture.
6. Bouvier L. Diet, [quoted in State c.
Dunn, 60 Kan. 483, 484, 71 Pac. 811].
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